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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
Email ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 


















Filing Fee:  $221.00 
   
Comes now Rebecca Parkinson, Plaintiff herein, who as and for a cause of action 
pleads and alleges as follows: 
FACTS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS 
1. Plaintiff, Rebecca Parkinson (Parkinson), is a divorced woman, residing in 
Ada County, Idaho. 
2. Defendant James A. Bevis (Bevis), is an attorney, with his principal place of 
business in Ada County, Idaho, and who resides in Ada County, Idaho. 
3. In July of 2014, Parkinson hired Bevis to represent her as an attorney in 
divorce proceedings with her now former husband, Joe Parkinson. 
4. During the course of Bevis’ representation of Parkinson, Bevis, without 
Parkinson’s knowledge or consent, shared attorney-client confidential information with Joe 
Parkinson’s attorney, Stanley Welsh. 
Electronically Filed
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5. During the course of the Bevis representation of Parkinson, on information 
and belief, Bevis was complicit with Welsh in securing a divorce for Joe Parkinson on terms 
more favorable to Joe Parkinson than with his client Rebecca Parkinson. 
6. During the course of the Bevis representation, Bevis failed to fully and 
adequately represent Parkinson, including but not limited to, a full and compete evaluation 
of the true value of the community real property held by the Parkinson community. 
COUNT I – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
7. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all preceding paragraphs herein as though fully 
set forth.  
8. Bevis, as Parkinson’s attorney, was subject to ethical and fiduciary duties to 
Parkinson during his representation of her in the divorce proceedings. 
9. Upon information and belief, Bevis breached his duties to Parkinson by, 
among other things, disclosing attorney client privileged communications to Welsh during 
the course of the divorce proceedings, all to Parkinson’s damage in an amount to be proven 
at time of trial. 
ATTORNEY’S FEES 
Parkinson has been required to retain an attorney duly licensed in the State of Idaho 
to prosecute this action, and has agreed to pay said attorney a reasonable attorney’s fee. The 
Court should award the sum of $5,000.00 as a reasonable attorneys fee should this matter be 
resolved by default, and such additional and further sums as the Court deems reasonable 
should this matter be contested. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
1. That pursuant to Count One, Parkinson be awarded her damages as proven 
at time of trial; 
000007
COMPLAINT 
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2. That Parkinson be awarded her costs, and reasonable attorney fees in an 
amount not less than $5,000 should this matter be resolved by a Default Judgment, and such 
other and further sums as the Court deems reasonable in the proceedings and necessarily 
incurred in this action; and 
3. That Parkinson be awarded such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just. 
DATED May 10, 2017. 
 




Kim J. Trout 
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
Email ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 



















   
TO: JAMES E. BEVIS, AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD 
 
NOTICE:  YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE NAMED 
PLAINTIFF.  THE COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU 
WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 
DAYS.  READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
 
1. You are hereby notified that in order to defend the lawsuit, an appropriate 
written response must be filed with the above designated court at 200 W. Front St., Boise, 
ID, within 20 days after service of this Summons on you.  If you fail to so respond the Court 
may enter judgment against you as demanded by the Plaintiff in the Complaint. 
2. A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons.  If you wish to seek 
the advice or representation of an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that 
your written response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected. 
Electronically Filed
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3. An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule 10 and other 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
a. The title and number of this case. 
b. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain 
admissions or denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses 
you may claim. 
c. Your signature, mailing address, and telephone number, or the 
signature, mailing address and telephone number of your attorney. 
d. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiff’s 
attorney as designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the 
Clerk of the above-named Court. 










Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
ISB #8380; adl@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
Electronically Filed 
11/17/201711:35 AM 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk 
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JAMES E. BEVIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV0l-17-08744 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
JUDGE RICHARD GREENWOOD 
WITHOUT CAUSE 
Defendant by and through its undersigned counsel of record, Duke Scanlan & Hall, 
PLLC, hereby moves this Court for an order disqualifying the Honorable Richard Greenwood 
from presiding in further proceedings herein without cause pursuant to Rule 40(a) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE RICHARD GREENWOOD WITHOUT CAUSE - 1 
000012
DATED this 17th day ofNovember, 2017. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
By Isl Keely E. Duke 
Keely E. Duke - Of the Firm 
Aubrey D. Lyon - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of November, 2017, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document using the iCourt E-File system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to 
the following persons: 
KimJ. Trout 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
!SJ iCourtlEmail 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
Isl Keely E. Duke 
Keely E. Duke 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE RICHARD GREENWOOD WITHOUT CAUSE - 2 
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Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
ISB #8380; adl@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
Electronically Filed 
12/1/2017 3:38 PM 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By: Lori Ferguson, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




JAMES E. BEVIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV0l-17-08744 
DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 
IRCP 12(b)(6) 
Defendant James A. Bevis (incorrectly identified as "James E. Bevis"), by and through 
his undersigned counsel of record, Duke Scanlan & Hall, PLLC, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12(b )( 6), moves this Court to dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff. 
This motion is supported by the record before this Court and for the reasons set forth in 
the memorandum of points and authorities filed concurrently herewith. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(6)-1 
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DATED this 1st day of December, 2017. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
By Isl Keely E. Duke 
Keely E. Duke - Of the Firm 
Aubrey D. Lyon - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of December, 2017, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document using the iCourt E-File system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to 
the following persons: 
KimJ. Trout 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
!SJ iCourtlEmail 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
Isl Keely E. Duke 
Keely E. Duke 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(6)-2 
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Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
ISB #8380; adl@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
Electronically Filed 
12/1/2017 3:38 PM 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By: Lori Ferguson, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




JAMES E. BEVIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV0l-17-08744 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 
IRCP 12(b)(6) 
Defendant James A. Bevis (incorrectly identified as "James E. Bevis"), by and through 
his undersigned counsel of record, hereby submits this memorandum in support of his Motion to 
Dismiss Pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated herein, Mr. Bevis respectfully 
requests that the Motion be granted. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson alleges her former attorney, Defendant James A. Bevis, 
disclosed attorney-client communications and filed a claim against him. However, Mrs. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(6) - 1 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(6) - 2 
Parkinson’s cryptic Complaint fails to allege sufficient information to put Mr. Bevis on notice of 
the nature of her suit against him.  Even if the Complaint does allege sufficient facts to support a 
cause of action, Mrs. Parkinson alleges the incorrect cause of action.  For these reasons, her 
Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This matter arises from a divorce wherein Mr. Bevis represented Mrs. Parkinson.  Mrs. 
Parkinson’s complaint against Mr. Bevis is skeletal.  She alleges Stan Welsh represented Mr. 
Parkinson, and that Mr. Bevis shared confidential attorney-client information with Mr. Welsh 
without Mrs. Parkinson’s consent.  (Compl. ¶ 4.)  She further alleges that Mr. Bevis was 
complicit with Mr. Welsh in securing a divorce that was more favorable to Mr. Parkinson than 
Mrs. Parkinson.  (Compl. ¶ 5.)  She further alleges that Mr. Bevis failed to obtain a full and 
complete evaluation of the marital property.  (Compl. ¶ 6.) 
Mrs. Parkinson alleges only one cause of action against Mr. Bevis, which is “breach of 
fiduciary duty.”  (See Compl.)  Mrs. Parkinson only includes her allegation that Mr. Bevis 
disclosed privileged communications as a basis for her “breach of fiduciary duty” cause of 
action.  (Compl. ¶ 8-9.)  She alleges that Mr. Bevis’s breach was “all to Parkinson’s damage,” 
without providing any allegations regarding how she was allegedly damaged. (Compl. ¶ 9.)  Mrs. 
Parkinson waited two years to file her complaint against Mr. Bevis, then waited a full six months 
to serve the complaint. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
A complaint which lacks allegations sufficient to state a claim for relief can be dismissed.  
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  “A 12(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to determine whether a claim 
for relief has been stated.”  Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 833, 243 P.3d 642, 649 (2010).  
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(6) - 3 
“While we ‘will make every intendment to sustain a complaint that is defective, e.g., wrongly 
captioned or inartful, a complaint cannot be sustained if it fails to make a short and plain 
statement of a claim upon which relief may be granted.’”  Id. at 843–44 (internal citations 
omitted).  “We look at whether the complaint puts the adverse party on notice of the claims 
brought against it.”  Id. 
When a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is considered, “the non-moving 
party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in his favor. After drawing all 
inferences in the non-moving party's favor, we then ask whether a claim for relief has been 
stated.”  Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted).  In order to withstand a motion to dismiss, the nonmoving 
party must allege all essential elements of the claims presented.  Johnson v. Boundary School 
Dist. No. 101, 138 Idaho 331, 334, 63 P.3d 457, 460 (2003). 
ARGUMENT 
A. Mrs. Parkinson improperly styled her cause of action as “breach of fiduciary duty” 
 
“Malpractice by any other name still constitutes malpractice.” Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 
228, 232, 775 P.2d 120, 124 (1989).  When an attorney breaches a fiduciary duty owed to a non-
client, the non-client may have an action for breach of fiduciary duty.  Jones v. Runft, Leroy, 
Coffin & Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 614, 873 P.2d 861, 868 (1994).  However, 
“[l]egal malpractice has traditionally been treated as the proper claim where an attorney breaches 
his or her duty, which arises from the attorney-client relationship.”  Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 
616, 621, 272 P.3d 1247, 1252 (2012).  An “action against one's attorney for damages resulting 
from the manner in which the attorney represented the client constitutes an action for malpractice 
within the meaning of [the statute of limitations for malpractice], regardless of whether 
l ‘ ill t i l
t i
t t f li f t d.’  . 3
t . “  W f
i it.   
is “t  
ti l r Vi . t l
r ' li f
t t .”  i Ketchu
Cit t t . Wi s
l l nti l f .   l
ist. 0.   
s r t f t re f fi t
alpr  til t l ti .”  
 t fi  
t f . , , 
ffi  tthe s,    
[1  i ll W tt
t , tt l l ti i . 
i ' tt l
t t t
i f t f itatio le f W t
IS  
( )( ) -
000017
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(6) - 4 
predicated upon contract or tort or whether for indemnification or for direct damages.”  Griggs, 
116 Idaho at 232.  “Under Idaho law, in determining which statute of limitations applies to a 
cause of action, courts must focus on the substance, rather than the form of a plaintiff's 
allegations.”  Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 159 Idaho 103, 105, 356 P.3d 1049, 1051 (2015); see 
also Bishop, 152 Idaho at 621.  “[T]he focus in Idaho is not on the remedy sought or the type of 
damages, but on the source of the damages.”  Id. at 105 n.3. 
In this case, Mrs. Parkinson attempts to characterize her cause of action as a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty, even though the alleged conduct arose from the manner in which Mr. 
Bevis represented his client.  As the Idaho Supreme Court held in Bishop, the law on this point is 
clear: legal malpractice is the proper claim where a client alleges the attorney breached his duty 
arising from the attorney-client relationship.  Mrs. Parkinson’s allegations fail to state a claim for 
relief, as discussed below.   
Even if they are sufficient to state a claim, the appropriate claim is for attorney 
malpractice, not breach of fiduciary duty.  Mrs. Parkinson appears to make this curious 
designation of her cause of action to qualify for the four-year catchall statute of limitation 
provided in Idaho Code section 5-224 rather than the shorter, two-year limitation period provided 
in Idaho Code section 5-219(4).  See Jones, 125 Idaho at 614.  Idaho law is not meant to be so 
tortured.  The Idaho Supreme Court instructed in Boy Scouts, Bishop, and other cases that the 
substance of a claim matters more than the form alleged.  Because the substance of Mrs. 
Parkinson’s factual allegations are for attorney malpractice, but she is not pursuing that cause of 
action, she failed to allege a viable cause of action.  See Bishop, 152 Idaho at 621 (dismissing 
improperly characterized cause of action for failure to state a claim).  Mrs. Parkinson’s 
Complaint should be dismissed. 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(6) - 5 
B. Mrs. Parkinson failed to allege sufficient information upon which relief can be 
granted. 
 
1. Mrs. Parkinson failed to allege a duty 
“The elements of a legal malpractice actions are: (a) the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) failure to perform the duty; 
and (d) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of the damages to the 
client.”  Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 845, 243 P.3d 642, 661 (2010).  The disclosure of 
attorney-client communications is not a per se breach of fiduciary duty or malpractice because 
attorney-client communications that are intended to be delivered to a third party are not 
confidential and privileged.  See Farr v. Mischler, 129 Idaho 201, 207, 923 P.2d 446, 452 (1996) 
(“To be a confidential communication the communication must ‘not be intended to be disclosed 
to third persons.’”).   
Here, Mrs. Parkinson’s single cause of action lacks an allegation that Mr. Bevis had a 
duty to maintain all attorney-client communications as confidential or that he improperly 
disclosed privileged information that was not intended for disclosure.  Mrs. Parkinson alleges 
that Mr. Bevis “was subject to ethical and fiduciary duties to Parkinson during his representation 
of her in the divorce proceedings.”  (Compl. ¶ 8.)  She then alleges only, “Upon information and 
belief, Bevis breached his duties to Parkinson by, among other things, disclosing attorney client 
privileged communications to Welsh during the course of the divorce proceedings, all to 
Parkinson’s damage in an amount to be proven at time of trial.”  (Compl. ¶ 9.)  Mrs. Parkinson 
does not identify the allegedly privileged communication that was disclosed or allege that she 
instructed Mr. Bevis to keep the communication private.  She ignores that it is a frequent 
occurrence for a client to convey information to her attorney that she wants presented to the 
opposing side.  An attorney does not commit malpractice by complying with the client’s wishes 
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and conveying the information, even if the information could be privileged had its disclosure not 
been intended.  Absent an allegation that Mr. Bevis disclosed an attorney-client communication 
that was intended to be kept private, Mrs. Parkinson has failed to state a claim that a breach 
occurred.     
2. Mrs. Parkinson failed to allege causation and damages 
Two elements of an attorney malpractice cause of action are causation and damages.  
Taylor, 149 Idaho at 845.  In Spur Prod. Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 44, 122 P.3d 
300, 303 (2005), a client brought an attorney malpractice action against its former attorney for 
allegedly improperly disclosing confidential attorney-client communications.  The client alleged 
that, as a proximate result of the attorney misconduct, the client was deprived of its opportunity 
to enter into arbitration and thereby incurred damages.  Id.  In reviewing the case, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the causation allegation was sufficient to state a claim for relief.  Id. 
In contrast to Spur Products, in this case Mrs. Parkinson has not put Mr. Bevis on notice 
as to how she alleges Mr. Bevis caused her damage.  In Spur Products, the client alleged that the 
attorney misconduct caused the client to miss an opportunity to enter arbitration, and that missed 
opportunity was damaging.  Here, Mrs. Parkinson does not allege the nature of her damages.  
She does not allege she was monetarily damaged or otherwise make an allegation to show that 
she has a recoverable claim.  All she alleges is that Mr. Bevis breached a duty “all to Parkinson’s 
damage in an amount to be proven at time of trial.”  (Compl. ¶ 9.)  She alleges Mr. Bevis’s 
breach was to disclose privileged information, but the disclosure of privileged information is not 
inherently damaging.  This is not like a car accident where a plaintiff alleges she was hurt or a 
medical malpractice case where a patient alleges she was injured by an unnecessary surgery.  
Here, all Mrs. Parkinson alleges is that Mr. Bevis disclosed privileged information and that she 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
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was damaged.  That is not sufficient to put Mr. Bevis on notice as to what he is defending 
against. 
3. Mrs. Parkinson’s cause of action relies upon an unsupported factual contention 
Factual contentions in a pleading must have “evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery.”  I.R.C.P. 11(b).  While a pleading need not be supported by a 
complete factual investigation, Rule 11 requires “at least a reasonable inquiry into the facts of the 
case prior to filing a complaint.”  Riggins v. Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1022, 895 P.2d 1210, 1215 
(1995). 
Here, Plaintiff cannot meet Idaho’s liberal pleading standard.  The crux of Mrs. 
Parkinson’s single cause of action is the allegation that Mr. Bevis “breached his duties to 
Parkinson by, among other things, disclosing attorney client privileged communications to 
Welsh during the course of the divorce proceedings.”  (Compl. ¶ 9.)  However, this allegation is 
prefaced by the phrase, “Upon information and belief.”  (Compl. ¶ 9.)  That phrase, upon 
“information and belief,” is used only one other time in Mrs. Parkinson’s complaint.  As used 
here, to qualify some allegations but not others, a reasonable inference is that Mrs. Parkinson 
intends the phrase as a caveat to provide some protection in case the Court later determines that 
she had no basis for the contention.  It is a sign that Mrs. Parkinson does not know whether an 
attorney-client communication was improperly disclosed, which is insufficient factual support 
for a pleading.  See Delphix Corp. v. Actifo, Inc., No. C 13-4613 RS, 2014 WL 4628490, at *1–2 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014) (granting dismissal because allegations relied heavily upon were 
cabined with “on information and belief” and suggested undue speculation).   
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(6) - 8 
The fundamental purpose of notice pleading is to put the defendant on notice as to the 
claim that is being asserted against him.  The contentions in a complaint must have some 
evidentiary support, and at least a reasonable inquiry into the facts is required before filing a 
complaint.  Mrs. Parkinson’s Complaint is so devoid of factual allegations regarding the basis of 
her claim that Mr. Bevis cannot divine what he is defending against.  Furthermore, Mrs. 
Parkinson’s unwillingness to make a firm allegation as to the fundamental facts of this action 
suggest this action is an improper fishing expedition of an unhappy former client who agreed to 
her settlement in writing in the presence of her attorney, Mr. Parkinson, and Mr. Parkinson’s 
attorney. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant James A. Bevis respectfully requests that this Court 
grant his Motion to Dismiss because Mrs. Parkinson failed to state a claim. 
DATED this 1st day of December, 2017. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
 
 
By /s/ Keely E. Duke    
Keely E. Duke – Of the Firm 
Aubrey D. Lyon – Of the Firm 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of December, 2017, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document using the iCourt E-File system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to 
the following persons: 
Kim J. Trout 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
~ iCourt/Email 
ktrout@trout -law. com 
Is/ Keely E. Duke 
Keely E. Duke 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(6)- 9 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
 





























Case No. CV-01-17-8744 
 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
I decline to grant the motion to disqualify without cause, but also will not deny it at this 
time.  It is incumbent on the party making a motion to entitlement to the relief sought. A motion 
to disqualify without cause  under I.R.C.P. 40(a) must be made “not later than 21 days after 
service or receipt of a complaint, summons, order or other pleading indicating or specifying who 
the presiding judge to the action will be.”  Ordinarily the Court accepts the date of service of the 
complaint and summons as reflected in the proof of service as the controlling date, when the 
motion is not filed within 21 days after the issuance of the summons. In this case there is no 
proof of service and the summons was in May 2017, nearly seven months ago.  There is nothing 
in the motion or otherwise of record that shows when Defendant was served or otherwise 
received notice of the assignment of the judge.  I have an obligation under the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Cannon 2, Rule 2.7, to serve in cases to which I am assigned unless disqualification is 
required.  I take that duty seriously and know of no reason at present that would require my 
disqualification other than the pending motion.   
I I
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ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 2 
 
I also recognize that the ability to disqualify a judge without cause is a procedure valued 
by both bench and bar and do not dismiss it lightly.  For that reason, rather than deny the motion, 
I will give counsel the opportunity to file an affidavit or other document showing the date of 
receipt of “a complaint, summons, order or other pleading indicating or specifying who the 
presiding judge to the action will be.”   
DATED:  ____________________ 
 
       ___________________________ 
       RICHARD D. GREENWOOD 
       District Judge  
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Signed: 12/13/2017 04:39 PM
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 2017, 1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
PO. Box 7387 
Boise, ID 83707 
Kim J. Trout 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 10] 
Boise, ID 83703 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 3 
( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Certified Mail/Return Receipt 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Email ked@dukescanlan.com 
adl@dukescanlan.com 
( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Cenified Mail/Return Receipt 
( )Hand Delivered 
( )Facsimile 
(X) Email ktrout@trout-law.com 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
By 
Deputy Clerk





Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Rebecca Parkinson 
vs. 
James A. Bevis 
For: 
Trout Law, PLLC 
3778 Plantation River Dr. , Ste. 101 
Boise, ID 83703 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiff(s): 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
Defendant(s): 
Case Number: CV01-17-08744 
:ss 
) 
Received by Tri-County Process Serving LLC on November 9, 2017 to be served on JAMES A. BEVIS. 
I, Kasey L. Vink, who being duly sworn, depose and say that on Friday, November 10, 2017, at 10:36 AM, 
1: 
SERVED the within named person(s) by delivering to and leaving with JAMES A. BEVIS a true copy of the 
Summons and Complaint. Said service was effected at 412 E. Parkcenter Blvd., Ste. 211 , Boise, ID 
83706. 
I hereby acknowledge that I am a Process Server in the county in which service was effected. I am over 
the age of Eighteen years and not a party to the action. 
Our Reference Number: 163417 
Client Reference: Kim J. Trout 
,,",,, .. uu,,,,,, 
,,, ~ON Ro '•, 
........ ~~ ········ ~~ ',, 
..... ~ .·· ··.~',.., 
f~l ~OTI\R \~~ 
TRI-COUNTY PROCESS ~ERVING LJc \ ;..<. ~ 
- • we .., • • 
P.O. Box 1224 : : : .. 
Boise, ID, 83701 \<f)..\ ..0(;8 Ll C l f 
(208) 344-4132 .. , .. .,:·... ..·::o .. : 
, , "r. ••••• ."\" ..... 
'•,, <: 0 F \\) t'- ,,,, ,,, ,, ............. 
Subscribed and sworn before me today 
Frida~ November10,2017 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires on November 2 
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; keddukescanlan‘com 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
ISB #8380; adl@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
PO. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REBECCA PARKlN SON , 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV01-17-08744 
vs. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
JAMES E. BEVIS, DISQUALIFY JUDGE RICHARD 
GREENWOOD WITHOUT CAUSE 
Defendant. 
Based on Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify Judge Richard Greenwood, he is disqualified 
Without cause as the presiding judge in this matter, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
40(3). 
DATED this day of November, 2017. 
Honorable Richard Greenwood 
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE RICHARD GREENWOOD WITHOUT 
CAUSE - l
Signed: 12/19/2017 01:25 PM
Signed: 12/20/2017 01:28 PM
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CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of November, 2017, I electronically filed 
the foregoing document using the iCourt E-File system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing 
to the following persons: 
Kim J. Trout El US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
TROUT LAW, PLLC D Hand Delivered 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 D Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
Boise, ID 83703 X iCourt/Email 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 ktrout@trout-law.com 
Attorneys for PlaintflRebecca Parkinson 
Keely E. Duke E] US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Aubrey D. Lyon |:I Hand Delivered 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC D Overnight Mail 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 D Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
Boise, ID 83702 X iCourt/Email 




ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE RICHARD GREENWOOD WITHOUT 
CAUSE - 2





Filed: December 20. 2017 at 1 :52 PM 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By : A l.4te+1t J tv Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 






Case No. CV01-17-08744 
Notice of Reassignment 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case has been reassigned to the 
Honorable Jonathan Medema. 
Dated: 12/20/2017 
Christopher D. Rich 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: .Jtusten] oseyli 
Deputy Clerk 
ANY OTHER HEARINGS CURRENTLY SET WILL HAVE TO BE RESET WITH THE NEWLY 
ASSIGNED JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this day I served a copy of the attached to: 
Kim Jay Trout 
3778 Plantation River Drive Ste 101 
Boise I D 83703 
Keely Elizabeth Duke 
PO Box 7387 
Boise I D 83707 
Aubrey Dean Lyon 
PO Box 7387 
Boise ID 83701 
Dated: 12/20/2017 
@ NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT 
] By mail 
[ ] By mai l 
[ ] By mail 
By: AiM~t"e¥VJ~rv 
Deputy Clerk 
[ x ] By e-mai l 
[ x ] By e-mai l 
[ x ] By e-mai l 
1 
000031
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
ISB #8380; adl@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
Electronically Filed 
1/16/2018 9:08AM 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REBECCA PARKINSON, 
Case No. CV01-17-08744 
Plaintiff, 
vs. NOTICE OF HEARING 
JAMES E. BEVIS, 
Defendant. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, defendant James A. Bevis by and through his counsel of 
record, Duke Scanlan & Hall, PLLC, have set before this Court to be heard his Motion to 
Dismiss Pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(6). Said motion is set to be heard before the Honorable 
Jonathan Medema on the 61h day of February, 2018, at 3:00pm at the Ada County Courthouse, 
Boise, Idaho. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
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DATED this 16th day of January, 2018. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
By Is/ Keely E. Duke 
Keely E. Duke- Of the Firm 
Aubrey D. Lyon- Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of January, 2018, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document using the iCourt E-File system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to 
the following persons: 
Kim J. Trout 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ISJ iCourt/Email 
ktrout@trout -law. com 
Is/ Keely E. Duke 
Keely E. Duke 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
__________________ 
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT 







   
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson submits this Memorandum in Response to Defendant James A. 
Bevis’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).   
RESPONSE ARGUMENTS 
1. Idaho’s Liberal Standards for Pleadings and Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissals: 
Idaho follows a notice pleading standard: “Pleadings serve the purpose of stating the nature 
of the action brought so as to put the other party on notice, and to declare the relief sought.  Unlike 
common law pleading and code pleading, perfection is not required; imperfections are not fatal.  
Pleadings serve to frame the issues so that an orderly trial can ensue, and a just resolution be pursued.  
Lawsuits are quests for the truth and justice; trials should no longer be waged in the pleading state.” 
Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 328, 715 P.2d 993, 998 (1986) (concurring opinion). 
Idaho also follows a liberal Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal standard: “A court may grant a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only when it appears beyond doubt that the 
Electronically Filed
1/30/2018 3:48 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
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Response to Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion to Dismiss | Page 2 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief.” 
Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
Bevis acknowledges these standards in his motion. (Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, pp. 2-3, citing Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 843, 243 P.3d 642, 659 (2010)). However,  
Bevis then proceeds to wage a trial on the pleadings in his arguments. To do this, Bevis transmutes 
Parkinson’s only claim, i.e. breach of fiduciary duty, into something it is not, i.e. legal malpractice, and 
then attacks the illusory malpractice claim for its alleged deficiencies. (Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss, pp. 3-4). This approach is a calculated abuse of the Idaho pleading and dismissal 
standards. As demonstrated herein, Parkinson states a valid a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The 
Court, if necessary, must allow Parkinson the opportunity to amend her claim to repair any of its 
alleged deficiencies.  
2. Parkinson Properly Characterizes her Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim:  
Parkinson properly characterizes her claim as one of breach of fiduciary duty. “The 
relationship of client and attorney is one of trust, binding an attorney to the utmost good faith in fair 
dealing with his client, and obligating the attorney to discharge that trust with complete fairness, 
honor, honesty, loyalty, and fidelity. For a breach or violation of those professional duties, the client 
may hold the attorney liable or accountable.” Blough v. Wellman, 132 Idaho 424, 426, 974 P.2d 70, 72 
(1999). This claim is distinct from a legal malpractice claim. Persuasive case law says: 
“A breach of fiduciary duty claim has been described as ‘entirely different’ from a legal 
malpractice claim. One way in which these claims are different is the damages that a plaintiff 
can recover. A breach of fiduciary duty claim is an equitable claim for which a defendant can 
be required to disgorge all compensation received during the time it was breaching the 
fiduciary duty, even if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate a financial loss. Wenzel v. Hopper & 
Galliher, P.C., 830 N.E.2d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); see also Prime Mortg. USA, Inc. v. 
Nichols, 885 N.E.2d 628, 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (‘we have previously held that one 
breaching a fiduciary duty may be required to disgorge all compensation received during the 
breach’). Conversely, ‘the measure of damages in a legal malpractice case is the value of the 
plaintiff's lost claim.’ Schultheis v. Franke, 658 N.E.2d 932, 939-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
(Hill Fulwider P.C. v. Swindell-Dressler Int'l Co., No. 1:15-cv-01554-JMS-TAB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14472, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2017) (emphasis added)).  
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 Parkinson is not asking Bevis for the value of any lost divorce claims. Rather, Parkinson seeks 
relief from the breach of her attorney-client confidences. This point is clear from paragraphs ¶ 4, 7-9 
of the Complaint.  Parkinson’s remedies of disgorgement and forfeiture of attorney fees are implicit 
in her breach of fiduciary duty claims. These remedies are also encompassed in her general prayer for 
“such other and further relief as the Court deems just.” (Complaint, p. 3). Idaho case law confirms 
this point: “As a rule, in an equitable action, any relief may be granted consistent with the averments 
of the complaint, under a prayer for general relief.” Barker v. McKellar, 50 Idaho 226, 236-37, 296 P. 
196, 200 (1930).  
3. Disgorgement and Forfeiture are Valid Remedies for Breach of Fiduciary Duty: 
In Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2001) (“Rockefeller I”), the Idaho Supreme 
Court explains that forfeiture of fees is an appropriate remedy against an agent who breaches his 
fiduciary duty to his principal. Before Rockefeller I, the Court had only sparsely developed its 
forfeiture doctrine. Not surprisingly, the Court in Rockefeller I relied on non-Idaho case law to further 
develop the doctrine. Citing to the Texas case Burrow v. Arce, the Rockefeller I Court lists several 
factors that should be considered in any Idaho forfeiture analysis. These factors include: the gravity 
and timing of the violation, its willfulness, its effect on the value of the agent’s work for the principal, 
threatened or actual harm, and the adequacy of other remedies. (Id., p. 642). The Court further explains 
that harm is not necessarily the controlling factor in a proper forfeiture analysis: 
“Allowing an agent to retain his entire commission as a matter of law when he has breached 
his fiduciary duties would eviscerate agency law. Secure in his compensation from the principal 
as long as the assigned task is completed, an agent's only chance of loss from violating his 
duties would be if he harmed the principal. The higher requirement of acting in the interest of 
the principal, without a means of enforcement, would simply cease to exist.” 
(Id., p. 642). Importantly, the Court’s forfeiture framework (which it borrowed from the Texas case 
Burrow v. Acre) relies on the language in Section § 37 of the Restatement 3d of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, “Partial or Complete Forfeiture of a Lawyers Compensation.” That section reads:  
“A lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client may be required to forfeit 
some or all of the lawyer's compensation for the matter. Considerations relevant to the 
question of forfeiture include the gravity and timing of the violation, its willfulness, its effect 
on the value of the lawyer's work for the client, any other threatened or actual harm to the 
client, and the adequacy of other remedies.” 
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(Id.). Given that the Court adopted this language in Rockefeller I, it is important to detail some of the 
relevant comments and illustrations on forfeiture by the Restatement drafters: 
• “The remedy of fee forfeiture presupposes that a lawyer’s clear and serious violation of a duty 
to a client destroys or severely impairs the client-lawyer relationship and thereby the 
justification of the lawyer’s claim to compensation.”  
• “The damage that misconduct causes is often difficult to assess. In addition, a tribunal often 
can determine a forfeiture sanction more easily than a right to compensating damages.” 
• “A violation is clear if a reasonable lawyer, knowing the relevant facts and law reasonably 
accessible to the lawyer, would have known that the conduct was wrongful.” 
• “To warrant fee forfeiture a lawyer's violation must also be serious. Minor violations do not 
justify leaving the lawyer entirely unpaid for valuable services rendered to a client, although 
some such violations will reduce the size of the fee.” 
• “Whether the breach involved knowing violation or conscious disloyalty to a client is also 
relevant.” 
• “Conduct constituting malpractice is not always the same as conduct warranting fee forfeiture. 
A lawyer's negligent legal research, for example, might constitute malpractice, but will not 
necessarily lead to fee forfeiture.” 
(Id.). These comments establish that disgorgement and forfeiture are valid remedies for breach of a 
fiduciary duty. Parkinson is entitled to these remedies under her existing fiduciary claims.   
4. Bevis Breached his Duty of Confidentiality to Parkinson: 
Parkinson has evidence that Bevis shared her confidential client information with opposing 
counsel, Stan Welsh. (Complaint, ¶ 4). This fact is enough to put Bevis on notice of the nature of his 
particular breach. Idaho Rules. Prof’l Conduct 1.6 on confidential client information says: “A lawyer 
shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed 
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure 
is permitted.” The official comments to this Rule further explains:  
“A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's 
informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation…this 
contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.  The client is 
thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the 
lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter… The rule of client-lawyer 
confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer 
through compulsion of law.  The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters 
communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the 
representation, whatever its source.”  
(Id., Comments [2] and [3]). This is a comprehensive rule. It applies to all case-related client 
information, including any personal or embarrassing client information.  
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 Bevis misconstrues this Rule by citing to Farr v. Mischler, 129 Idaho 201, 923 P.2d 446 (1996), 
in which the Court says: “To be a confidential communication the communication must ‘not be 
intended to be disclosed to third persons.’” (Id., p. 207). But the Court in that case is referencing the 
attorney-client privilege rule under I.R.E. 502, which protects against a forced disclosure in a trial or 
discovery context. That narrow rule is different from Idaho Rules. Prof’l Conduct 1.6, which requires 
attorneys to keep all case-related information confidential as a matter of course, unless authorized or 
compelled otherwise. Bevis’s notion that Parkinson must designate each communication to Bevis as 
“confidential,” at the risk of disclosure, is an ethical fabrication, not grounded in reality, and a 
substantial distortion of his duty.    
 As seen in Trout’s supporting declaration, Bevis committed a clear and serious breach of 
Parkinson’s confidences. In a May 17, 2015 email, Bevis says to Stan Welsh:  
“This is all I have received from Becky around 2 PM yesterday. I told you about it yesterday. 
I sent emails to her about it and she has not responded. I will forward them to you. I will try 
to look at your exhibits today.” 
(Declaration of Kim J. Trout in Support of Response to Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion to 
Dismiss, Exhibit A).1 Bevis then proceeds to forward to Stan Welsh all of Parkinson’s post-mediation 
emails about the settlement. (Id., Exhibit A). In one particularly long and personal email, dated May 
12, 2015, Parkinson vents her frustrations at Bevis—telling him that he failed to stand up to her at the 
mediation and that her husband got the better of her in the final settlement. (Id.). This was a personal, 
embarrassing communication which pertained to the value of Bevis’s services. Bevis had no good 
reason to disclose it. In fact, Bevis’s May 17, 2015, email only references the “yesterday” emails, 
meaning the emails dated May 16, 2015. By disclosing Parkinson’s other private emails, Bevis left 
Parkinson with feelings of shame and inferiority as to how she faired in divorce. (Id., Exhibit A).  
                                            
1 In light of the declaration filed concurrently herewith, Parkinson asks the Court to rule on this motion under I.R.C.P. 
56: “If matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is converted 
into a summary judgment motion under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Syringa Networks, Ltd. Liab. Co. 
v. Idaho Dep't of Admin., 159 Idaho 813, 824, 367 P.3d 208, 219 (2016). To the extent it does not consider the declaration, 
Parkinson asks the Court to consider Defendant’s statements contained in Exhibit A as an admission of a party opponent, 
and evidence as providing a valid basis to amend her pleadings.   
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 Admittedly, Bevis’s breach did not affect the substance of Parkinson’s divorce, as the parties 
had already settled at the time of his emails. Instead, the breach impaired the value of Bevis’s services. 
Parkinson paid Bevis a substantial sum of money to stand by her and put forward her very best case. 
However, Bevis was blatantly and objectively disloyal to Parkinson, betraying her self-respect by 
willingly and intentionally giving over sensitive communications to her husband’s attorney. 
The fact that this did not ‘harm’ Parkinson’s divorce case is immaterial. The Court in Rockefeller 
v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 P.3d 450 (2003) (“Rockefeller II), says: “The weight to be given the 
various factors [in Rockefeller I] was within the discretion of the district court.” (Id., 544). The Court 
should consider the grievous nature of Bevis’s betrayal, even though it did not cause any lasting 
financial damages. The Court should not allow Bevis to expose Parkinson’s vulnerabilities just because 
the case is near over. The Court must apply the forfeiture principles in Rockefeller I to insure 
deterrence of this kind of disloyalty by Bevis, and others in the future:  
“Allowing an agent to retain his entire commission as a matter of law when he has breached 
his fiduciary duties would eviscerate agency law. Secure in his compensation from the principal 
as long as the assigned task is completed, an agent's only chance of loss from violating his 
duties would be if he harmed the principal. The higher requirement of acting in the interest of 
the principal, without a means of enforcement, would simply cease to exist.” 
(Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 642, 39 P.3d 577, 582 (2001) (emphasis added)).  
5. The Amount of Disgorgement or Forfeiture is a Triable Issue: 
The specific amount of Bevis’s disgorgement or forfeiture is a triable issue. The Court cannot 
resolve the issue on the pleadings. Both Rockefeller I and Section § 37 of the Restatement 3d of the 
Law Governing Lawyers show that Bevis should not be able to keep all his fees. The Court must allow 
this issue to proceed to trial as to the amount of disgorgement or forfeiture.  
Perhaps of greater significance, Bevis entirely fails to identify any (not a single one ) adverse 
facts to Parkinson’s claims from the pleadings. “The questions at issue are fact-intensive and should 
not be resolved on a motion to dismiss where adverse dispositive facts are not evident on the face of 
the Complaint and are not otherwise admitted.” Waterfall Homeowners Ass'n v. Viega, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 
571, 582 (D. Nev. 2012). Parkinson says in her Complaint that Bevis breached his duty of 
confidentiality. There is nothing in the record to contradict this statement, and so it must be assumed 
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as true under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. “A motion to dismiss, unsupported by affidavits or depositions, 
does not controvert the facts alleged in the petition.” Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 
369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986) (citations omitted).       
6. Causation of Damages is Irrelevant to Parkinson’s Claim: 
Parkinson has not alleged a legal malpractice claim, and so causation of damages—in the 
normal sense—is irrelevant. Parkinson is not seeking ordinary damages. As explained above, 
Parkinson’s remedies of disgorgement and forfeiture are distinct from any legal malpractice damages, 
and the remedies do not require a specific nexus to damages. Parkinson’s harm is in the impaired value 
of Bevis’s legal services. Parkinson does not need to show any legal malpractice damages.   
7. Parkinson is Entitled to All Favorable Inferences: 
Parkinson is entitled to all favorable inferences from the complaint. “[The] standard for 
reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is the same as our summary judgment standard. The non-moving 
party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in his favor and only then may the 
question be asked whether a claim for relief has been stated.” Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 
637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989). The record now includes Trout’s declaration, and the favorable 
inferences to Parkinson are: (1) that Parkinson intended to file a breach of fiduciary claim, not a legal 
malpractice claim; (2) that Bevis breached his duties of confidentiality to Parkinson; (3) that Bevis’s 
breach impaired the value of his services to Parkinson; and (4) that Parkinson is entitled to a partial 
disgorgement or forfeiture of Bevis’s fees. These inferences, if proven at trial, entitle Parkinson to 
forfeiture relief. The Court must, therefore, deny the motion to dismiss.  
8. Parkinson is Entitled to Amend Her Complaint to Repair any Deficiencies:  
Finally, Parkinson is entitled to amend her pleadings to repair any alleged deficiencies. “[When] 
the complaint is capable of being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, a 
refusal to grant permission to amend would deprive appellant, a party to the action, of a substantial 
right.” Markstaller v. Markstaller, 326 P.2d 994, 997, 80 Idaho 129, 134-135 (1958). If Parkinson has 
failed to state a viable claim, the Court must give her sufficient time to amend the Complaint and fix 
any material deficiencies. Idaho case law explains:  
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“The purpose of [amended pleadings] is two-fold: First, to allow the best chance for each 
claim to be determined on its merits rather than on some procedural technicality; and, second, 
to relegate pleadings to the limited role of providing parties with notice of the nature of the 
pleader's claim and the facts that have been called into question…”  
“…Issue formulation is to be left to the discovery process and pleadings are not to be viewed 
as carrying the burden of fact revelation or of controlling the trial phase of the action.”  
(Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993, 996 (1986)).  
Importantly, Bevis did not have to file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. He had more 
appropriate options to address what he saw as a “cryptic” complaint. For instance, Bevis could have 
filed a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement of the claims. “If upon reading the complaint 
the defendant is uncertain as to the nature of the claim of which he has been placed on notice, the 
proper remedy for seeking more particularity is by motion for a more definite statement at the pleading 
stage or by the rules of discovery thereafter.” Andemeskel v. Waffle House, 227 Ga. App. 887, 888, 490 
S.E.2d 550, 551 (1997). Moreover, Bevis could have sent Parkinson’s counsel a letter, asking for 
clarification. By filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bevis clearly demonstrates he was uninterested in clarity 
but rather, sought to wage a trial on the pleadings—which is no longer acceptable procedure in Idaho. 
This type of bullying procedural assault is consistent with his demonstrated nature in communication, 
and certainly his conduct in representation of Parkinson. “Our liberal notice pleading standard is 
intended to see justice done, and prevent the dismissal of a valid claim for a mere technical failing.” 
Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 809, 229 P.3d 1164, 1171 (2010).  
CONCLUSION 
The Court should deny Bevis’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion in its entirety, as he fails to show that the 
breach of fiduciary claim is invalid. To the extent Parkinson’s claim is deficient, the Court should allow 
her the chance to amend it and to try it on its full merits.   
DATED January 30, 2018. 
 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 30, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
iCourt     
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 






   
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-1406 and I.R.C.P. 2.7, I declare the following is true and correct 
and submit the following declaration: 
1. I am the Plaintiff and have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of correspondence from Mr. 
Bevis to Ms. Parkinson, including relevant attachments. 
I declare under the penalty of perjury and pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the 
foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED January 30, 2018. 
 





Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 30, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
iCourt     
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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JAMES A. BEVIS 
KRISTA D. THIRY 
JENNIFER M. SCHINDELE 
PHILIP M. BEVIS 
BEVIS, THIRY & SCHINDELE, P.A. 
ATIORNEYS AT LAW 
December 21, 2015 
412 E. PARKCENTER, SUITE 211 
P.O. BOX827 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-0827 
TELEPHONE (208) 345-1040 
FAX (208) 345-0365 
Becky Parkinson Via Email 
bjparkinson@att.net 
Re : Rebecca Jean Parkinson v. Joe Parkinson 
BT&S File No. 9484.00 
Dear Ms. Parkinson: 
In view of your statement, "your billing is rejected", you 
leave me no other choice but to file suit against you. 
Let me also respond to the unfounded speculation of Mr. 
Trout who wrote on August 18, 2015, "your failure to make 
production gives the impression you have something to conceal". 
I have nothing to hide, but wasting more time in this office 
to furnish documents you already have is expensive, when you are 
not paying for the services rendered to date. The expense of 
providing documents pursuant to a valid production request will 
be added as attorney fees in the lawsuit to collect fees. 
Nevertheless, I am providing the attached documents 
pertaining to emails from May 12-17, when you chose to agree a 
second time. You made demands in writing, and cut-off speaking 
to Peggy, Karen or me and failed to show for your appointment on 
May 13, 2015. As a result I sent you an email on May 14, 2015 
(enclosed) . The implication of complicity with Joe and his 
attorney is false. 
I will wait to serve you after the holiday. 
Signed, 
E::::> ~ -==-




From: Jim Bevis 
Sent: 
To: 
Saturday, May 16,2015 2:08PM 
'Buck Harris' 
Subject: FW: I am sick to my stomach 
From: Jim Bevis 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 2:07 PM 
To: 'Becky J. Parkinson' 
Subject: RE: I am sick to my stomach 
I received your email confirming that you accept the stipulation signed on May 11. It should also state that you will not 
change your mind. Please delete an attempt to negotiate the YMCA plan and cell phone plan because that is a 
counteroffer and rejection. The YMCA family plan currently costs $144 one-time fee and dues of $71 +tax. You can 
negotiate with Joe about the cell plan after the Judgment and Decree is entered. I will ask the Judge to enter the Decree 
Tuesday A.M. and he will likely ask to see the email, so please send me immediately another email with the wording I 
need . Welsh will probably be calling any minute so Time is of the essence now. Thank you . Jim Bevis 
From: Becky J. Parkinson [mailto:bjparkinson@att.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2015 7:54AM 
To: Jim Bevis; Karen Hall 
Subject: I am sick to my stomach 
Jim, 
I honestly cannot get past what happened yesterday. I was afraid to be in that room yesterday and I 
needed to to fight for me and NOT fight for Joe!! I don't even know the totality of what was agreed to 
yesterday because it was such a blur of activity and decisions were being made that I DID NOT 
AGREE TO, i.e. what portion of the attorney fees Joe would pay. I thought you and I had always 
agreed that he should pay all of the attorney fees!! It didn't even sink in until I got home that you had 
unilaterally agreed to $26,500 and I don't even know where that figure came from. Honestly, I expect 
you to make this right today and to stop that document from being recorded. I need to understand the 
totality of this agreement I felt forced to have to sign. 
I am not making this up. I was rushed into signing and I was not comfortable with it and I believe you 
know that. Someone needs to make be feel better about what transpired, because that was my life I 
was rushing into signing off on. Buck is the only one who took real time to listen to me. You might be 
tired of listening to me, but I paid you heftily to be on MY SIDE, and not on Joe's. The three of you 
were all coming from the same place yesterday and, as you know, I am not fully motivated by the 
money. I needed to know why you turned so quickly from telling me you "intended to win this", to 
suddenly thinking I had no choice by to sign yesterday. I DIDN'T KNOW I WAS GOING DOWN 
THERE TO SIGN OFF ON MY DIVORCE. I thought yesterday was just going to be the start of a 
discussion. Joe always pushes things like this and you let him push and win. 
I process things and the more important those things are to me, the longer it takes me to feel 
comfortable. I don't know if I got the best deal I could get, but I know Joe feels he did. Alii felt I was 
pressure to buy in. You know that. You know I was uncomfortable because I told you that. Why did 
you abandon me yesterday? I was against three aggressive men yesterday and I needed to take a 
1 
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time out. I tried, but the longer I was there, the more I felt pressured to go along. Now, maybe I 
would have anyway, but we will never know. I just know that none of you wanted me to leave without 
signing and I felt completely alone in making that decision because you were also rushing me to 
make a decision. Honestly, what happened? Was it always going to play out this way? My birthday 
is Friday and I didn't want to be divorced ahead of my birthday. Not a big deal to you, but it is a big 
deal to me. I didn't know, as I said already, that I was walking into a situation yesterday, where I was 
going to feel pressured to sign anything. I have never been in this kind of situation and I was not 
prepared for what transpired. 
This was my first and, hopefully, only divorce. I couldn't even grasp everything that was happening 
yesterday and I feel betrayed on every level. Who made the decision about the $26,500 in attorney 
fees? I don't even know where that figure came from. All I know is that Joe got let off the hook 
yesterday and you seemed to help him. I didn't see any negotiating going on, except what I was 
negotiating and winning for myself. You didn't even ask him about the dumb cabinets. I got 
completely side-tracked on everything and no one had my back. I hate how I feel today. I felt just as 
badly last night. The way things played out yesterday was not right, and I am not even talking about 
the settlement part yet. I am so disappointed by how I was treated, on both levels. I had was haven 
bad feelings about the meeting ahead of time, which I ignored. I thought you would fight harder for 
me. 
I don't know what to do now. I don't know how I am going to ever feel better about the way this all 
played out. Ugh! I didn't deserve to feel as confused and pressured as I did yesterday. it was up to 
you to slow it all back down so that I felt I was making the best decision I could make ... and I didn't 
need to make that yesterday on the spot. I need someone to help me come to terms with this. I hope 
you can keep the agreement from getting gfiled, given my reluctance to be forced in to it yesterday, 
which everyone ignored. 
Becky 
No virus found in this message. 
Checked by A VG - w w.a g.com 










Sunday, May 17, 2015 8:30AM 
'Stanley W. Welsh' 
'Buck Harris' 
FW: Settlement Agreement 
Dear Stan: This is alii have received from Becky around 2 PM yesterday. I told you about it yesterday. 1 sent emails to 
her about it and she has not responded. I will forward them to you. I will try to look at your exhibits today 
From: Buck Harris [mailto:buck@harriscpa.com] 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 1:55 PM 
To: Jim Bevis 
Subject: Fwd: Settlement Agreement 
Buck 
Buckne1 A. Harris 
BAHan is LLP 
960 Broadway S!.. Suite 314 
Boise. IQ 83706 
-------- Original message --------
From: Becky Parkinson <bjparkinson@att.net> 
Date: 05/16/2015 12:53 PM (GMT-07:00) 
To: Buck Harris <buck@harriscpa.com> 
Subject: Fwd: Settlement Agreement 
From: "Becky J. Parkinson" <bjpurkinson@att.net> 
Date: t 16, 2015 at 8:53 :43 AM MDT 
To: Becky Parkinson <bjparkinson@atl.net> 
Subject: Settlementr Agreement 
Reply-To: "Becky J. Parkinson" <bjnarkinson@att.ne 
Buck,t 
Per our conversation this morning, I am willing to move forward, under the same terms 
as Monday. 
I ask only for Joe to give me until the end of the month to get my affairs in order as they 
relate to changing plans/policies/accounts into the correct names. I would further like to 
be able to negotiate on who carries theY membership and the cell phone plan. I prefer 
to keep the family plan with AT&T, so that I do not lose my unlimited text and data plan 
with them. I will pay for the kids to remain on that plan with me, and Joe can sign up for 
his own plan, if AT&T allows me to carry the same plan (which Joe may need to 
1 
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authorize). If Joe will show me this respect, and will show respect on other items that 
still need negotiation, then I will settle to get this over once and for all. 
I would ask that whenever they file the new stipulation agreement, I would just prefer it 
be timed in such a way as that the final judgement does not fall until at least Tuesday 
(our 25th wedding anniversary). I wanted to make it to 25 years, for what ever reason. 
I think it is going to work that way anyway. 
Buck, thank you for your understanding and for taking time to help me sort this all out. 
Becky 
--------------------------------- --
No virus found in this message. 
Checked by A VG- www.a g.com 










Sunday, May 17, 2015 8:43AM 
'Stanley W . Welsh' 
'Buck Harris' 
RE: Parkinson 
Gentlemen: I have not received an email from Becky this morning or last night. I'm at the office. 345-1048; cell 890-
5019. I assume she got my emails . 
From: Stanley W. Welsh [mailto:swelsh@Cosholaw.com] 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 10:55 AM 
To: Jim Bevis 





After it arrives, I suggest U & I go to court early AM Monday and appear to have it entered. 
From: Stanley W. Welsh [mailto:swelsh@Cosholaw.com] 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 9:59 AM 
To: Buck Harris; Jim Bevis 
Subject: RE: Parkinson 
Thanks 
From: Buck Harris [mailto: buck@harriscpa.com] 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 8:35 AM 
To: Stanley W. Welsh; James Bevis 
Subject: Parkinson 
Stan and Jim, 
Haven't received the email from Becky. I did call and talk with her this morning. She has been 
busy with graduation activities last night and was preparing to head back to Caldwell this 
morning. She told me she would get the email sent this morning. I will forward it as soon as I get 
it. 
Buck 
Buck net A Han is 
BAHan is LLP 
960 Btoadway St. Suite 314 
Boise, I D 83 706 










Sunday, May 17, 2015 10:32 AM 
'Stanley W. Welsh' 
'Buck Harris' 
RE: Parkinson 
If she ever responds, I would note that the settlement did include, that Becky would receive Cole as a deduction for 2015 
& 2016 . It was omitted from the judgment .. Please call or email after your family time. JAB 
From: Stanley W. Welsh [mailto:swelsh@Cosholaw.com] 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 10:55 AM 
To: Jim Bevis 
Subject: Re: Parkinson 
Agreed 
Stanley Welsh 
Cosho Humphrey ,LLP 
208 .344.7811 
islaw.com> wrote: 
After it arrives, I suggest U & I go to court early AM Monday and appear to have it entered. 
From: Stanley W. Welsh [mailto:swelsh@Cosholaw.com] 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 9:59 AM 
To: Buck Harris; Jim Bevis 
Subject: RE: Parkinson 
Thanks 
From: Buck Harris [mailto :buck@harriscpa.com] 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 8:35 AM 
To: Stanley W. Welsh; James Bevis 
Subject: Parkinson 
Stan and Jim, 
Haven't received the email from Becky. I did call and talk with her this morning. She has been 
busy with graduation activities last night and was preparing to head back to Caldwell this 
morning. She told me she would get the email sent this morning. I will forward it as soon as I get 
it. 
Buck 
Buckner A Han is 
BA Harris LLP 
960 B1 oadway St, Suitd 14 
Boise. I D 83 706 










Sunday, May 17, 201511 :58AM 
'Buck Harris' 
'Becky J. Parkinson' 
RE: Settlement agreement 
Dear Becky: Thank you for sending to me through Buck your confirmation. As you know Buck and Karen Hall and I 
endorse the settlement reached on May 11t11 • I emailed it to Welsh. I will go to court Monday with Welsh to advise the 
court to enter the Judgment and Decree Tuesday, and that you withdraw your motion to withdraw the stipulation. I will 
notify our witnesses Tim and Paul whose claims were honored 100% and thank them. I will notify Jake too. I will stop my 
trial preparation today once I hear from Stan. I know this process has been painful. We all tried to do our best for you 
because we cared. We hope you won't be a stranger as you are still welcome here. I remain, Very truly yours, James A. 
Bevis. 
From: Buck Harris [mailto:buck@harriscpa.com] 
Sent: Sunday, May 17, 2015 11:31 AM 
To: Jim Bevis 
Subject: Fwd: Settlement agreement 
Buck 
Buckner A Han is 
£JA lla11 is LLP 
960 Broadway St , Suite 314 
Boise. I D 83706 
\\\\\\ l11u I IS\.1).1 cum 
-------- Original message --------
From: Becky Parkinson <bjparkinson@att.net> 
Date: 05117/2015 11:28 AM (GMT-07:00) 
To: Buck Harris <buck@harriscpa.com> 
Subject: Settlement agreement 
Dear Buck, 
I am prepared to agree to the settlement agreement struck Monday, May 11, 2015. I will not change my mind . 
Becky Parkinson 
Cell (208) 250-1848 
No virus found in this message. 
Checked by A VG - wv ' .a g.com 









Sunday, May 17,201511:39 AM 
'Stanley W. Welsh' 
'Becky J. Parkinson' 
FW: Settlement agreement 
From: Buck Harris [mailto:buck@harriscpa.com] 
Sent: Sunday, May 17, 2015 11:31 AM 
To: Jim Bevis 
Subject: Fwd: Settlement agreement 
Buck 
Buckne1 A. Han is 
13A Han is LLP 
960 Broadway St , Suite 314 
Boise, I D. 83706 
'' '' \\ ,hnrr!scpn.qnn 
-------- Original message --------
From: Becky Parkinson <bjparkinson@att.net> 
Date: 05/17/2015 11:28 AM (GMT-07:00) 
To: Buck Harris <buck@harriscpa.com> 
Subject: Settlement agreement 
Dear Buck, 
I am prepared to agree to the settlement agreement struck Monday, May II, 2015. I will not change my mind. 
Becky Parkinson 
Cell (208) 250-1848 
No virus found in this message. 
Checked by A VG- www.avg.~.:om 








From: Jim Bevis 
Jim Bevis 
Sunday, May 17, 2015 8:32AM 
'Stanley W . Welsh' 
FW: 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 2:34 PM 
To: 'Becky J. Parkinson' 
Subject: 
Welsh is waiting. Please respond as I asked . 
From: Becky J. Parkinson [mailto:bjparkinson@att.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2015 7:54AM 
To: Jim Bevis; Karen Hall 
Subject: I am sick to my stomach 
Jim, 
I honestly cannot get past what happened yesterday. I was afraid to be in that room yesterday and I 
needed to to fight for me and NOT fight for Joe!! I don't even know the totality of what was agreed to 
yesterday because it was such a blur of activity and decisions were being made that I DID NOT 
AGREE TO, i.e. what portion of the attorney fees Joe would pay. I thought you and I had always 
agreed that he should pay all of the attorney fees!! It didn't even sink in until I got home that you had 
unilaterally agreed to $26,500 and I don't even know where that figure came from. Honestly, I expect 
you to make this right today and to stop that document from being recorded. I need to understand the 
totality of this agreement I felt forced to have to sign. 
I am not making this up. I was rushed into signing and I was not comfortable with it and I believe you 
know that. Someone needs to make be feel better about what transpired , because that was my life I 
was rushing into signing off on . Buck is the only one who took real time to listen to me. You might be 
tired of listening to me, but I paid you heftily to be on MY SIDE, and not on Joe's. The three of you 
were all coming from the same place yesterday and, as you know, I am not fully motivated by the 
money. I needed to know why you turned so quickly from telling me you "intended to win this", to 
suddenly thinking I had no choice by to sign yesterday. I DIDN'T KNOW I WAS GOING DOWN 
THERE TO SIGN OFF ON MY DIVORCE. I thought yesterday was just going to be the start of a 
discussion. Joe always pushes things like this and you let him push and win. 
I process things and the more important those things are to me, the longer it takes me to feel 
comfortable. I don't know if I got the best deal I could get, but I know Joe feels he did. Alii felt I was 
pressure to buy in. You know that. You know I was uncomfortable because I told you that. Why did 
you abandon me yesterday? I was against three aggressive men yesterday and I needed to take a 
time out. I tried, but the longer I was there, the more I felt pressured to go along. Now, maybe I 
would have anyway, but we will never know. I just know that none of you wanted me to leave without 
signing and I felt completely alone in making that decision because you were also rushing me to 
make a decision. Honestly, what happened? Was it always going to play out this way? My birthday 
is Friday and I didn't want to be divorced ahead of my birthday. Not a big deal to you, but it is a big 
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deal to me. I didn't know, as I said already, that I was walking into a situation yesterday, where I was 
going to feel pressured to sign anything. I have never been in this kind of situation and I was not 
prepared for what transpired . 
This was my first and, hopefully, only divorce. I couldn't even grasp everything that was happening 
yesterday and I feel betrayed on every level. Who made the decision about the $26,500 in attorney 
fees? I don't even know where that figure came from. Alii know is that Joe got let off the hook 
yesterday and you seemed to help him. I didn't see any negotiating going on, except what I was 
negotiating and winning for myself. You didn't even ask him about the dumb cabinets. I got 
completely side-tracked on everything and no one had my back. I hate how I feel today. I felt just as 
badly last night. The way things played out yesterday was not right, and I am not even talking about 
the settlement part yet. I am so disappointed by how I was treated , on both levels. I had was haven 
bad feelings about the meeting ahead of time, which I ignored. I thought you would fight harder for 
me. 
I don't know what to do now. I don't know how I am going to ever feel better about the way this all 
played out. Ugh! I didn't deserve to feel as confused and pressured as I did yesterday. it was up to 
you to slow it all back down so that I felt I was making the best decision I could make ... and I didn't 
need to make that yesterday on the spot. I need someone to help me come to terms with this. I hope 
you can keep the agreement from getting gfiled, given my reluctance to be forced in to it yesterday, 
which everyone ignored. 
Becky 
No virus found in this message. 
Checked by A VG - www.avg. om 








From: Jim Bevis 
Jim Bevis 
Sunday, May 17, 2015 8:32AM 
'Stanley W. Welsh' 
FW: 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 2:26 PM 
To: 'Buck Harris' 
Subject: FW: 
From: Jim Bevis 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 2:19PM 
To: 'Becky J. Parkinson' 
Subject: 
Your email cannot state that you want to negotiate about other issues as that is a rejection. Jim Bevis 
From: Becky J. Parkinson [mailto:bjparkinson@att.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2015 7:54AM 
To: Jim Bevis; Karen Hall 
Subject: I am sick to my stomach 
Jim, 
I honestly cannot get past what happened yesterday. I was afraid to be in that room yesterday and I 
needed to to fight for me and NOT fight for Joe!! I don't even know the totality of what was agreed to 
yesterday because it was such a blur of activity and decisions were being made that I DID NOT 
AGREE TO, i.e. what portion of the attorney fees Joe would pay. I thought you and I had always 
agreed that he should pay all of the attorney fees!! It didn't even sink in until I got home that you had 
unilaterally agreed to $26,500 and I don't even know where that figure came from. Honestly, I expect 
you to make this right today and to stop that document from being recorded. I need to understand the 
totality of this agreement I felt forced to have to sign. 
I am not making this up. I was rushed into signing and I was not comfortable with it and I believe you 
know that. Someone needs to make be feel better about what transpired, because that was my life I 
was rushing into signing off on. Buck is the only one who took real time to listen to me. You might be 
tired of listening to me, but I paid you heftily to be on MY SIDE, and not on Joe's. The three of you 
were all coming from the same place yesterday and, as you know, I am not fully motivated by the 
money. I needed to know why you turned so quickly from telling me you "intended to win this", to 
suddenly thinking I had no choice by to sign yesterday. I DIDN'T KNOW I WAS GOING DOWN 
THERE TO SIGN OFF ON MY DIVORCE. I thought yesterday was just going to be the start of a 
discussion. Joe always pushes things like this and you let him push and win. 
I process things and the more important those things are to me, the longer it takes me to feel 
comfortable. I don't know if I got the best deal I could get, but I know Joe feels he did. Alii felt I was 
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pressure to buy in. You know that. You know I was uncomfortable because I told you that. Why did 
you abandon me yesterday? I was against three aggressive men yesterday and I needed to take a 
time out. I tried, but the longer I was there, the more I felt pressured to go along. Now, maybe I 
would have anyway, but we will never know. I just know that none of you wanted me to leave without 
signing and I felt completely alone in making that decision because you were also rushing me to 
make a decision. Honestly, what happened? Was it always going to play out this way? My birthday 
is Friday and I didn't want to be divorced ahead of my birthday. Not a big deal to you, but it is a big 
deal to me. I didn't know, as I said already, that I was walking into a situation yesterday, where I was 
going to feel pressured to sign anything. I have never been in this kind of situation and I was not 
prepared for what transpired. 
This was my first and, hopefully, only divorce. I couldn't even grasp everything that was happening 
yesterday and I feel betrayed on every level. Who made the decision about the $26,500 in attorney 
fees? I don't even know where that figure came from. Alii know is that Joe got let off the hook 
yesterday and you seemed to help him. I didn't see any negotiating going on, except what I was 
negotiating and winning for myself. You didn't even ask him about the dumb cabinets. I got 
completely side-tracked on everything and no one had my back. I hate how I feel today. I felt just as 
badly last night. The way things played out yesterday was not right, and I am not even talking about 
the settlement part yet. I am so disappointed by how I was treated, on both levels. I had was haven 
bad feelings about the meeting ahead of time, which I ignored. I thought you would fight harder for 
me. 
I don't know what to do now. I don't know how I am going to ever feel better about the way this all 
played out. Ugh! I didn't deserve to feel as confused and pressured as I did yesterday. it was up to 
you to slow it all back down so that I felt I was making the best decision I could make ... and I didn't 
need to make that yesterday on the spot. I need someone to help me come to terms with this. I hope 
you can keep the agreement from getting gfiled, given my reluctance to be forced in to it yesterday, 
which everyone ignored. 
Becky 
No virus found in this message. 
Checked by A VG- www.avg.com 








From: Jim Bevis 
Jim Bevis 
Sunday, May 17, 2015 8:33AM 
'Stanley W . Welsh' 
FW: I am sick to my stomach 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 2:08 PM 
To: 'Buck Harris' 
Subject: FW: I am sick to my stomach 
From: Jim Bevis 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 2:07 PM 
To: 'Becky J. Parkinson' 
Subject: RE: I am sick to my stomach 
I received your email confirming that you accept the stipulation signed on May 11. It should also state that you will not 
change your mind. Please delete an attempt to negotiate the YMCA plan and cell phone plan because that is a 
counteroffer and rejection. The YMCA family plan currently costs $144 one-time fee and dues of $71 +tax. You can 
negotiate with Joe about the cell plan after the Judgment and Decree is entered. I will ask the Judge to enter the Decree 
Tuesday A.M. and he will likely ask to see the email, so please send me immediately another email with the wording I 
need. Welsh will probably be calling any minute so Time is of the essence now. Thank you . Jim Bevis 
From: Becky J. Parkinson [mailto:bjparkinson@att.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2015 7:54AM 
To: Jim Bevis; Karen Hall 
Subject: I am sick to my stomach 
Jim, 
I honestly cannot get past what happened yesterday. I was afraid to be in that room yesterday and I 
needed to to fight for me and NOT fight for Joe!! I don't even know the totality of what was agreed to 
yesterday because it was such a blur of activity and decisions were being made that I DID NOT 
AGREE TO, i.e. what portion of the attorney fees Joe would pay. I thought you and I had always 
agreed that he should pay all of the attorney fees!! It didn't even sink in until I got home that you had 
unilaterally agreed to $26,500 and I don't even know where that figure came from. Honestly, I expect 
you to make this right today and to stop that document from being recorded. I need to understand the 
totality of this agreement I felt forced to have to sign. 
I am not making this up. I was rushed into signing and I was not comfortable with it and I believe you 
know that. Someone needs to make be feel better about what transpired, because that was my life I 
was rushing into signing off on. Buck is the only one who took real time to listen to me. You might be 
tired of listening to me, but I paid you heftily to be on MY SIDE, and not on Joe's. The three of you 
were all coming from the same place yesterday and, as you know, I am not fully motivated by the 
money. I needed to know why you turned so quickly from telling me you "intended to win this", to 
suddenly thinking I had no choice by to sign yesterday. I DIDN'T KNOW I WAS GOING DOWN 
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THERE TO SIGN OFF ON MY DIVORCE. I thought yesterday was just going to be the start of a 
discussion. Joe always pushes things like this and you let him push and win. 
I process things and the more important those things are to me, the longer it takes me to feel 
comfortable. I don't know if I got the best deal I could get, but I know Joe feels he did. Alii felt I was 
pressure to buy in. You know that. You know I was uncomfortable because I told you that. Why did 
you abandon me yesterday? I was against three aggressive men yesterday and I needed to take a 
time out. I tried, but the longer I was there, the more I felt pressured to go along. Now, maybe I 
would have anyway, but we will never know. I just know that none of you wanted me to leave without 
signing and I felt completely alone in making that decision because you were also rushing me to 
make a decision. Honestly, what happened? Was it always going to play out this way? My birthday 
is Friday and I didn't want to be divorced ahead of my birthday. Not a big deal to you , but it is a big 
deal to me. I didn't know, as I said already, that I was walking into a situation yesterday, where I was 
going to feel pressured to sign anything. I have never been in this kind of situation and I was not 
prepared for what transpired. 
This was my first and, hopefully, only divorce. I couldn't even grasp everything that was happening 
yesterday and I feel betrayed on every level. Who made the decision about the $26,500 in attorney 
fees? I don't even know where that figure came from. Alii know is that Joe got let off the hook 
yesterday and you seemed to help him. I didn't see any negotiating going on, except what I was 
negotiating and winning for myself. You didn't even ask him about the dumb cabinets. I got 
completely side-tracked on everything and no one had my back. I hate how I feel today. I felt just as 
badly last night. The way things played out yesterday was not right, and I am not even talking about 
the settlement part yet. I am so disappointed by how I was treated, on both levels. I had was haven 
bad feelings about the meeting ahead of time, which I ignored. I thought you would fight harder for 
me. 
I don't know what to do now. I don't know how I am going to ever feel better about the way this all 
played out. Ugh! I didn't deserve to feel as confused and pressured as I did yesterday. it was up to 
you to slow it all back down so that I felt I was making the best decision I could make ... and I didn't 
need to make that yesterday on the spot. I need someone to help me come to terms with this. I hope 
you can keep the agreement from getting gfiled, given my reluctance to be forced in to it yesterday, 
which everyone ignored. 
Becky 
No virus found in this message. 
Checked by AVG- wv w.a g. m 








From: Jim Bevis 
Jim Bevis 
Sunday, May 17, 2015 8:32AM 
'Stanley W. Welsh' 
FW: 
Sent: Saturday, May 16, 2015 2:56 PM 
To: 'Becky J. Parkinson' 
Subject: 
I have to take care of grandchild at 3. I will be leaving in 6 minutes. I've been here since 10:30 waiting on a proper 
response from you. I don't have email at home. JAB 
From: Becky J. Parkinson [mailto:bjparkinson@att.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2015 7:54AM 
To: Jim Bevis; Karen Hall 
Subject: 
Jim, 
I honestly cannot get past what happened yesterday. I was afraid to be in that room yesterday and I 
needed to to fight for me and NOT fight for Joe!! I don't even know the totality of what was agreed to 
yesterday because it was such a blur of activity and decisions were being made that I DID NOT 
AGREE TO, i.e. what portion of the attorney fees Joe would pay. I thought you and I had always 
agreed that he should pay all of the attorney fees!! It didn't even sink in until I got home that you had 
unilaterally agreed to $26,500 and I don't even know where that figure came from. Honestly, I expect 
you to make this right today and to stop that document from being recorded. I need to understand the 
totality of this agreement I felt forced to have to sign. 
I am not making this up. I was rushed into signing and I was not comfortable with it and I believe you 
know that. Someone needs to make be feel better about what transpired, because that was my life I 
was rushing into signing off on. Buck is the only one who took real time to listen to me. You might be 
tired of listening to me, but I paid you heftily to be on MY SIDE, and not on Joe's. The three of you 
were all coming from the same place yesterday and, as you know, I am not fully motivated by the 
money. I needed to know why you turned so quickly from telling me you "intended to win this", to 
suddenly thinking I had no choice by to sign yesterday. I DIDN'T KNOW I WAS GOING DOWN 
THERE TO SIGN OFF ON MY DIVORCE. I thought yesterday was just going to be the start of a 
discussion. Joe always pushes things like this and you let him push and win. 
I process things and the more important those things are to me, the longer it takes me to feel 
comfortable. I don't know if I got the best deal I could get, but I know Joe feels he did. Alii felt I was 
pressure to buy in. You know that. You know I was uncomfortable because I told you that. Why did 
you abandon me yesterday? I was against three aggressive men yesterday and I needed to take a 
time out. I tried, but the longer I was there, the more I felt pressured to go along. Now, maybe I 
would have anyway, but we will never know. I just know that none of you wanted me to leave without 
signing and I felt completely alone in making that decision because you were also rushing me to 
make a decision. Honestly, what happened? Was it always going to play out this way? My birthday 
is Friday and I didn't want to be divorced ahead of my birthday. Not a big deal to you, but it is a big 
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deal to me. I didn't know, as I said already, that I was walking into a situation yesterday, where I was 
going to feel pressured to sign anything. I have never been in this kind of situation and I was not 
prepared for what transpired. 
This was my first and, hopefully, only divorce. I couldn't even grasp everything that was happening 
yesterday and I feel betrayed on every level. Who made the decision about the $26,500 in attorney 
fees? I don't even know where that figure came from. Alii know is that Joe got let off the hook 
yesterday and you seemed to help him. I didn't see any negotiating going on, except what I was 
negotiating and winning for myself. You didn't even ask him about the dumb cabinets. I got 
completely side-tracked on everything and no one had my back. I hate how I feel today. I felt just as 
badly last night. The way things played out yesterday was not right, and I am not even talking about 
the settlement part yet. I am so disappointed by how I was treated, on both levels. I had was haven 
bad feelings about the meeting ahead of time, which I ignored. I thought you would fight harder for 
me. 
I don't know what to do now. I don't know how I am going to ever feel better about the way this all 
played out. Ugh! I didn't deserve to feel as confused and pressured as I did yesterday. it was up to 
you to slow it all back down so that I felt I was making the best decision I could make ... and I didn't 
need to make that yesterday on the spot. I need someone to help me come to terms with this. I hope 
you can keep the agreement from getting gfiled, given my reluctance to be forced in to it yesterday, 
which everyone ignored. 
Becky 
No virus found in this message. 
Checked by A VG - ww .avg.com 
Version: 2013.0.3495 I Virus Database: 4311/9765 -Release Date: 05113115 
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Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
ISB #8380; adl@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
Electronically Filed 
2/2/2018 5:09PM 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REBECCA PARKINSON, 
Case No. CV01-17-08744 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES E. BEVIS, 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT 
JAMES A. BEVIS'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(6) 
Defendant. 
Defendant James A. Bevis (incorrectly identified as "James E. Bevis"), by and through 
his undersigned counsel of record, hereby submits this memorandum in further support of his 
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to IRCP 12(b )(6). For the reasons stated herein, Mr. Bevis 
respectfully requests that the Motion be granted. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson's breach of fiduciary duty cause of action should be 
dismissed because her only cause of action against her former attorney for an alleged breach of a 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 
IRCP 12(b)(6)- 1 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 
IRCP 12(b)(6) - 2 
professional duty arising is legal malpractice.  Mrs. Parkinson attempts to remedy her claim by 
alleging that she is seeking only the disgorgement of fees and therefore need not prove causation 
and damages, two elements of a legal malpractice cause of action.  This argument is unavailing 
because Idaho does not allow a shortcut around proof of a legal malpractice claim.  Reasonable 
inferences and a potential amended pleading also do not save Mrs. Parkinson’s Complaint 
because, even when allowed all reasonable inferences, she cannot establish a claim for relief.  
Additionally, Mrs. Parkinson improperly offers evidence outside the pleadings in connection 
with this Motion to Dismiss. 
With respect to the claim of legal malpractice, despite Plaintiff’s counsel’s response to 
the Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Bevis’s Motion is not directed at inartful drafting of the Complaint.  
Rather, Mr. Bevis brings his Motion because Mrs. Parkinson alleges an improper cause of action 
and has failed to allege facts which, if proved, would constitute a claim for relief.  It is well-
established that the fundamental purpose of notice pleading is to put the defendant on notice as to 
the nature of the claims levied against him.  In this case, Mrs. Parkinson’s allegations are a 
moving target, and the brief in response to Mr. Bevis’s Motion to Dismiss demonstrates that the 
Complaint fails to put Mr. Bevis on notice of what he is defending against. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Mrs. Parkinson ignores controlling Idaho authority regarding claims against an 
attorney arising from the provision of professional services. 
 
Mrs. Parkinson’s only cause of action against her former attorney for an alleged breach of 
a professional duty arising from the representation is legal malpractice, not breach of fiduciary 
duty. The Court need not look outside Idaho to answer the question of whether a former client 
may maintain a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against her former attorney, (see Plf. 
Response to Mot. To Dismiss 3), because Idaho’s own authority directly answers the question.   
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 
IRCP 12(b)(6) - 3 
In considering whether a client may bring a claim against a former attorney for more than 
legal malpractice, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that “legal malpractice” is defined as 
“wrongful acts or omissions in the performance of professional services by any person ... 
licensed to perform such services under the law of the state of Idaho.”  Greenfield v. Smith, 162 
Idaho 246, 395 P.3d 1279, 1283 (2017) (citing Idaho Code § 5-219(4)).  “Legal malpractice” is 
an amalgamation and encompasses claims beyond those sounding in tort.  See id.   
It is a long-established rule in Idaho that regardless of the label applied to claims by the 
plaintiff, a cause of action against a professional arising out of the provision of professional 
services to the plaintiff sounds in professional negligence. Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 232, 
775 P.2d 120, 124 (1989); Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 588, 51 P.3d 396, 402 (2002); 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 621, 272 P.3d 1247, 1252 (2012); Greenfield v. Smith, 162 
Idaho 246, 395 P.3d 1279, 1284 (2017). In Lapham, the Idaho Supreme Court considered what 
claims could be asserted against an attorney in an action arising out of the provision of legal 
services to the plaintiff to determine the statute of limitations applicable to such claims. Id. at 
585, 51 P.3d at 399. The case involved a mistake in disbursing funds to a debtor.  The plaintiff 
argued that he was entitled to assert claims against the attorney for ordinary negligence, breach 
of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, because they arose out of the provision of escrow 
services, which were separate and distinct from the legal services being provided by the attorney. 
Id. at 588-89, 51 P.3d at 402-03. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that 
the focus of its inquiry would be whether the act or omission complained of arose out the 
performance of professional services, which it found that the disbursement of closing funds did. 
Id. at 589, 51 P.3d at 403. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the only applicable 
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 
IRCP 12(b)(6) - 4 
claim was professional negligence and the district court properly refused to allow amendment to 
assert claims for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. See id.  
Based upon Lapham, the Idaho Supreme Court has gone on to find that even when the 
claim asserted arises out of an express contract for professional services, the only claim that can 
properly be asserted is professional negligence, not some other claim such as breach of contract. 
See Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 149, 90 P.3d 894, 899 
(2004).   
Here, all of Mrs. Parkinson’s claims arise out of Mr. Bevis’s alleged wrongful acts in 
performing services in connection with his representation of her.  While Mrs. Parkinson argues 
that this is really a breach of fiduciary duty action for the forfeiture of fees, she has not 
distinguished the factual basis of her claim from a claim for legal malpractice.  Rather, Mrs. 
Parkinson’s characterization of her claim appears to be an effort to remedy her inability to prove 
causation or damages.  (See Plf.’s Response 3, 6, 7 (conceding that Mrs. Parkinson cannot prove 
damages and arguing proof of causation is irrelevant).)  The fact that Mrs. Parkinson seeks to 
recover fees allegedly paid to Mr. Bevis does not, alone, separate it from a legal malpractice 
claim because the “focus in Idaho is not on the remedy sought or the type of damages, but on the 
source of the damages.”  Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 159 Idaho 103, 105, 356 P.3d 1049, 1051 
(2015).  Because Mrs. Parkinson has not alleged the only cognizable cause of action against her 
attorney, Mrs. Parkinson has failed to state a claim. 
Mrs. Parkinson contends that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is distinct from a legal 
malpractice claim.  (Plf.’s Response 2.)  For this proposition, Mrs. Parkinson cites to Blough v. 
Wellman, 132 Idaho 424, 426, 974 P.2d 70, 72 (1999) and Hill Fulwider P.C. v. Swindell-
Dressler Int’l Co., No. 1:15-cv-01554-JMS-TAB, 2017 WL 447239, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 
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2017), an unreported decision from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.  
Blough is inapposite because it does not hold that a breach of fiduciary duty claim is separate and 
distinct from a legal malpractice claim.  Even if it did so hold, the subsequent cases of Lapham, 
137 Idaho at 588, Bishop, 152 Idaho at 621, and Greenfield, 395 P.3d at 1284 make clear that 
Idaho does not recognize a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action against one’s own attorney.  
Hill Fulwider is also inapposite because it relies on a series of Indiana state court cases 
establishing two parallel causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice, 
which contradict Idaho’s unambiguous authority that it does not recognize a breach of fiduciary 
duty cause of action against one’s own attorney.  Hill Fulwider, 2017 WL 447239 at *3 (the 
attorney-defendant failed to cite any Indiana precedent holding that a plaintiff cannot pursue both 
a legal malpractice claim and a breach of fiduciary duty claim).  As such, based on Idaho law, 
Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim should be dismissed. 
B. Mrs. Parkinson concedes that she does not have a legal malpractice cause of action 
because she cannot prove damages. 
 
Idaho does not allow a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action in lieu of a legal 
malpractice cause of action.  The “negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of 
the damages to the client.”  Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 845, 243 P.3d 642, 661 (2010).  
Here, Mrs. Parkinson concedes that Mr. Bevis did not cause her damages.  (Plf.’s Response 3.)  
Rather, she argues, she seeks only disgorgement and forfeiture of attorney fees from Mr. Bevis.  
(Id.)  Mrs. Parkinson argues that, “The fact that this did not ‘harm’ Parkinson’s divorce case is 
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immaterial.”  (Plf.’s Response 6.)1  She further argues, “The Court should consider the grievous 
nature of Bevis’s betrayal, even though it did not cause any lasting financial damages.” (Id.) 
Mrs. Parkinson argues that she need not prove damages because her claim is for the 
forfeiture of fees.  For this proposition, Mrs. Parkinson cites to Rockefeller v. Graham, 136 Idaho 
637, 39 P.3d 577 (2001).  Rockefeller, however, and the Idaho cases cited therein, relate only to 
real estate agents and their commissions.  The Rockefeller court cited to the Texas case of 
Burrows v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999), a case which did involve a claim against an 
attorney.  However, the Idaho Supreme Court only cited for Burrows for a discussion of the 
theory of automatic full forfeiture, not to upset the settled law on legal malpractice claims.  
Rockefeller, 136 Idaho at 642.  Mrs. Parkinson cites to no Idaho authority for the proposition that 
a client can sue her former attorney and obtain a recovery without establishing the elements of 
legal malpractice. 
Rockefeller and the Idaho cases cited therein do not address the duties of attorneys or 
harmonize their rule with the longstanding rules regarding legal malpractice being the only 
appropriate cause of action against an attorney for wrongful acts or omissions in the performance 
of an attorney’s professional services.  The Idaho Supreme Court discussed in Bishop, 152 Idaho 
at 620, that legal malpractice actions encompass claims for a breach of the attorney-client 
relationship.  “Legal malpractice has traditionally been treated as the proper claim where an 
attorney breaches his or her duty, which arises from the attorney-client relationship.”  Id. at 621. 
                                                 
1 Mrs. Parkinson’s concession that Mr. Bevis did not harm her divorce case contradicts allegations in her Complaint.  
(See, e.g., ¶¶ 5, 6).  Mr. Bevis will accept that the contradictory allegations in Mrs. Parkinson’s Complaint have been 
abandoned. 
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C. Favorable inferences do not salvage Mrs. Parkinson’s Complaint, and entitling Mrs. 
Parkinson to amend would be futile. 
 
Mrs. Parkinson argues she is entitled to favorable inferences in this matter.  (Plf.’s 
Response 7.)  She also argues that she should be entitled to amend her pleading to remedy any 
deficiencies.  (Id.)  When determining whether to allow an amendment, “the court may consider 
whether the new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by the amended complaint state a 
valid claim. If the amended pleading does not set out a valid claim, or if the opposing party 
would be prejudiced by the delay in adding the new claim, or if the opposing party has an 
available defense such as a statute of limitations, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to deny the motion to file the amended complaint.”  Taylor, 149 Idaho at 847. 
Here, Mrs. Parkinson’s claim should be dismissed because, even when she is given all 
reasonable inferences, she cannot establish an entitlement to relief.  Mrs. Parkinson’s only 
potential cause of action is for legal malpractice, and she acknowledges that she cannot prove all 
the elements of a legal malpractice claim.  Mrs. Parkinson has not identified how she could 
amend her Complaint to assert a valid claim, and it appears from her representations in the 
Response Memorandum and the Complaint, that she cannot make allegations sufficient to state a 
claim for relief. 
D. Mrs. Parkinson improperly relies on materials outside the pleadings. 
In connection with her Response Memorandum, Ms. Parkinson offers various emails for 
the Court’s consideration, which are improper in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  See 
Taylor, 149 Idaho at 833 (“The grounds for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal comprise only the 
pleadings and no more”).  Mrs. Parkinson asks the Court to convert Mr. Bevis’s motion from a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.  However, 
converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment is only appropriate when the 
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parties have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to present materials pertinent to a motion for 
summary judgment.  Taylor, 149 Idaho at 833.  Here, Mr. Bevis has not had an opportunity to 
prepare and present materials in support of a motion for summary judgment.  Mr. Bevis further 
objects to the emails offered in counsel’s declaration because they are not properly 
authenticated—counsel did not author and was not copied on the emails, and there is no 
additional information supporting his testimony that the emails are true and correct copies of 
correspondence among the parties.   
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant James A. Bevis respectfully requests that this Court 
grant his Motion to Dismiss because Mrs. Parkinson failed to state a claim. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2018. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
 
 
By /s/ Keely E. Duke    
Keely E. Duke – Of the Firm 
Aubrey D. Lyon – Of the Firm 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of February, 2018, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document using the iCourt E-File system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to 
the following persons: 
Kim J. Trout 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
~ iCourt/Email 
ktrout@trout -law. com 
Is/ Keely E. Duke 
Keely E. Duke 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
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COURT MINUTES 1
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF




     Plaintiff,
vs.
James Bevis
     Defendant.
Event Code: CMIN
JUDGE: Jonathan Medema DATE: 02/06/2018 TIME: 3:00 PM
CLERK: Janet Ellis COURTROOM: 504
REPORTER: Sue Heronemus
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for Plaintiff(s): Kim Jay Trout
Counsel for Defendant(s): Keely Elizabeth Duke
03:26:40 PM Court
called REBECCA PARKINSON vs JAMES BEVIS CV01-17-8744, 
time set for Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
03:27:18 PM Kim 
Trout counsel for plaintiff
03:27:24 PM Keeley 
Duke counsel for defendant
03:27:31 PM Court has viewed the pleadings filed in this matter
03:28:39 PM Ms. 
Duke would request to be considered under a 12B-6 motion.
03:29:34 PM Court facts submitted inquired if need time to refute
03:29:52 PM Ms. 
Duke
stated do not need extra time. Cont'd argument Request case be 
dismissed in its entirety.
03:36:00 PM
Court
Greenfiled, Biship, Griggs and Latham all stand for proposition, 
failure to provide add'l services. Agree with that proposition. Bishop 
and Greenfield suggest can sue attorney in contract. Parties can 
agree to heighten expectations.
03:37:21 PM Ms. 
Duke overstatement of cases. Implied contract
03:40:09 PM Court regarding Justice Horton's dissent in Bishop
03:40:24 PM Ms. 
Duke duty that is owed
Filed: February 06, 2018  at 4:07, p.m.
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Janet Ellis   Deputy Clerk
i  m  4: . 

































:      i  W 
gjk  3 8  
   i  i   
   '  
 i i . 
 ,     
'l  
 . . . 
 fi l  I  . 
. W S' I   
 






03:40:51 PM Court hypothetical in a future 12 B-6 is that a malpractice
03:41:21 PM Ms. 
Duke comments
03:42:14 PM Mr. 
Trout argues breach of fiduciary claim.
04:00:10 PM Court not a fair statement
04:00:16 PM Mr. 
Trout Request court deny the Motion to dismiss
04:01:20 PM Ms. 
Duke
rebuttal argument - have to take it to a legal malpractice means - no 
exception here in Idaho, request Court follow the Supreme Court 
decision of Greenfield
04:06:53 PM Court takes under advisement
04:07:06 PM End 
Case  
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 






   
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson respectfully moves the Court for the entry of an Order granting 
Plaintiff the right to file a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Supplemental Memorandum”), a copy of which is attached hereto, 
and for its reasons relies upon the following: 
Plaintiff timely filed its Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, however Defendant’s 
Reply Memorandum and at the hearing on February 6, 2018, Defendant argued that there were 
substantive differences between a real estate agent and an attorney with respect to the doctrine of 
equitable forfeiture.  Plaintiff has found relevant case law that addresses equitable forfeiture as it 
relates to attorneys.  Given that Plaintiff did not have an opportunity to fully respond to this issue, 
Plaintiff requests an opportunity to do so. 





Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
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DATED February 9, 2018. 
 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 9, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
iCourt     
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 








   
Based upon questions presented and raised at oral argument on February 6, 2017, Plaintiff 
Rebecca Parkinson submits this Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Defendant James A. 
Bevis’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).   
SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENTS 
1. Both Realtors and Attorneys Qualify as “Agents” under Idaho Agency Law: 
The Idaho Supreme Court describes agents generally: “An agent is a person who has been 
authorized to act on behalf of a principal towards the performance of a specific task or series of tasks.” 
Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366 P.3d 1088, 1095 (2016). The Court describes realtors 
specifically: “A real estate broker is an agent standing in fiduciary relation to his principal.” Giese v. 
Tarp, 92 Idaho 243, 244, 440 P.2d 521, 522 (1968). And the Court describes attorneys specifically: 
“The relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency in which the client is the principal 
and the attorney is the agent.” Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329, 332, 92 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2004). See 
also Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B.V., 148 Idaho 89, 109, 218 P.3d 1150, 1170 (2009) (“It is generally 
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Supplemental Memorandum | Page 2 
accepted that the relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency in which the client is 
the principal and the attorney is the agent.”); and, Jaquith v. Stanger, 79 Idaho 49, 53, 310 P.2d 805, 807 
(1957) (“Where the relation of attorney and client exists, the client is bound, according to the ordinary 
rules of agency, by the acts of his attorney, within the scope of the latter's authority.”). Thus, there is 
no substantive distinction, with respect to principal/agent relations between realtors and attorneys. 
With respect to equitable forfeiture, the Idaho Supreme Court, in Rockefeller I, relied on general 
agency law to delineate Idaho’s equitable forfeiture doctrine:   
“As the Grabows' agent, Rockefeller was ‘a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope 
of his agency.’ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958); see also Mallory v. 
Watt, 100 Idaho 119, 122, 594 P.2d 629, 632, (1979) (‘A real estate broker is an agent standing 
in a fiduciary relation to his principal.’); Jordan v. Hunter, 124 Idaho 899, 865 P.2d 990 
(Ct.App.1993) (corporate officers are agents and subject to the fiduciary duties of agents).” It 
is the established law of this jurisdiction that an agent's right to compensation will be affected 
by a violation of his fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Cooke v. Iverson, 94 Idaho 929, 933, 500 P.2d 830, 
835 (1972) (real estate agents lose their commissions for failure to disclose material facts); 
Schroeder v. Rose, 108 Idaho 707, 710, 701 P.2d 327, 330 (Ct.App.1985) (compliance with 
fiduciary duties is a condition precedent to collecting a commission); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 456 and 469 (1958). Allowing an agent to 
retain his entire commission as a matter of law when he has breached his fiduciary duties 
would eviscerate agency law. Secure in his compensation from the principal as long as the 
assigned task is completed, an agent's only chance of loss from violating his duties would be 
if he harmed the principal. The higher requirement of acting in the interest of the principal, 
without a means of enforcement, would simply cease to exist.” 
(Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 642, 39 P.3d 577, 582 (2001)). Importantly, the Court in Rockefeller 
I used real estate agents and corporate officers as examples of agents—emphasizing the point that 
equitable forfeiture applies to all types of agents and that it is not industry specific. Here, the Court 
need not make any extensions of Idaho case law, but may simply apply the equitable forfeiture 
principles in Rockefeller I to Bevis as Parkinson’s attorney, i.e. as Parkinson’s agent.  
2. Both Realtors and Attorneys are Subject to Equitable Forfeiture: 
Both realtors and attorneys are subject to equitable forfeiture for breach of their fiduciary 
duties. The Court in Rockefeller I applied this doctrine generally to all types of agents. The Court then 
articulated its equitable forfeiture standards using the near-verbatim language of Section § 37 of the 
Restatement 3d of the Law Governing Lawyers, “Partial or Complete Forfeiture of a Lawyers 
Compensation,” as seen in the following table: 
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A Comparison of Equitable Forfeiture Standards  
Rockefeller I Standards: Section § 37 Restatement Standards: 
“In making its determination, the trial judge 
should consider factors including:  
(1) the seriousness and timing of the violation;  
(2) the willfulness of the breach; 
(3) the potential for, or actual harm to the 
principal; 
(4) and whether the agent completed a 
divisible portion of his contract duties 
before the breach occurred for which 
compensation can be determined.” 
“Considerations relevant to the question of 
forfeiture include: 
(1) the gravity and timing of the violation; 
(2) its willfulness; 
(3) its effect on the value of the lawyer's 
work for the client;  
(4) any other threatened or actual harm to 
the client, and the adequacy of other 
remedies.” 
 It would be logically and substantively inconsistent to recognize the Rockefeller I forfeiture 
standards but not apply them to attorney conduct—particularly when those standards were gleaned 
from a near identical forfeiture standard specifically written for attorneys. As demonstrated in 
Parkinson’s response brief, filed on 1/30/2018, the Court in Rockefelelr I also cited to Texas case law 
which relied on Section § 37 standards. The fact that Rockefeller I involved realtors, not attorneys, is a 
matter of chance and is not legally significant. The Court should find that the Rockefeller I equitable 
forfeiture standards apply to Bevis’s conduct toward Parkinson and provide a legally sufficient basis 
for her breach of fiduciary duty claims.  
3. Recognition of Equitable Forfeiture as A Cause of Action Against Attorneys:   
As substantive authority, the Texas Supreme Court has said that the doctrine of equitable 
forfeiture applies broadly to attorneys and is not limited to cases with proof of actual damages:  
“Texas courts of appeals, as well as courts in other jurisdictions and respected commentators, 
have also held that forfeiture is appropriate without regard to whether the breach of fiduciary 
duty resulted in damages. See, e.g., Watson v. Limited Partners of WCKT, Ltd., 570 S.W.2d 179, 
182 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin, 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that limited partners may recover 
against general partner without a showing of actual damages); Russell v. Truitt, 554 S.W.2d 948, 
952 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that plaintiffs were entitled 
to recovery of agency fees as a matter of law if the breach of fiduciary duty was proved without 
regard as to whether the breach caused any harm); Anderson v. Griffith, 501 S.W.2d 695, 701 
(Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e) (explaining that, even though the principal 
was not injured, ‘the self-interest of the agent is considered a vice which renders the transaction 
voidable at the election of the principal without looking into the matter further than to 
ascertain that the interest of the agent exists’) (quoting Burleson v. Earnest, 153 S.W.2d 869, 874 
(Tex. Civ. App.--Amarillo 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.)); see also Judwin Properties, Inc. v. Griggs & 
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Harrison, P.C., 911 S.W.2d 498, 507 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (stating in 
dicta that ‘when an attorney has stolen or used the interest to the detriment of his client, the 
plaintiff need not prove causation for breach of fiduciary duty’); Bryant v. Lewis, 27 S.W.2d 604, 
608 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1930, writ dism'd ) (holding that attorney who represented clients 
with conflicting interests was not entitled to any compensation for legal services rendered 
without addressing whether actual damages were sustained).” 
(Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 239 n.35 (Tex. 1999)). See also, Hendry v. Pelland, 315 U.S. App. D.C. 
297, 73 F.3d 397, 402 (1996) (“Under District of Columbia law, clients suing their attorney for breach 
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and seeking disgorgement of legal fees as their sole remedy need prove 
only that their attorney breached that duty, not that the breach caused them injury.”).   
 Next, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals confirms that the Texas rule in Burrow v. Arce is 
consistent with the Restatement Second on Agency § 469, the same Restatement cited by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Rockefeller I: 
“Under Texas law, a client need not prove actual damages in order to obtain forfeiture of an 
attorney’s fee for the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty to the client. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 
229, 240, 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 932 (Tex. 1999). See Yaquinto v. Sergerstrom, (In re Segerstrom, 247 
F.3d 218, 226 n.5 (5th Cir. 2001). The Texas rule accords with the rule adopted in several other 
states, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 243, the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469, 
and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, §§ 37, 55. It also comports with 
the two circuit level decisions on the issue, Hendry v. Pelland, 315 U.S. App. D.C. 297, 73 F.3d 
397 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying D.C. law), Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 
1980) (applying Kansas law).” 
(Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 77 (3d Cir. 2006)).  
Finally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explains that an attorney’s ethical violations are 
sufficient for the attorney to forfeit or disgorge his or her fees: 
“In sum, under long-standing equitable principles, a district court has broad discretion to deny 
fees to an attorney who commits an ethical violation. In making such a ruling, the district court 
may consider the extent of the misconduct, including its gravity, timing, willfulness, and effect 
on the various services performed by the lawyer, and other threatened or actual harm to the 
client. See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 37 (2000).” 
(Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d 645, 655 (9th Cir. 2012)). See also, Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash. 2d 451, 462, 
824 P.2d 1207, 1213 (1992) (“The general principle that a breach of ethical duties may result in denial 
or disgorgement of fees is well recognized.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn. 1982) (“This 
court has repeatedly stated that an attorney (or any fiduciary) who breaches his duty to his client 
forfeits his right to compensation…the law has traditionally been unyielding in its assessment of 
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penalties when a fiduciary, or trustee, or agent has breached any of his obligations. The underlying 
policy is a strong one. It recognizes that insuring absolute fidelity to the principal's (or beneficiary's) 
interests is fundamental to establishing the trust necessary to the proper functioning of these 
relationships.”).  
4. The Court’s Forms-of-Action Analysis is Controlled by Parkinson’s Remedies:  
Bevis asserts in his reply brief, filed on 02/02/2018, that Parkinson’s claim is really a 
malpractice claims because “…Idaho does not recognize a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action 
against one’s own attorney.” (Reply in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion to Dismiss 
Pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(6), p. 5). This statement is misleading as a matter of fact and law. Legal 
malpractice is traditionally a legal action, with legal remedies, while equitable forfeiture is an equitable 
action with equitable remedies. Of course, Parkinson knows that the Idaho State Constitution 
abolished forms of action in 1890. However, the Idaho Supreme Court noted soon afterward: 
“Abolition of the distinction between legal and equitable actions and the forms of legal actions does 
not abolish the distinction between remedies.” Anderson v. War Eagle Consol. Mining Co., 8 Idaho 789, 
807, 72 P. 671, 676 (1903).  
Here, Parkinson simply seeks the equitable remedies of forfeiture and disgorgement. 
Parkinson has a clear legal right to seek these remedies under a breach of fiduciary duty action, not a 
legal malpractice action, as demonstrated above. Bevis’s position, if adopted, would force the Court 
to combine all of Parkinson’s potential claims and remedies under a single malpractice action. Bevis 
does not cite any authorities to support this result. In fact, one of Bevis’s alleged supporting 
authorities, Bishop v. Owens, contains a dissent by Justice Horton which explains that not all forms of 
action against an attorney (e.g., breach of contract) necessarily fit within a legal malpractice action.  See 
Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 617, 625, 272 P.3d 1247, 1256 (2012). As stated in the Hendry v. Pelland case, 
cited above, there is a fundamental rationale and purpose to these distinct remedies:  
“The different treatment of compensatory damages and forfeiture of legal fees also makes 
sense. Compensatory damages make plaintiffs whole for the harms that they have suffered as 
a result of defendants’ actions. Clients therefore need to prove that their attorney’s breach 
caused them injury so that the trier of fact can determine whether they are entitled to any 
damages. Forfeiture of legal fees serves several different purposes. It deters attorney 
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misconduct, a goal worth furthering regardless of whether a particular client has been harmed. 
See Gilchrist, 387 N.W.2d at 416; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 49 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991) (noting that forfeiture deters 
misconduct). It also fulfills a longstanding and fundamental principle of equity--that fiduciaries 
should not profit from their disloyalty. See, e.g., Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 
262, 268-69, 85 L. Ed. 820, 61 S. Ct. 493 (1941); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 469 cmt. a (1958). And, like compensatory damages, it compensates clients for a 
harm they have suffered. See Gilchrist, 387 N.W.2d at 416; Kidney Ass'n of Oregon, Inc., 843 P.2d 
at 447. Unlike other forms of compensatory damages, however, forfeiture reflects not the 
harms clients suffer from the tainted representation, but the decreased value of the 
representation itself.” 
(Hendry v. Pelland, 315 U.S. App. D.C. 297, 73 F.3d 397, 402 (1996)).  
Parkinson respectfully requests the Court reject Bevis’s arguments and allow Parkinson to 
proceed upon her stated claim. If Bevis is still confused as to the nature of the claim, or its remedies, 
he can move for a more definite statement instead of seeking a dismissal: “If upon reading the 
complaint the defendant is uncertain as to the nature of the claim of which he has been placed on 
notice, the proper remedy for seeking more particularity is by motion for a more definite statement at 
the pleading stage or by the rules of discovery thereafter.” Andemeskel v. Waffle House, 227 Ga. App. 
887, 888, 490 S.E.2d 550, 551 (1997). In any event, the Court should allow Parkinson the chance to 
amend her pleadings, if necessary, prior to any Rule 12 dismissal.  
DATED February 9, 2018. 




    /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 9, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
iCourt     
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE  
OF COURT TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM – PAGE 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
 




REBECCA PARKINSON,  
  




JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 
FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
                 Defendant.  
  
 
 On December 1, 2017, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Each party submitted briefing in accordance with the schedule set 
forth in I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3). After recusal of the previously assigned District Judge, this Court held a 
hearing on the motion on February 6, 2018. After hearing oral argument, this Court took the 
matter under advisement. Plaintiff now moves this Court for permission to file a supplemental 
memorandum because Plaintiff has found additional relevant case law that Plaintiff believes 
refutes arguments made by counsel for the Defendant at the hearing on this motion. That request 
is denied. The parties each had ample opportunity to provide briefing on the issues presented. If 
the Court believes it needs the parties to address an issue of law that was not previously 
addressed by the parties, the Court will order additional briefing.  
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied. The Court will not consider the supplemental 
brief submitted along with Plaintiff’s motion.  
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
  _____________________________ 
  JONATHAN MEDEMA 
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Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
 I hereby certify that on February ___, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the within 
instrument as follows: 
Kim J. Trout 
Trout Law, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 
Boise, ID 83703 
Email: ktrout@trout-law.com 
(  ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(  ) Hand Delivered 
(X) Electronic Mail 
(  ) Facsimile 
 
 
Keely E. Duke 
Email: ked@dukescanlan.com  
Aubrey D. Lyon 
Email: adl@dukescanlan.com 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, ID 83707 
 
  
(  ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(  ) Hand Delivered 
(X) Electronic Mail 




 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 




     Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 










JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 








Case No. CV01-17-8744 
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
 





 In 2015, Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson was represented in her divorce proceedings by 
Defendant James Bevis, a licensed attorney. Before the Court for decision presently is 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
Defendant alleges Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead in her complaint a claim upon 
which this Court may grant her relief. Ms. Parkinson alleges in this action that Mr. Bevis 
breached his fiduciary duties to her during her divorce. Importantly for this motion, Ms. 
Parkinson has not alleged in her complaint that she suffered any economic damages as a 
result of Mr. Bevis’ alleged breach of his fiduciary duties to her. Indeed, she has admitted 
at argument that she suffered no economic loss and she is not seeking compensatory 
damages. Instead, Ms. Parkinson asserts she is entitled to a remedy in equity. She is 
seeking to have this Court order Mr. Bevis to disgorge all or some of the fees Ms. 
Parkinson paid to him for the services he provided to her in the divorce action. For the 
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Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
I. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO A MOTION PURSUANT TO 
 I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
 Rule 12(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure lists various defenses to a claim 
for relief that a party may assert by motion. One of those defenses is that the pleading by 
the adverse party simply fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6). In deciding such motions, the Court’s review is limited to the language of the 
pleading. The Court must draw all inferences from the facts stated in the pleading in favor 
of the non-moving party and determine whether a claim for relief has been alleged. Miles 
v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989).  
II. THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM PLAINTIFF HAS MADE AND THE 
 PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS. 
 In her complaint, Plaintiff makes several, what she calls, factual allegations. The 
relevant ones are: that she and Mr. Bevis were in an attorney-client relationship; that 
during the course of representing her in the divorce, Mr. Bevis shared attorney-client 
confidential information with her husband’s attorney; that Mr. Bevis “was complicit” with 
her husband’s attorney in securing a divorce for her husband on terms more favorable to 
him than to her; and that Mr. Bevis failed to fully and adequately evaluate the true value of 
the marital community’s real property. [Compl. ¶¶ 4-6].  
 However, despite this varied list of allegations, Plaintiff makes only one claim for 
relief in her complaint. She alleges Mr. Bevis “was subject to ethical and fiduciary duties” 
to her and that he “breached his duties to [her] by, among other things, disclosing attorney 
client privileged communications to Welsh during the course of the divorce proceedings, 
all to [her] damage in an amount to be proven at time of trial.” [Compl. ¶¶ 8-9]. Plaintiff 
entitled her cause of action as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that it fails to state a 
claim upon which the Court may grant relief. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff 
has alleged a claim for legal malpractice. Defendant argues that the elements a plaintiff 
must prove in a claim for legal malpractice are: 1) the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship, 2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer, 3) failure of the lawyer to 
perform the duty, and 4) the negligence of the lawyer must have been the proximate cause 
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of damage to the client. Defendant argues the complaint is deficient, in part, because 
Plaintiff has failed to allege the nature of her damages or the mechanism by which she 
believes Defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of those damages.  
 In response, Plaintiff concedes that she cannot show causation and damages to 
support a claim for professional malpractice. Plaintiff clarifies she does not intend to bring 
a claim at law for negligence. Rather, she is seeking equitable relief for what she alleges is 
Defendant’s breach of his fiduciary duties to her. In her briefing, she states that she is 
seeking an order compelling Defendant to disgorge all or some of the fees she paid him for 
his professional services as a consequence for that alleged breach. 
 Defendant argues in response that the courts of Idaho do not permit a former client 
to bring a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty. Defendant argues that the Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that the only permissible cause of action a former client may bring against 
her former attorney for breach of the duties the attorney owes her because of that 
relationship is a claim for legal malpractice. Because Plaintiff concedes that she has not 
alleged and cannot prove such a claim, Defendant argues her complaint must be dismissed.  
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A CLAIM FOR PROFESSIONAL  
  MALPRACTICE AND A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY  
  DUTY.  
 In Idaho a principal may bring an action in the courts seeking to compel the 
principal’s agent to disgorge or to forgo the agent’s compensation where the principal 
alleges the agent has breached his fiduciary duties to the principal. In Rockefeller v. 
Grabow, the Idaho Supreme Court explained this cause of action, as to real estate agents, 
as follows: 
It is the established law of this jurisdiction that an agent’s right to 
compensation will be affected by a violation of his fiduciary duties. See, 
e.g., Cooke v. Iverson, 94 Idaho 929, 933, 500 P.2d 830, 835 (1972) (real 
estate agents lose their commissions for failure to disclose material facts); 
Schroeder v. Rose, 108 Idaho 707, 710, 701 P.2d 327, 330 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(compliance with fiduciary duties is a condition precedent to collecting a 
commission); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 456 and 469 
(1958). Allowing an agent to retain his entire commission as a matter of law 
when he has breached his fiduciary duties would eviscerate agency law. 
Secure in his compensation from the principal as long as the assigned task is 
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completed, an agent’s only chance of loss from violating his duties would be 
if he harmed the principal. The higher requirement of acting in the interest 
of the principal, without a means of enforcement, would simply cease to 
exist. 
136 Idaho 637, 642, 39 P.3d 577, 582 (2001) (Rockefeller I). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
permitted similar claims in other agent/principal relationships. See Sorenson v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 118 P.3d 86 (2005) (retirement plan 
manager as fiduciary to plan participants); Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin &  Matthews, 
Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 873 P.2d 861 (1994) (lawyer acting as depository of funds on 
behalf of non-client); All American Realty, Inc. v. Sweet, 107 Idaho 229, 687 P.2d 1356 
(1984) (lawyer acting as closing agent in real estate transaction as agent of third parties 
having interest in transaction); and Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348, 
210 P. 1003 (1922) (employee as agent of employer). See also, Stearns v. Williams, 72 
Idaho 276, 240 P.2d 833 (1952) (finding a contract void as a matter of public policy 
because a government geologist breached his fiduciary duties to the public by executing 
the contract).  Examples of relationships from which the law will recognize a fiduciary 
relationship also include: members of the same family, partners, attorney and client, 
executor and beneficiary of an estate, insurer and insured, and close friends. Mitchell v. 
Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 820 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1991). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
held that lawyers owe their clients fiduciary duties as a result of the lawyer-client 
relationship. Idaho State Bar v. Williams, 122 Idaho 404, 834 P.2d 1320 (1992) (lawyer 
breached fiduciary duty to client by committing battery upon her).  
 As the Idaho Supreme Court’s statement in Rockefeller I quoted above makes clear, 
the remedy for an agent’s breach of a fiduciary duty to his principal may include loss of the 
agent’s right to compensation for the services the agent rendered to the principal. See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 456 and 469 (1958). Thus there is some logic to 
Plaintiff’s position that she may bring a cause of action against her lawyer for either 
professional negligence (malpractice) or for breach of his fiduciary duties to her; each may 
require her to prove different facts and each may entitle her to different remedies, but, she 
argues, there is no reason she may not pick and choose which action to bring as she sees 
fit.  
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 Defendant disagrees. Defendant argues the lawyer-client relationship is different 
from other fiduciary or agency relationships. Defendant seems to acknowledge that an 
Idaho client may sue her lawyer for breach of a duty if that duty does not arise from the 
lawyer’s standard of care as a professional. For example, if an attorney entered into a 
contract with a client whereby the attorney undertook an obligation to perform a certain 
action and failed to perform that action, the client could sue for breach of the contract. See 
Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d 650, 652, 654-55 (1982). 
Similarly, if an attorney agreed to provide a standard of care above the local standard for 
reasonably competent attorneys, a client could bring a breach of contract action if the 
lawyer were to breach that express higher standard. See Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 
620, 272 P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012) (“If an attorney and client want to provide for a higher 
standard of care, they may do so by express language in the contract.”). However, 
Defendant argues that if a client is alleging breach of a duty that a lawyer owed that client 
under the professional standard of care governing attorneys, then the client may only bring 
an action for malpractice; even if the lawyer and client executed a contract which created 
identical duties for the lawyer and even if the duty breached is one the law would have 
imposed on the lawyer as a fiduciary irrespective of the standards of his profession. Of 
course, if Defendant is correct, this means the client would not have available to her the 
equitable remedies available to other principals whose agents violate their fiduciary duties 
to that principal. The client would have a cause of action only if the lawyer’s breach of the 
duty actually caused her economic damage. Defendant argues the lawyer-client 
relationship is different from other agent-principal relationships in this regard, such as the 
real estate agent-customer relationship discussed in Rockefeller I, because, Defendant 
argues, the Idaho Supreme Court has said it is different.  The Court addresses those 
arguments below. Before doing so, it is necessary to put the arguments into some legal and 
historical context.  
 Dealing with the problematic lawyer has and continues to be problematic for the 
states. It is problematic in part because a lawyer’s duties to his client can arise from more 
than one source.  A  lawyer may owe his client particular duties because he and the client 
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consideration provided by the client to the lawyer, generally payment of a fee. The duties 
can be unique to that particular lawyer, that particular client, and the particular service that 
client wants the lawyer to perform. As it does for other parties who enter such agreements, 
the law provides a mechanism by which the client may seek to recover damage she 
suffered as a result of the lawyer’s failure to abide by or fulfill his agreement. That 
mechanism is a suit for breach of contract. 
 The lawyer is also a professional. Like many other professionals, attorneys 
collectively hold themselves and each other to certain standards. The law provides a 
mechanism by which the client may seek to recover damage she suffered because the 
attorney has failed to act consistently with the standards of his profession. That remedy is a 
suit for professional negligence. That remedy is available even in the absence of an 
agreement between the lawyer and client that the lawyer will live up to those standards. 
 Depending upon the service the lawyer is hired to perform, the law may also view 
the lawyer as being an agent for his client. The common law developed rules and remedies 
to protect a person, called the principal, who empowers another, called the agent, to act on 
his behalf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). This relationship is described 
as a fiduciary one; i.e. one of trust. Id. Black’s Law describes a fiduciary as: “Someone 
who is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope of 
their relationship.” Black’s Law Dictionary 10th Ed. 743. The law developed duties the 
agent owes to his principal. The Idaho Supreme Court has previously approved of the 
following description of some of those duties: 
Loyalty to his trust is the first duty which an agent owes to his principal. It 
follows as a necessary conclusion that the agent must not put himself in such 
a relationship that his interests become antagonistic to those of his principal. 
Fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at, and as a means of securing it the 
law will not permit the agent to place himself in a situation in which he may 
be tempted by his own private interest to disregard that of his principal. So it 
is the duty of the agent to make his principal a full and complete disclosure 
of all facts relative to the subject of his agency which it may be material to 
the principal to know. And, if an agent makes any profit in the course of his 
agency because of his failure to inform his principal of facts known to him, 
or which in the exercise of due diligence he should have ascertained for his 
principal, the profits of such transaction, as a matter of law, will belong 
exclusively to the agent’s principal. The law guards the fiduciary relation, 
i  , r ll f  
l , r
. i , 
ide  
f l f  lfi
i f . 
l . t
l ti l  ide
  f
t i t tl f . 
i . i i f
Wil t  
r i  l Vi
 
l l
l . § 1  
f  . fi  
i fi f l f
i l ti i . 10th   
. l f
ri f f  
l i . 
r lf 
t i f . 
li i f ri
r i lf i
 t f . 
f
f l j f
. f f
f f
f ige rt i
t f t f Wil
l i l t’ . 
’  IS -
000090
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 7 
which the relation of principal and agent is, with jealous care. It seeks to 
prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and personal interest. It 
demands that the agent shall work with an eye single to the interest of his 
principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his principal, either for 
himself or for others. 
Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348, 353, 210 P. 1003, 1005 (1922). 
Courts have historically provided to principals whose agents breach their fiduciary duties a 
broader range of remedies than a suit to recover actual damages. As the Supreme Court 
explained in Rockefeller I, quoted above, one remedy available to a principal when the 
agent breaches his fiduciary duties is to force the agent to return (disgorge) some or all of 
the compensation the principal paid the agent for the agent’s services. See also, 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (1958) (stating that agent is entitled to no 
compensation for conduct that is disobedient or breaches agent’s duty of loyalty to 
principal). 
 These various sources of imposing duties upon an attorney and the various 
remedies available to the client in the event the lawyer breaches those duties raise many 
questions to be resolved by the courts. If an attorney commits a single act that breaches his 
contractual, professional, and fiduciary duties to a client, is the client entitled to bring suit 
for breach of contract, malpractice, and breach of a fiduciary duty? Only one? Does the 
answer depend on the nature of the act? The nature of the duty breached? The remedy 
being sought by the client? A particularly difficult question is the question raised in this 
dispute – may a client pursue a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against her lawyer and 
seek disgorgement of some or all of the fees she paid the lawyer when the client has 
suffered no actual damage from the lawyer’s breach of any duty and, therefore, could not 
recover anything in a suit for breach of contract or malpractice? 
 Lawyers, courts, and legal scholars have wrestled with these questions for some 
time, particularly the question presented here. Some scholars have argued that courts 
should permit clients to sue their attorneys for breach of any fiduciary duty and should 
order attorneys who do so to disgorge fees paid them by the client under a broad range of 
circumstances. See Ray Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort 
and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. Rev. 235 (1994). 
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The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers advocates permitting clients to bring 
breach of fiduciary duty claims, like other principals may, but only where the breach of the 
duty has been clear and serious. The Restatement also advocates limiting the circumstances 
in which the lawyer is compelled to disgorge all of his fees. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000).   
 One scholar argues, for policy reasons, that claims for fiduciary breach and the 
remedy of fee disgorgement should be limited to those situations where the lawyer 
commits a crime against the client, where the lawyer commits an actual fraud against the 
client, and where the lawyer breaches a fiduciary duty and the client suffers actual damage 
from that breach, but the client cannot pursue a claim for professional malpractice because 
the lawyer was not negligent in the performance of the service the client hired him to 
perform. See Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1137 (1999). 
Another scholar advocates limiting fiduciary breach claims, and the remedy of fee 
disgorgement, not for policy reasons, but simply as a pragmatic matter to enable trial 
courts to apply the claim and the remedy in a somewhat logically and historically 
consistent manner. See Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as 
Legal Malpractice, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 689 (2006). 
 The states have taken differing approaches to these issues. The Texas Supreme 
Court has explicitly permitted clients to bring a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty against 
the client’s former attorney even where the client has suffered no actual damages. Burrow 
v. Arce, 997 S.W. 2d 229, 245 (Tex. 1999). The Texas Supreme Court adopted the rule 
regarding fee forfeiture from the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. Id. 
The courts of Washington, Minnesota, and the District of Columbia similarly permit such 
claims. See Eriks v. Denver, 824 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1992); Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W. 2d 
412 (Minn. 1986); and Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The courts 
of New York permit clients to bring breach of fiduciary duty claims against an attorney, 
but will dismiss such claims as redundant if they are premised on the same facts and seek 
identical relief as a claim for legal malpractice. See Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP v. 
Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 780 N.Y.S. 2d 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). The 
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Supreme Court of California has held that a plaintiff is not entitled to the remedy of fee 
disgorgement if the plaintiff cannot show actual damage from breach of the fiduciary duty. 
See Frye v. Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc., 129 P.3d 408, 423-24 (Cal. 2006); see also 
Slovensky v. Friedman, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), review denied, 
(discussing the Frye rule).  
 The parties argue that the Idaho Supreme Court has previously decided whether a 
client in Idaho may sue her lawyer for breach of a fiduciary duty in the absence of any 
actual damages. Not surprisingly, the parties each argue the Idaho Supreme Court has 
reached a different answer to that question.  
 B. THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHETHER IDAHO  
  RECOGNIZES THE TORT OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY  
  WHERE THE FIDUCIARY DUTY ARISES FROM THE   
  ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. 
 Plaintiff argues that the Idaho Supreme Court implicitly adopted the rules of the 
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers in Rockefeller I. Plaintiff argues that the 
Court in Rockefeller I cited to Burrow v Arce, a case involving a breach of fiduciary duty 
by an attorney, where the Texas Supreme Court did explicitly adopt the rules of the 
Restatement. Plaintiff points out much of the language the Court used in Rockefeller I to 
explain the rationale behind permitting actions to compel disgorgement of fees is similar to 
the language used in the Restatement. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, the Court adopted the 
rules in the Restatement for Idaho, despite the fact that Rockefeller I involved an agent who 
was not an attorney.  
 Defendant argues the Idaho Supreme Court has said lawyers are different and that 
the claims available to other parties in certain relationships are not available to those in the 
attorney client relationship. Defendant argues that when a plaintiff’s claim against her 
former attorney arises out of the professional relationship with him, the only claim that she 
may properly assert is one for professional negligence. Defendant cites to Griggs v. Nash, 
116 Idaho 228, 232, 775 P.2d 120, 124 (1989); Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 588, 51 
P.3d 396, 402 (2002); Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 621, 272 P.3d 1247, 1252 (2012); 
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and Greenfield v. Smith, 162 Idaho 246, ___, 395 P.3d 1279, 1284 (2017) in support of this 
argument.  
 In Griggs, the defendants filed a third party complaint seeking indemnity or 
contribution from their attorney based on alleged breach of a fiduciary relationship and 
negligence by their attorney. Griggs, 116 Idaho at 229, 775 P.2d at 121. The Court 
concluded that the action was not in fact an action for indemnity or contribution. Id. at 231, 
775 P.2d at 123. The Court stated: 
The third-party complaint is drawn in the form of an action for indemnity or 
contribution. It alleges that the liability of EMSI and Van Gelder to the 
Griggses, if any, resulted from the acts or omissions of Trout. It alleges that 
Trout’s breaches of his fiduciary duty and/or his negligence were the 
proximate cause of the damages. However, the claims in the third-party 
complaint are not based on any of the theories upon which the right to 
indemnity or contribution may be made. The only basis for the claims is 
Trout’s alleged malpractice in his representation of EMSI and Van Gelder. 
Id. The Court held that the statute of limitations for professional malpractice actions barred 
the third party claims. The Court found support for its rationale in the decision by the Ohio 
Court of Appeals in Muir v. Hadler Real Estate Mgmt. Co., 446 N.E. 2d 820 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1982). Griggs, 116 Idaho at 232, 775 P.2d at 124. The Idaho Supreme Court 
approved the following language used by the Ohio Supreme Court:  
An action against one’s attorney for damages resulting from the manner in 
which the attorney represented the client constitutes an action for 
malpractice within the meaning of [the statute of limitations for 
malpractice], regardless of whether predicated upon contract or tort or 
whether for indemnification or for direct damages… Malpractice by any 
other name still constitutes malpractice. 
Id., citing Muir, 446 N.E. 2d at 822. The Court’s decision in Griggs does not precisely 
answer the question here. The Court did not discuss any distinction between the third party 
plaintiffs’ claim that their attorney had breached a fiduciary duty and their claim that their 
attorney had been negligent. The Court simply held that the third party complaint in that 
case alleged a claim for malpractice and therefore was barred by the statute of limitations 
applicable to malpractice actions. While the Court’s use of the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
language suggests the Idaho Supreme Court might be inclined to follow Ohio Supreme 
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Court’s precedent and bar plaintiffs from bringing claims for breach of a fiduciary duty 
against their attorneys, at least if such claims are barred by the statute of limitations for 
professional negligence claims, the Idaho Supreme Court did not decide that issue in 
Griggs.  
 In Lapham, the plaintiff, through an agent, hired defendant Stewart, an attorney, to 
prepare loan documents and to assist in closing a transaction where Lapham was lending 
funds to others secured by an interest in real property. Lapham, 137 Idaho at 584, 51 P.3d 
at 398. When the loan closed, Lapham’s attorney received the loan proceeds and allegedly 
distributed the proceeds to the borrower without Lapham’s approval. Id. Lapham alleged 
his agent had instructed Stewart not to disburse the funds without Lapham’s approval. Id. 
After the borrower defaulted on the loan, Lapham brought an action for legal malpractice 
against Stewart. He later sought permission to amend his complaint to include claims for 
professional negligence, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. The 
district court denied his motion to amend and dismissed the claim for professional 
negligence as being barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 585, 51 P.3d at 399.  
 In affirming the district court’s decision to deny the motion to amend, the Idaho 
Supreme Court focused on the language of I.C. § 5-219(4). The Court stated: 
Lapham contends that the claims for negligence, breach of contract, and 
breach of fiduciary duty are distinct from his claim for professional 
malpractice and are not included within the scope of Idaho Code § 5–219(4). 
That statute applies to “professional malpractice,” which it defines as 
“wrongful acts or omissions in the performance of professional services by 
any person, firm, association, entity or corporation licensed to perform such 
services under the law of the state of Idaho.”  
Id. at 588, 51 P.3d at 402 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The Court held that 
I.C. § 5-219(4) bars untimely claims even if such claims are not alleged as a negligence 
action. The Court held the language of the statute precludes any untimely claim where the 
allegation is a licensed professional committed a wrongful act or omission in the 
performance of that professional service, whether the claim was grounded in tort or breach 
of contract. See id. at 588 n.4, 51 P.3d at 402 n.4.  
 This Court concludes I.C. § 5-219 is applicable to Plaintiff’s complaint in this 
action for the reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in Lapham. However, that does not 
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resolve the instant motion. Defendant has not argued that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by 
the statute of limitations. Nothing else in Lapham answers the questions presented here. 
 In Bishop, a client sued her former attorney, defendant Owens, for both 
professional negligence and breach of contract. During litigation the client died and 
plaintiff Bishop pursued the claims as the client’s personal representative. Defendant 
Owens argued that the claim for professional negligence abated on the client’s death and 
that the claim for breach of contract failed to state a valid claim for relief because it simply 
reasserted the professional negligence claim. The Court held that “Bishop’s breach of 
contract claim, which asserts the same claim as the legal malpractice theory, which has 
traditionally been treated as the proper claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.” Bishop, 152 Idaho at 621, 272 P.3d at 1252. The majority in Bishop cited three 
concerns that led them to reach this result: that to hold otherwise would create a per se 
breach of contract action in every legal malpractice action, would render the statute of 
limitations applying to legal malpractice actions moot, and would call into question the 
standard of care regarding legal malpractice actions and the application of the economic 
loss rule to legal malpractice claims. Id. Defendant argues this holding is equally 
applicable to Plaintiff’s claim for breach of a fiduciary duty. However, the Court in Bishop 
did not discuss claims for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court’s holding was simply that 
the breach of contract claim made by Bishop did not state a claim for relief. That holding 
was limited to the specific claim made in that case. If that holding is binding on this Court 
in this case it is only because the rationale applied by the Court in Bishop would compel a 
similar result here.  
 The majority’s rationale in Bishop is candidly difficult for this Court to understand. 
Therefore this Court struggles to determine how it should apply here. A breach of contract 
claim would arise only where the contract expressly set forth a standard of care the 
attorney agreed to be held to. As Justice Horton points out in his dissent, nothing requires 
an attorney to agree to an express standard of care in contracts with his clients. See Id. at 
626, 272 P.3d at 1257 (Horton, J., dissenting). In cases where the attorney does not 
expressly agree in the contract to undertake any duties, or specify the manner in which he 
will perform his services, the law will impose duties on the attorney under the local 
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standard of practice for professionals and breach of those duties is actionable in 
negligence, not contract.  
 Justice Jim Jones stated in his concurring opinion that a plaintiff may still sue her 
lawyer for breach of contract. Id. at 622-23, 272 P.3d at 1253-54. However, that apparently 
only applies where the contract expressly creates a duty the law would not otherwise also 
impose on the lawyer as a professional. Id. Reading both the majority opinion and Justice 
Jim Jones’ concurring opinion, the Court’s decision in Bishop seems to stand for the 
following proposition: a client cannot sue her attorney in both negligence and contract if 
the manner in which the client alleges the attorney breached the provisions of the contract 
is the same as the manner in which the client alleges the attorney breached the local 
standard of care. Stated another way, where a contract and the law impose identical duties 
on a legal professional, a client may only bring an action to recover for breach of the duty 
imposed by law.  
 This conclusion seems contrary to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d) that 
expressly permits a party to allege claims in the alternative. Some states, like New York, 
do not permit parties to allege duplicitous claims for relief. See Kordower-Zetlin v. Home 
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 22 N.Y.S. 3d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). Not surprisingly, as discussed 
above, New York courts will typically dismiss a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty if the 
claim is duplicitous of a claim for professional negligence.  
 Historically plaintiffs in Idaho have been permitted to seek alternative forms of 
relief under a single factual and legal theory, M.K. Transp., Inc., v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 
612 P.2d 1192 (1980), and to pursue alternative legal claims given one particular factual 
scenario, Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 249 P.3d 829 (2011). The Court in Bishop did 
not discuss I.R.C.P. 8(d) or otherwise explain its concern about alternative claims by 
plaintiffs in malpractice cases. This Court concludes the majority in Bishop intended the 
rule announced in Bishop to be an exception to I.R.C.P. 8(d); an exception that applies, if 
nowhere else, in legal malpractice cases. Whether that rule should bar Plaintiff’s claim in 
this case depends on whether the reasons the Court adopted the rule in Bishop should apply 
equally to breach of fiduciary duty claims as it does to claims for breach of contract. 
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Therefore, this Court will return to examining the expressed rationale behind the holding in 
Bishop.  
 The Supreme Court stated that to permit Bishop to bring a claim for breach of 
contract that is essentially identical to a claim for professional negligence would render the 
statute of limitations for professional malpractice actions moot.  Bishop, 152 Idaho at 621, 
272 P.3d at 1252. This statement seems inconsistent with the language of I.C. § 5-219 and 
the Court’s decision in Lapham. As the Court explained in Lapham, the language of I.C. § 
5-219 is not specific to actions in negligence. The statute places a limitation on when a 
plaintiff may file any action to recover damages for a wrongful act or omission in the 
performance of professional services by any person, firm, association, entity or corporation 
licensed to perform such services under the law of the state of Idaho. I.C. § 5-219(4). The 
language of the statute seems to apply to actions where the plaintiff alleges the wrongful 
act was a breach of the express terms of a contract for professional services and to actions 
where the plaintiff alleges the wrongful act was a breach of some duty imposed by law on 
the professional. The Court stated as much in footnote 4 in its decision in Lapham. 
Lapham, 137 Idaho at 588 n. 4, 51 P.3d at 402 n. 4. Therefore, it seems unnecessary to bar 
plaintiffs from asserting alternative claims for breach of contract and professional 
negligence against their attorneys simply to avoid making I.C. § 5-219(4) moot. The 
statute would bar both claims if filed after the deadline set in that statute. In any event, that 
rationale is not helpful in resolving Defendant’s motion in this case. As stated above, this 
Court believes I.C. § 5-219(4) is applicable to Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim 
because she is alleging that a licensed professional committed a wrongful act (breach of a 
fiduciary duty) in the performance of professional services. That statute would not be moot 
if this Court permits her claim to proceed. There simply has been no argument that her 
claim is untimely under I.C. § 5-219(4).  
 The Court also expressed concern in Bishop that if it permitted Bishop’s claim for 
breach of contract to proceed, doing so “would also call into question matters such as the 
standard of care regarding legal malpractice actions, which is to comply with the local 
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malpractice claims.” Bishop, 152 Idaho at 621, 272 P.3d at 1252. The majority did not 
further elucidate these concerns.  
 At the risk of further confessions of inability, this Court is not sure it understands 
either of these concerns. As both Justice Jim Jones and Justice Horton articulated in their 
opinions, a lawyer may agree to undertake specific duties in a contract and be liable in 
contract for breaching those duties. Whatever duty the lawyer agreed to undertake in the 
contract, the law would still impose those duties on the lawyer applicable under the local 
standard of care and the lawyer would be liable for damages caused by breach of those 
duties in negligence.1 Depending upon the language of the contract, the lawyer might be 
liable to the client for breach of the contract, but not negligence; for negligence, but not 
breach of the contract; neither; or both. However, permitting a client to bring both actions 
seems unlikely to create confusion as to the local standard of care. The local standard of 
care would not change except in a very broad way due to changing customer expectations. 
Hypothetically, if more and more attorneys started agreeing in their contracts to perform 
their services in a manner that was more stringent or more demanding than that which 
would otherwise be expected under the local standard of care existing at the time the 
contract was made; eventually, the local standard of care will rise to match what the 
majority of attorneys were agreeing to do in their contracts. This is simply another way of 
saying that the local standard of care is a local one. However, this will occur regardless of 
whether courts permit clients to pursue actions against their attorneys for breach of 
contract in addition to actions for negligence. As lawyers in an area become more 
competitive and start providing a higher and higher standard of care for their clients, the 
minimum standards expected of all lawyers in that area will increase. Those issues and 
sources of confusion will exist regardless of whether clients are permitted to sue their 
attorneys for breaching contracts.  
 Therefore, this Court remains uncertain of the Bishop majority’s concern. The 
standard of care owed by a lawyer to his client in a certain area is a question of law. 
Generally a plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish a defendant has breached 
                                                          
1 Lawyers cannot, by contract, relieve themselves of the duty to perform their professional services 
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this standard. What duties the lawyer owed his client under that standard will be given to 
the jury by the Court in its instructions. Any duties a lawyer agrees to be responsible to 
perform in a contract will be set forth in the contract. What that duty was will be 
determined by the language of the contract. Having to decide whether the lawyer’s act 
breached both the duty under the local standard of care as set forth in the Court’s 
instructions and the duty set forth in the language of the contract itself seems no more 
difficult in the context of a lawyer-client relationship than in any other case where a 
plaintiff alleges breach of contract and negligence.  
 The Bishop majority’s concern regarding the application of the economic loss rule 
is also difficult to understand. The economic loss rule states generally that a claimant may 
not recover purely economic losses in a negligence action because the law does not impose 
a general duty upon everyone to protect others from economic loss. Duffin v. Idaho Crop 
Improvement Ass’n., 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995); Tusch Enters. v. 
Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 41, 740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987); Clark v. Int’l Harvester Co., 99 
Idaho 326, 336, 581 P.2d 784, 794 (1978). However, there is an exception to this general 
rule in cases where a professional performs personal services for another. In that case, the 
law imposes a duty on the professional to protect the client from economic loss and, 
therefore, the client may recover for economic losses caused by the professional’s 
negligence in performing those duties. McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. of America, 97 Idaho 
777, 780, 554 P.2d 955, 958 (1976). Professional negligence actions therefore almost 
always involve an exception to the economic loss rule. How the economic loss rule applies 
to professional negligence actions seems a question unlikely to be impacted by permitting 
a client to bring a separate claim alleging that her attorney violated the specific language of 
the contract she entered into with him. A lawyer will always owe to a client those duties 
mandated by the local standards of his profession. While the scope of the tasks the client 
wishes the lawyer to perform will necessarily be set by the lawyer and client’s agreement, 
the lawyer will always be bound to perform those tasks consistent with the local standards 
of his profession or be liable to his client in negligence for having failed to do so. This is 
so simply because of the existence of the relationship between the lawyer and the client; 
not the language of their specific agreement.  
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 However, there seems little difficulty with permitting lawyers to expressly agree to 
additional duties or a greater standard of care if a lawyer chooses to do so.  Adjudicating a 
client’s claim that her lawyer also violated a duty the lawyer specifically agreed to perform 
in a contract, even if the act or omission the client alleges violated both duties is the same, 
seems no more complicated in the context of an attorney-client relationship than it is in the 
multitude of other circumstances where the courts permit plaintiffs to alternatively allege 
that a defendant’s single act breached both the express terms of a contract (breach of 
contract) and the unwritten terms the law implies in every contract (breach of implied 
warranty), or where the plaintiff claims a defendant’s single act breached a duty owed to 
the plaintiff that has been expressly set by the legislature (negligence per se) and also 
breached a duty the courts simply impose on any defendant in that situation (negligence).  
 By this discussion, this Court is not intending to be critical of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bishop or of the majority’s opinion in that case. This Court is simply 
attempting to be transparent about how this Court evaluates Defendant’s argument that the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Bishop compels this Court to grant Defendant’s motion.  
 The final rationale stated by the majority in Bishop for its conclusion is that the 
legal malpractice theory “has traditionally been treated as the proper claim” in such 
circumstances. Bishop, 152 Idaho at 621, 272 P.3d at 1252. Justice Horton pointed out in 
his dissent that he was unaware of any prior instance where the Court determined a party 
may be relieved of liability for the breach of an express term of a written contract on the 
basis that the plaintiff advanced the wrong theory. Id. at 625, 272 P.3d at 1256. Certainly 
this rationale for barring breach of contract actions would apply equally to Plaintiff’s 
breach of fiduciary duty claim. This Court concludes the Supreme Court in Bishop 
expressed that plaintiffs whose claims “traditionally” have been treated as claims for legal 
professional negligence may not alternatively allege relief under some other legal theory 
based on the same facts. This rule appears to be unique to plaintiffs in legal professional 
negligence actions.  
 Lastly, Defendant cites to Greenfield v. Smith, 162 Idaho 246, 395 P.3d 1279 
(2017). In Greenfield, a client sued her former attorney and alleged claims for negligence, 
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied by law in 
l i fi r i l
i t f  
l l cifi ll
l l  
f tt l
t f sta W i f l r ti l l
i f f
t ie f
l i tiff  i
l i tiff l   l
i l  i . 
 f
i f j i  i i l
t t r
. 
t  j i
 i l l i
sta ce .  
f  W
f il f f tt
i tiff . . rt i l
f l ll l i ti
f fi
i i ll
l  l r ti l l li f
 fs
l . 
l fi l . i  
fi t l  
f f f i l  
’  IS - l
000101
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 18 
such contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and fraud.  All of 
the claims came from complaints about how the lawyer had represented her in a prior 
criminal case and a prior civil action. Id. at ___, 395 P.3d at 1273. The district court 
dismissed the fraud claim for a defect in the pleadings. The district court determined all of 
the remaining claims were subject to the statute of limitations for professional malpractice 
actions: I.C. § 5-219(4). The Supreme Court agreed. The Court again affirmed the holding 
in Lapham that I.C. § 5-219(4) includes more than negligence actions. Its time limitations 
apply to any claim for damage as a result of a wrongful act or omission in the performance 
of a professional service by a person licensed in Idaho to perform such service. Greenfield, 
162 Idaho at ___, 395 P.3d at 1283-84.  
 The Court’s holding in Greenfield does not support Defendant’s argument here. 
Defendant argues that Greenfield stands for the proposition that a plaintiff may only bring 
a professional negligence action against her lawyer when she alleges the lawyer committed 
wrongful acts in the course of rendering her professional services. There is some language 
in Greenfield from which Defendant might understandably reach this conclusion. The 
Supreme Court holds in part one of its opinion that all of the plaintiff’s various contract 
and tort claims are subject to the statute of limitations governing professional malpractice 
actions. Id. In part three of its opinion the Court then writes that “[i]n order to establish a 
claim for legal malpractice the plaintiff must show: “(a) the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) a breach of duty by 
the lawyer (i.e., the lawyer’s conduct fell below the standard of care); and (d) the lawyer’s 
deficient performance proximately caused damages.” Id. at __, 395 P.3d at 1285. 
Defendant concludes that every plaintiff alleging that a licensed attorney committed a 
wrongful act in the course of rendering the plaintiff services must prove the elements of a 
negligence claim. This Court does not read the language in Greenfield so broadly. Courts 
frequently, and perhaps confusingly, use the term “malpractice” when referring to a claim 
for professional negligence. However, as the Supreme Court made clear in Lapham, the 
definition of “malpractice” in I.C. § 5-219 is significantly broader. It includes claims other 
than those in professional negligence. In parts one and three of its opinion in Greenfield, 
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the Court was using the term “malpractice” to mean different things. In part one, the Court 
was referring to all those claims that subject to the temporally limitations in I.C. § 5-219. 
This includes more than claims for professional negligence. In part three of its opinion, the 
Court was simply setting forth the elements of a professional negligence claim. By using 
the term legal malpractice instead of legal professional negligence, the Court did not hold 
that every possible claim that might be barred by I.C. § 5-219(4) is necessarily converted 
into a claim for professional negligence and the plaintiff must therefore prove the elements 
of that claim and that claim alone. For example, the Court did not hold that the plaintiff 
was precluded from bringing her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
unless she could prove the elements of the professional negligence claim or that she could 
never sue her attorney for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court simply 
held that her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was barred by the statute of 
limitations applicable to professional malpractice actions because it arose out of an alleged 
wrongful act by a licensed professional in the performance of professional services. 
Nothing about the holding in Greenfield supports Defendant’s argument that plaintiffs are 
barred from bringing breach of fiduciary duty claims against their former attorneys, 
assuming such claims are timely under I.C. § 5-219(4).  
 C. IDAHO PERMITS PLAINTIFFS TO BRING A CLAIM FOR   
  BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY WHERE THE FIDUCIARY  
  DUTY ARISES FROM THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP;  
  HOWEVER, THE CLAIM MUST BE DISTINCT FROM A CLAIM  
  FOR PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE. 
 This Court concludes the Idaho Supreme Court has not expressly prohibited clients 
from bringing breach of fiduciary duty claims against their attorneys. This Court concludes 
that the Idaho Supreme Court has not categorically barred principals from suing their agent 
for alleged breaches of the agent’s fiduciary duty simply because the fiduciary duty arose 
from an attorney-client relationship.   
 However, the Supreme Court’s holding in Bishop seems to stand for the proposition 
that the Supreme Court will not permit clients in Idaho to sue their attorneys under a legal 
theory other than professional negligence if the client’s claim is one that could be brought 
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in professional negligence. As discussed above, the Court appears to have reached the 
decision it did in Bishop because the language of the contract Bishop alleged her attorney 
breached was the functional equivalent of a duty the law imposed on her attorney anyway. 
See Bishop, 152 Idaho at 621, 272 P.3d at 12521 (“The language in the contingent fee 
agreement that ‘[a]ttorneys shall represent Client in said matter and do all things necessary, 
appropriate, or advisable, in regard thereto’ is not materially different from the standard 
applied in the legal malpractice claim.”). See also, id. at 626 n.3, 272 P.3d at 1257 n.3 
(Horton, J., dissenting).  
 This Court concludes the rationale expressed in Bishop as to Bishop’s breach of 
contract claim apply well enough to claims for breach of fiduciary duty claim so as to 
compel this Court to reach a similar conclusion. There are some distinctions between a 
breach of contract claim and a breach of fiduciary duty claim. One obvious difference is 
the available remedies. In a breach of contract claim the plaintiff must show causation and 
damages in addition to showing breach of the contract itself. The plaintiff in Bishop was 
alleging the same damages were caused by her attorney’s breach of the terms of the 
contract as were caused by his breach of the local standard of care for professionals. Her 
remedy was identical under either claim. The only benefit to her at trial in alleging both 
claims would have been the ability to argue the attorney breached the slightly different 
wording of his duties under the contract versus the duties imposed by law. Perhaps the 
Supreme Court simply concluded that where her remedy was the same either way, it was 
going to require her to assert the traditional cause of action for the sake of efficiency and to 
avoid confusion.  
 In a breach of fiduciary duty claim, the remedies can be vastly different. This case 
is a perfect example. Defendant claims she has no actual injuries; thus she cannot prove a 
claim for professional malpractice. She is seeking only the remedy of fee disgorgement, 
which she argues she is entitled to in equity because Defendant did an act that she alleges 
damaged not her, but rather their relationship. Should that be sufficient to avoid the result 
in Bishop? This Court feels compelled by Bishop to hold otherwise, for this reason: In 
Bishop, the distinction between a claim sounding in contract and a claim sounding in 
negligence had a significant practical effect given the original client’s death. The claim in 
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negligence abated upon the client’s death; the claim in contract did not. In Bishop, 
permitting the plaintiff to pursue alternative claims for breach of contract and professional 
negligence would have had the practical effect of permitting the plaintiff to pursue the 
breach of contract claim. Thus, while the legal remedy (compensatory damages) for each 
claim was the same; the practical remedies available were vastly different. This fact was 
not sufficient to prevent the Supreme Court from adopting its apparently unique rule for 
suits against lawyers – if a claim can be asserted as both one for breach of contract and one 
for professional negligence, only the claim for professional negligence can be brought, 
regardless of whether that limits or eliminates any remedy. 
 This Court feels compelled to reach the same result here. In other words, if a 
plaintiff’s claim for professional negligence and for breach of fiduciary duty are identical 
except for the remedy being sought – actual damages versus fee disgorgement – the 
plaintiff may only pursue the claim for professional negligence. This conclusion seems 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s rationale and holding in Bishop.  
 However, as discussed above, that does not mean a plaintiff is precluded from bring 
a breach of fiduciary duty claim simply because the fiduciary duty is one that arose 
because of an attorney-client relationship. In Bishop, the Supreme Court’s concern was not 
that the duties Bishop alleged the attorney breached arose from different sources: language 
of the contract versus the local standard of care for legal professionals. Rather, the Court’s 
concern appeared to be that the duty that arose under each was essentially the same. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate not to focus on the source of the duty Plaintiff alleges 
Defendant breached, but rather precisely what that duty was and how it was allegedly 
breached.  
 Despite allowing clients to bring claims for breach of a fiduciary duty against their 
attorneys, the courts of Texas have precluded plaintiffs from bringing a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty and a claim for professional negligence where those claims would be 
duplicitous. Texas courts refer to this rule as the rule against “fracturing” professional 
negligence claims against attorneys. The Texas Court of Appeals has explained the rule as 
follows:  
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The rule against “fracturing” professional negligence claims against 
attorneys holds that “a case arising out of an attorney’s alleged bad legal 
advice or improper representation” may not “be split out into separate 
claims for negligence, breach of contract, or fraud [(or any other non-
negligence theory)] because the real issue remains one of whether the 
professional exercised that degree of care, skill, and diligence that 
professionals of ordinary skill and knowledge commonly possess and 
exercise.”…  
On the other hand, “when cases say that clients cannot divide or fracture 
their negligence claims against their attorneys into other claims, this does 
not mean that clients can sue their attorneys only for negligence.” Nor does 
the non-fracturing rule necessarily bar a client from simultaneously asserting 
professional negligence and non-negligence claims against an attorney that 
are predicated on some common or overlapping facts. However, the 
claimant must do more than “merely reassert the same claim for legal 
malpractice under an alternative label.” “The plaintiff must present a claim 
that goes beyond what traditionally has been characterized as legal 
malpractice.” 
Beck v. Law Offices of Edwin J. (Ted) Terry, Jr., P.C., 284 S.W. 3d 416, 426-27 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2009) (internal citations omitted). The Texas courts have applied this rule to 
distinguish between enforceable claims for breach of a fiduciary duty arising from the 
attorney-client relationship and claims for professional negligence by an attorney. The 
Texas Court of Appeals explained the distinction as follows: 
In determining whether a complaint is a claim for negligence or something 
else, “we are not bound by the labels the parties place on their claims.” 
“Regardless of the theory a plaintiff pleads, as long as the crux of the 
complaint is that the plaintiff’s attorney did not provide adequate legal 
representation, the claim is one for legal malpractice.” This analysis focuses 
primarily on ascertaining whether the facts that are the basis for an asserted 
cause of action implicate only the lawyer’s duty of ordinary care or 
independently actionable fiduciary, statutory, contractual, or other tort 
duties. As the Fourteenth Court of Appeals has summarized the analysis: 
If the gist of a client’s complaint is that the attorney did not exercise 
that degree of care, skill, or diligence as attorneys of ordinary skill 
and knowledge commonly possess, then that complaint should be 
pursued as a negligence claim, rather than some other claim. If, 
however, the client’s complaint is more appropriately classified as 
another claim, for example, fraud, DTPA, breach of fiduciary duty, 
or breach of contract, then the client can assert a claim other than 
negligence. 
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This inquiry may also be informed by the remedy the plaintiff seeks. The 
analysis is analogous to determining whether claims are based on contract 
versus the DTPA or whether they sound in contract or tort. The 
determination of whether a complaint against a lawyer is actionable in 
negligence versus some other legal theory is a question of law….  
In addition to the duty of ordinary care, an attorney owes fiduciary duties to 
his client as a matter of law. The term “fiduciary” refers to integrity and 
fidelity; thus, “the attorney-client relationship is one of the most abundant 
good faith, requiring absolute perfect candor, openness and honesty, and the 
absence of any concealment or deception.” Attorneys must, among other 
things, “render a full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client’s 
representation.” To prevail on a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, a plaintiff 
must prove (1) the existence of the fiduciary relationship; (2) a breach of 
that duty by the attorney defendant; (3) that causes; and (4) damages to the 
plaintiff. However, if a client seeks the remedy of equitable fee forfeiture 
and proves a breach of fiduciary duty by the attorney, the client may obtain 
that remedy without need to prove causation or damages if the court finds 
the attorney’s conduct was a “clear and serious breach of duty” and that 
forfeiture of the fee (or some portion of it) is “necessary to satisfy the 
public’s interest in protecting the attorney-client relationship.” 
Not every complaint that can be said to implicate a lawyer’s fiduciary duties 
is actionable separately from a negligence claim. Because a lawyer’s 
“standard of care in negligence claims is often defined by the characteristics 
of that inherent fiduciary relationship ... courts refer to the fiduciary 
relationship that the lawyer has to the client and use fiduciary standards to 
define the standard of care required of lawyers.” Consequently, “courts have 
most often applied those standards to conclude that the claims are really 
negligence, not breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.” To distinguish 
independently actionable breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims against lawyers 
from those that sound in negligence, Texas courts have generally held that a 
breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim focuses on “whether an attorney obtained an 
improper benefit from representing the client,” while a negligence claim 
focuses on “whether an attorney represented a client with the requisite level 
of skill.” “Breach of fiduciary duty by an attorney most often involves the 
attorney’s failure to disclose conflicts of interest, failure to deliver funds 
belonging to the client, placing personal interests over the client’s interests, 
improper use of client confidences, taking advantage of the client’s trust, 
engaging in self-dealing, and making misrepresentations.” 
Id. at 427-29 (internal citations omitted). The Texas Court of Appeals has explained some 
of the jurisprudential reasons for making these distinctions as follows: 
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Nothing is to be gained by fracturing a cause of action arising out of bad 
legal advice or improper representation into claims for negligence, breach of 
contract, fraud or some other name. If a lawyer’s error or mistake is 
actionable, it should give rise to a cause of action for legal malpractice with 
one set of issues which inquire if the conduct or omission occurred, if that 
conduct or omission was malpractice and if so, subsequent issues on 
causation and damages. Nothing is to be gained in fracturing that cause of 
action into three or four different claims and sets of special issues.... The 
ultimate issue is whether there has been a breach of duty which causes 
damage. 
Ersek v. Davis & Davis, P.C., 69 S.W. 3d 268, 274–75 (Tex. App. 2002) (pet. denied) 
(quoting Sledge v. Alsup, 759 S.W. 2d 1, 2 (Tex. App. 1988)). The rule in Texas also 
serves to “prevent[ ] legal-malpractice plaintiffs from opportunistically transforming a 
claim that sounds only in negligence into other claims” to avail themselves of longer 
limitations periods, less onerous proof requirements, or other tactical advantages. Deutsch 
v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., 97 S.W.3d 179, 189 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 
2002). 
 In Rockefeller I, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted the Texas Supreme Court’s 
explanation of breach of fiduciary duty claims with approval. Rockefeller, 136 Idaho at 
642, 39 P.3d at 582. The distinction the Texas courts have made between permissible and 
non-permissible claims for breach of a fiduciary duty arising out of the attorney-client 
relationship are consistent with the conclusion the Idaho Supreme Court reached in Bishop, 
as well as the rationale it expressed for why it did so.  Claims traditionally brought as 
claims in negligence must be brought as claims for negligence, not under some other legal 
theory. In the absence of explicit guidance from the Idaho Supreme Court, this Court 
concludes it is appropriate to follow the approach used by the courts of Texas. Their 
approach seems consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court’s language in Bishop and also 
does not conflict with the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in Rockefeller I.  
 This Court concludes Plaintiff may sue her former attorney for breach of a 
fiduciary duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship, just like other principals may 
sue their agents who owe them a fiduciary duty. The test articulated by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Rockefeller I and in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is 
applicable to those claims. However, Plaintiff may not bring a claim for breach of a 
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fiduciary duty against her attorney if the crux of her complaint is that her attorney did not 
provide adequate legal representation. In that event, the Plaintiff must pursue an action for 
professional negligence. To pursue a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiff’s 
allegation must be something other than her attorney simply failed to provide competent 
legal services. In an action for breach of fiduciary duty, where Plaintiff is only seeking the 
remedy of fee disgorgement, Plaintiff must allege and prove that such breach was a clear 
and serious one and that forfeiture of the fee, or some portion of it, is necessary to protect 
the public’s interest in preserving the attorney-client relationship. With this standard, the 
Court will examine whether Plaintiff has, or can, allege a claim upon which this Court 
could grant such relief.  
III. THE COURT CONCLUDES PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ALLEGED, AND 
 CANNOT ALLEGE, A CLAIM UPON WHICH THIS COURT CAN GRANT 
 RELIEF.  
  In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she hired Defendant to represent her in a 
divorce action. [Compl. ¶ 3]. She alleges that during the course of that representation 
Defendant, without her knowledge or consent, “shared attorney-client confidential 
information” with her husband’s attorney. [Compl. ¶ 4]. She later alleges that Defendant 
“breached his [fiduciary] duties to [her] by, among other things, disclosing attorney client 
privileged communications” to her husband’s attorney. [Compl ¶ 9]. Defendant argues 
these assertions are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This 
Court agrees.  
 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief. I.R.C.P. 8(a)(2). Such statement must include a concise 
statement of the facts constituting the cause of action. Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 715 
P.2d 993 (1986). Plaintiff’s allegations are mixed assertions of fact and conclusions of law. 
The allegation that Defendant shared information with her husband’s attorney is an 
assertion of fact. The argument that such information was confidential is a proposition of 
law. Plaintiff has failed to allege in her complaint what information it is that she claims 
Defendant disclosed or when and how Defendant acquired it. Therefore, this Court cannot 
independently determine whether her proposition that such information was “attorney-
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client confidential” is correct. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached his fiduciary 
duty by “disclosing attorney client privileged communications.” The assertion that 
Defendant disclosed communications is an assertion of fact, albeit a vague one. The 
argument that those communications were privileged under I.R.E. 502 is a legal one. The 
Plaintiff has failed to allege what the communications were, whom they were between, or 
the circumstances under which she alleges those took place. Therefore, the Court cannot 
assess if her legal argument is correct.  
 Because her claim for breach of fiduciary duty rests on the proposition that 
Defendant disclosed information that was “confidential” and/or communications that were 
“privileged,” and because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show the 
information was confidential and/or the communications were privileged, Plaintiff’s 
complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.  Plaintiff is 
required to plead all facts necessary or essential to her claim for relief. Plaintiff cannot 
avoid this requirement by simply by making a legal argument in her complaint. Therefore, 
Defendant’s motion as to this claim must be granted. 
 Plaintiff makes two additional allegations: that Defendant was complicit with her 
husband’s attorney in securing a divorce more favorable to her husband than to her and 
that Defendant failed to adequately represent her by failing to fully and completely 
evaluate the community real property. [Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6].  
 Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant failed to fully and completely evaluate the 
value of the community property during the divorce proceedings is clearly a claim for 
professional negligence. As Defendant admits she cannot show damages from this alleged 
failure, and damages are an essential element of a claim for professional negligence, 
Defendant’s motion is granted as to this claim.  
 This Court concludes Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant “was complicit” with her 
husband’s attorney in securing a divorce more favorable to her husband than to her is also, 
in reality, a claim for professional negligence. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant 
profited or received some personal advantage by being “complicit” with her husband’s 
attorney. She does not allege, for example, that her husband’s attorney paid Defendant to 
talk her into a settlement that was disadvantageous to her. From her briefing on this 
fi ti l . i i l i tiff l fi
 i t ile i ti .” erti
erti f l i  
ile .  
l i tiff l W
sta l  
r . 
f i
fi ti l 0
ile l i tiff l ffi
fi ilege , l i ti s
f ti li f  l i tiff i
l r nti l l i tiff
i  i l  r . 
 
l i tiff i l  li
t ri
t l  i l l
i . L 1H] , ]. 
l i tif  l t l l l
f i i rl
 l
r  nti l f
. 
l i ti s l a li i
t ri l
li l i tiff l
fit i  li i
t . l tt i
l ttl t s  fi
’  IS -
000110
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS - 27 
motion, the Court discerns that her complaint is that Defendant failed to negotiate with her 
husband’s attorney as aggressively or as zealously as she wanted. That is a claim for 
professional negligence. As she admits she cannot show damages from Defendant’s 
alleged failure, this claim must be dismissed as well.  
 This Court must then consider whether it should permit Plaintiff to amend her 
complaint to correct the deficiencies in her pleading. As to her claims that Defendant failed 
to properly evaluate the community real property and that Defendant failed to zealously 
negotiate on her behalf, Plaintiff concedes she cannot show any damage from these 
actions. Therefore, these claims must simply be dismissed with prejudice, as permitting her 
to amend her pleadings or to conduct discovery on these claims will serve no purpose.  
 As to her claim regarding the disclosure of confidential information and/or 
privileged communications, Plaintiff argues that she should be permitted to amend her 
complaint, although she has not filed a motion seeking leave to do so. Because both parties 
argued that issue in their briefing as to this motion, the Court will consider whether 
Plaintiff should be permitted to amend her complaint. Whether to permit such amendment 
is a discretionary decision for this Court.  
 In opposing this motion, Plaintiff has submitted a declaration by her attorney in this 
action. That declaration includes copies of the information/communications that she 
alleges Defendant disclosed to her husband’s attorney during their divorce case. The 
information/communications are contained in an electronic mail message Plaintiff 
allegedly sent Defendant that Defendant then allegedly forwarded to her husband’s 
attorney in the divorce action.  
 In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), this Court may 
consider information outside of the pleadings so long as it provides the parties with those 
procedural protections under I.R.C.P. 56 when it does so. I.R.C.P. 12(d). The parties have 
been granted such protections here. This Court will consider the materials submitted by 
Plaintiff in deciding whether to simply dismiss her claim with prejudice or whether to 
permit her to amend her complaint. In making that decision, this Court is required to draw 
reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. This Court should permit amendment of 
t si l l l . 
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Plaintiff’s complaint unless it is clear that Plaintiff can plead no set of facts that would 
entitle her to relief.  
 The email message Plaintiff alleges she sent Defendant and that Defendant 
subsequently forwarded to her husband’s attorney appears to have been sent after Plaintiff 
and her husband had engaged in mediation, but shortly before the trial in her divorce 
proceeding was scheduled to begin. From the contents of the communications, it appears 
Plaintiff and her husband signed a stipulation regarding entry of a divorce decree during 
either formal mediation or an informal negotiation session; however, Plaintiff subsequently 
filed a motion to withdraw the stipulation. Defendant, her attorney, was seeking written 
direction from Plaintiff on whether she wished to agree to entry of a divorce decree 
pursuant to the stipulation or whether she wished to attempt to withdraw the stipulation 
and go to trial. In that context, Plaintiff sent Defendant a lengthy email in which Plaintiff 
did not clearly answer that question but rather expounded at length about her feelings that 
Defendant did not zealously represent her during the mediation or negotiation proceedings 
and that Defendant had pressured her into accepting a stipulation she was not comfortable 
with. She discussed her feelings about certain specific items of the stipulation and her 
general feelings that her husband got a better deal than she wanted. 
 She alleges Defendant shared this email with her husband’s attorney and a CPA 
who was present during the mediation/negotiation.  
 Taking these facts to be true, this Court must decide if they state a claim for breach 
of fiduciary duty that would warrant disgorgement of all or some of the fee Plaintiff paid 
Defendant for his professional services.  
 While this is a more difficult question than her other claims, this Court concludes 
this claim is still, in essence, a claim for professional negligence. As the Texas Court of 
Appeals stated in Beck: 
To distinguish independently actionable breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims 
against lawyers from those that sound in negligence, Texas courts have 
generally held that a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim focuses on “whether an 
attorney obtained an improper benefit from representing the client,” while a 
negligence claim focuses on “whether an attorney represented a client with 
the requisite level of skill.” “Breach of fiduciary duty by an attorney most 
often involves the attorney’s failure to disclose conflicts of interest, failure 
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to deliver funds belonging to the client, placing personal interests over the 
client’s interests, improper use of client confidences, taking advantage of the 
client’s trust, engaging in self-dealing, and making misrepresentations.” 
Beck, 284 S.W. 3d at 429 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff argues Defendant’s 
disclosure of her email was a breach of his fiduciary duty of fidelity - to keep information 
he learned in the course of his representation of her confidential. She argues the disclosure 
embarrassed her and is damaging to the public’s interest in preserving attorney-client 
relationships generally. Arguably, Plaintiff’s allegations constitute an “improper use of 
client confidences.” However, Plaintiff’s factual allegations are distinguishable from those 
situations where agency law will compel a fiduciary to disgorge fees for misuse of 
confidential information obtained in the course of being a fiduciary. An agent is generally 
forbidden from using or communicating information confidentially given to him by his 
principal, or acquired by him during or an account of his agency, to benefit himself or third 
parties in competition with his principal. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY (SECOND) § 395 (1958). 
The common law developed such rules to address the concern that an agent might provide 
his principal with wonderfully competent services, but nonetheless use his relationship 
with the principal to his own advantage and to the detriment of the principal. Thus, the 
reason the Texas courts focus on whether a plaintiff is alleging the attorney obtained an 
improper benefit from representing a client (breach of fiduciary duty claim) and whether 
the attorney represented a client with the requisite skill (professional negligence claim).  
 Here Plaintiff does not allege Defendant had a conflict of interest, that he stood to 
benefit himself by sharing her email with the other attorney, or that he lied to her in any 
way. She simply claims, essentially, that the rules of conduct that govern Defendant’s 
profession precluded him from sharing her email without her permission and that he did so 
anyway. While Plaintiff has chosen to articulate that claim in the language of an action for 
breach of fiduciary duty, it is, at its essence, a claim that Defendant did not exercise the 
care his profession demands in handling her communications. That is a claim for 
professional negligence.  
 Given the Supreme Court’s decision in Bishop, this Court feels compelled to reach 
the conclusion that Plaintiff is not entitled to allege alternative claims for breach of 
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fiduciary duty and for professional negligence on the same facts. In the language of the 
Texas rule, she may not “fracture” her claim for professional negligence into a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty simply to take advantage of the remedy of fee disgorgement. 
Where her facts would traditionally be viewed as alleging a claim sounding in negligence, 
Plaintiff is required to bring her claim under that theory.  Plaintiff concedes she cannot 
because she cannot show damages as a result of Defendant’s alleged breach of his 
professional duties to her. Therefore, permitting Plaintiff to amend her complaint would 
serve no purpose.  
 Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Complaint is GRANTED. All of 
Plaintiff’s claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice.  




       ______________________________ 
 JONATHAN MEDEMA    
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 I hereby certify that on March ____, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument as follows: 
 
Kim J. Trout 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 
Boise, ID 83703 
Email: ktrout@trout-law.com 
(  ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(  ) Interdepartmental Mail 
(X) Electronic Mail 




Keely E. Duke 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Email: ked@dukescanlan.com 
            adl@dukescanlan.com  
(  ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(  ) Hand Delivered 
(X) Electronic Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 










JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 

















JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
 All of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice. 




       ______________________________ 
 JONATHAN MEDEMA    
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 







   
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson respectfully moves this Court for permission to amend her 
Complaint, as more fully set out in her supporting legal brief.  
See attached proposed amended complaint, “Exhibit A.”  
DATED April 6, 2018. 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 





Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 6, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
E-file      
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 






   
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson complains and alleges against Defendant, as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
1. This is a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and equitable forfeiture.  
2. This is not a claim for legal malpractice, as Parkinson cannot, in good faith, plead all the nec-
essary elements for a legal malpractice claim under applicable Idaho case law.  
3. Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson is a divorced woman residing in Ada County, Idaho.  
4. Defendant James Bevis is an attorney residing and working in Ada County, Idaho.  
5. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-705. 
6. Venue is property in Ada County pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404 because the defendant 
resides or has his principal place of business in this county.  
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
7. In July of 2014, Parkinson hired Bevis to represent her as an attorney in divorce proceedings 
with her now former husband, Joe Parkinson. 
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8. On May 11, 2015, the parties attended a mediation conference with their attorneys. The par-
ties reached a stipulated settlement agreement during mediation.  
9. On May 12, 2015, Parkinson sent Bevis an email with a subject line “I am sick to my stom-
ach,” in which Parkinson expressed her extreme concern and dissatisfaction to Bevis about the set-
tlement and about how she was taken advantage of therein. See attached, “Exhibit A.”  
10. Parkinson then instructed Bevis to move to withdraw the stipulated agreement.  
11. On May 14, 2015, Bevis sent Parkinson a letter in which Bevis acknowledges that he had 
filed a motion to withdraw the stipulation, but that he had also filed a motion to withdraw as coun-
sel.  
12. Notwithstanding his withdrawal motion, Bevis continued to communicate with Parkinson 
for purposes of pressuring her into changing her mind about the stipulated settlement.  
13. Parkinson finally agreed to accept the settlement, and she communicated this fact to Bevis.  
14. On Saturday, May 16, 2015, at 8:35 a.m., Parkinson’s accountant, Buck Harris, emailed Bevis 
and Welsh, explaining that the had talked to Parkinson that morning and that she had been busy 
with graduation activities and was at the time traveling back to Caldwell. Harris explained that Par-
kinson planned to confirm her acceptance of the settlement by email that morning.   
15. On Saturday, May 16, 2015, at 8:53 p.m., Parkinson wrote a message to Harris (later for-
warded to Bevis) which said: “I am willing to move forward, under the same terms as Monday.”  
16. On Saturday, May 16, 2015, at 9:59 a.m., Welsh replied to Harris, “Thanks,” (apparently un-
aware that Parkinson had already emailed her acceptance). Then at 10:53 a.m., Bevis replied to 
Welsh and said, “After it arrives, I suggest U & I go to court early AM Monday and appear to have it 
entered.” Then at 10:55 a.m., Welsh replied to Bevis, “Agreed.”  
17. On Saturday, May 16, 2015, at 2:07 p.m., Bevis emailed Parkinson and said: “I received your 
email confirming that you accept the stipulation signed on May 11. It should also state that you will 
not change your mind…I will ask the judge to enter the Decree Tuesday A.M. and he will likely ask 
to see the email, so please send me immediately another email with the wording I need. Welsh will 
probably be calling any minute so time is of the essence now.” Then at 2:19 p.m., Bevis again 
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emailed Parkinson and said: “Your email cannot state that you want to negotiate about other issues 
as that is a rejection.” Then at 2:34 p.m., Bevis again emailed Parkinson and said, “Welsh is waiting. 
Please respond as I asked.” Finally, at 2:56 p.m., Bevis again emailed Parkinson and said: “I have to 
take care of a grandchild at 3. I will be leaving in 6 minutes. I’ve been here since 10:30 waiting on a 
proper response from you. I don’t have email at home.”  
18. Parkinson did not respond to Bevis’s additional emails, being otherwise disposed.  
19. On Sunday, May 17, 2015, at 8:30 a.m., Bevis became impatient and emailed Welsh, saying: 
“Dear Stan: This is all I have received from Becky around 2 PM yesterday. I told you about it yester-
day. I sent emails to her about it and she has not responded. I will forward them to you.” The 
phrase “this is all I have received from Becky” referred to Parkinson’s May 16, 8:53 a.m. acceptance 
email to Harris, and which Bevis then forwarded to Welsh as part of his 8:30 a.m. email.  
20. On Sunday, May 17, 2015, at 8:32 a.m., Bevis forwarded to Welsh some of his emails of the 
previous day between 2:07 p.m. and 2:56 p.m. However, Bevis also forwarded to Welsh a full copy 
of Parkinson’s May 12, 2015 email with the subject line “I am sick to my stomach.”  
21. On Sunday, May 17, 2015, at 11:28 a.m., Parkinson sent Harris an email, saying: “I am pre-
pared to agree to the settlement struck Monday, May 11, 2015. I will not change my mind.”  
22. On Sunday, May 17, 2015, at 11:39 a.m., Bevis forwarded Parkinson’s email to Welsh.  
23. Parkinson was unaware that Bevis had sent her May 12, 2015 email to Welsh.  
24. Parkinson did not authorize Bevis to send her May 12, 2015 email to Welsh. 
25. Bevis did not have any reason to send Welsh a copy of Parkinson’s May 12, 2015 email, ti-
tled “I am sick to my stomach,” or his other emails to Parkinson. Bevis had already notified Welsh 
of Parkinson’s May 16, 2015, 8:53 a.m. acceptance email, which was sufficient for Welsh to know 
that Parkinson had accepted the terms of the parties’ prior settlement agreement.   
26. Parkinson paid Bevis approximately $73,500.00 for his legal services. Bevis’s disclosures to 
opposing counsel have significantly impaired the value of those services for Parkinson.  
COUNT 1: BRECH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
27. Parkinson incorporates the above paragraphs by reference, as is fully set out herein.  
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28. Bevis had a duty under Idaho R. Prof. C. 1.6(a) not to reveal information relating to Parkin-
son’s representation unless Parkinson had given informed consent.  
29. Bevis breached his duty by disclosing Parkinson’s private email communications to Welsh 
without Parkinson’s informed consent.  
30. Bevis’s disclosure to Welsh did not meet the exceptions of Idaho R. Prof. C. 1.6(b).  
31. Bevis failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent the disclosure of Parkinson’s emails to 
Welsh; in fact, Bevis admits that he intended to disclose the emails to Welsh.   
32. Bevis breached his confidentiality duties to Parkinson under the official commentary to Ida-
ho R. Prof. C. 1.6, which state: “When transmitting a communication that includes information re-
lating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the 
information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.” Bevis did not take reasonable 
precautions to prevent Parkinson’s high personal May 12, 2015 email titled “I am sick to my stom-
ach” from coming into the hands of opposing counsel.  
33. Bevis did not have good cause for disclosing Parkinson’s emails to Welsh.  
34. Bevis’s disclosures were a clear and serious and willful violation of his duty of confidentiality.  
35. Parkinson paid Bevis approximately $73,500.00 for his legal services. Bevis’s disclosures to 
opposing counsel have significantly impaired the value of those services for Parkinson.  
36. Parkinson does not have an adequate legal remedy for Bevis’s breach of confidentiality, as 
the breach occurred after Parkinson had renewed her agreement to settle her divorce case.    
37. Bevis is entitled to the remedies of equitable forfeiture and fee disgorgement, in amounts to 
be proven at trial.  
38. Parkinson reserves the right to amend this complaint to make additional claims against Bevis 
as more information becomes available through discovery, including claims for additional breaches 
of duty and claims for legal malpractice.  
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
39. Parkinson has been required to retain Trout Law to prosecute this action and has agreed to 
pay said attorney a reasonable attorney’s fee. The Court should award the sum of $15,000.00 as a 
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reasonable attorney fees should this matter be resolved by default, and any additional fees and costs 
as the Court deems reasonable should this matter be contested. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Wherefore, Parkinson prays for the following relief:  
1. For a judgment that Bevis must forfeit his unpaid legal, and disgorge his paid legal fees, in-
curred in the underlying divorce action, in amounts to be proven at trial; if the matter is re-
solved by default, a judgment that Bevis must forfeit all his unpaid legal fees, and disgorge all 
his paid legal fees, in incurred in the underlying divorce action; and,  
2. For attorney fees and costs, in amounts to be proven at trial; or, if the matter is resolved by 
default, then for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $15,000.00.  
DATED April 6, 2018. 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 6, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
E-file      
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 
LEGAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 







   
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson respectfully submits this legal brief in support of her motion to 
amend her Complaint, as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
In its memorandum decision, the Court found that Parkinson had not sufficiently alleged a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (See Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss, pp. 25-26). Specifically, the Court found: “Because her claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
rests on the proposition that Defendant disclosed information that was “confidential” and/or com-
munications that were ‘privileged,’ and because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show 
the information was confidential and/or the communications were privileged, Plaintiff’s complaint 
fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.” (Id., at p. 25). This deficiency, if 
true, has now been fully remedied by Parkinson’s proposed amended complaint. As set out below, 




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
 
  




. t .  
i
( ) —57  
i ( ) —57  
ut tr0ut— 0tn
t r i t . 
,
, . 01— —087
l i ti
 I
. IS . . . .
. 
l intiff r ctf i f f
l s
r ffi l
i f fi . (  e ami  r e m‘k o i 2‘0 
ix/71m  —2  ifi : ec i f fi
fi l” d/0 m— 
ile l intiff l ffi ShOW
fi d/ ile l i t ’ i
t t l f  .” (M, . i fi i
 r ’ . t





Legal Brief in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint | Page 2 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
“The decision to grant or refuse permission to amend a complaint is left to the sound discre-
tion of the trial court when a party proposes to amend its complaint after a responsive pleading is 
served…Nonetheless, as this Court indicated in Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 725 
P.2d 155 (1986), in the interest of justice, district courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend 
a complaint.” Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997).  
“A pleading may be amended even after judgment has been entered.” Snake River Equip. Co. 
v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 546, 691 P.2d 787, 792 (Ct. App. 1984).  
LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
1. Parkinson States a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Grated: 
Parkinson’s proposed amended complaint states a breach of fiduciary duty claim upon which 
relief can be granted. Idaho’s pleading standards are clear—Parkinson only needs to state a viable 
claim; she does not have to prove or prevail on her claim right now at the risk of another Rule 12 
dismissal. “The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure set forth a system of notice pleading intended to free 
litigants from what were once rigid pleading requirements.” Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., No. 37026, 2012 
Ida. LEXIS 58, at *24 (Mar. 1, 2012); “The key issue in determining the validity of a complaint is 
whether the adverse party is put on notice of the claims brought against it.” Gibson v. Ada Cty. Sher-
iff's Dep't, 139 Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.3d 845, 849 (2003); “Pleadings serve the purpose of stating the nature 
of the action brought so as to put the other party on notice, and to declare the relief sought. Unlike 
common law pleading and code pleading, perfection is not required; imperfections are not fatal. 
Pleadings serve to frame the issues so that an orderly trial can ensue, and a just resolution be pur-
sued. Lawsuits are quests for the truth and justice; trials should no longer be waged in the pleading 
state.” Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 328, 715 P.2d 993, 998 (Idaho Mar. 5, 1986) (concurring opin-
ion).  
Moreover, Parkinson’s proposed claim is not futile just because the amount of her eventual 
recovery (or, in this case, the amount of Bevis’s forfeiture or disgorgement) is indeterminate. The 
amount of recovery is a question of material fact—reserved for the Court or for the jury after weigh-
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ing all the relevant forfeiture factors. In our case, the Court has already approved the form of Par-
kinson’s claim: “This Court concludes Plaintiff may sue her former attorney for breach of a fiduciary 
duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship, just like other principals may sue their agents who 
owe them a fiduciary duty. The test articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Rockefeller I and in the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is applicable to those claims.” (Memorandum De-
cision, p. 24). Parkinson is entitled to assert her amended claim, which is modeled after these findings. 
Whether Parkinson gets full, partial, or no relief from her claim is immaterial at this stage of the 
case.  
2. Parkinson Has Already Addressed Objections to the Form of Her Claim:  
Parkinson has already addressed Bevis’s objections to the form of her claim in her Legal Brief 
in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, filed herewith—including Bevis’s circular arguments that Par-
kinson should have brought her claim as a legal malpractice claim. To summarize, Parkinson could 
not have brought her breach of fiduciary duty claim as a legal malpractice claim due to her lack of 
actual malpractice damages. Parkinson’s known injury is limited to the impaired value of her legal 
services from Bevis.1 Parkinson is entitled to rely on the equitable forfeiture remedies set out in 
Rockefeller I and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers to address the impaired val-
ue of her services. The Court should adopt and apply the holding in Rockefeller I, which says:  
“It is the established law of this jurisdiction that an agent's right to compensation will be af-
fected by a violation of his fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Cooke v. Iverson, 94 Idaho 929, 933, 500 
P.2d 830, 835 (1972) (real estate agents lose their commissions for failure to disclose material 
facts); Schroeder v. Rose, 108 Idaho 707, 710, 701 P.2d 327, 330 (Ct.App.1985) (compliance 
with fiduciary duties is a condition precedent to collecting a commission); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 456 and 469 (1958). Allowing an agent to re-
tain his entire commission as a matter of law when he has breached his fiduciary duties 
would eviscerate agency law. Secure in his compensation from the principal as long as the 
assigned task is completed, an agent's only chance of loss from violating his duties would be 
if he harmed the principal. The higher requirement of acting in the interest of the principal, 
without a means of enforcement, would simply cease to exist.” 
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 642, 39 P.3d 577, 582 (2001) (emphasis added). 
                                            
1 However, as explained in Parkinson’s motion for reconsideration, Parkinson is entitled to discovery on Bevis’s addi-
tional breaches prior to dismissal. It is likely that Parkinson will have evidentiary support for her other allegations of 
misconduct once the complete divorce file is turned over to Parkinson.  
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 For now, Parkinson has removed any allegations which might suggest a cause of action for 
legal malpractice. However, Parkinson reserves the right to amend her pleadings, and to have those 
amendments relate back to the original filing date, should Parkinson find additional information 
supporting a legal malpractice claim during her discovery against Bevis.  
CONCLUSION 
 The Court should grant Parkinson’s motion to amend her complaint under Idaho’s liberal 
amendment standards. The Court should recognize Parkinson’s claim as valid and should allowing 
the claim to proceed on its merits to trial.   
DATED April 6, 2018. 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
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Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 







   
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson respectfully moves this Court for reconsideration, as more fully 
set out in her supporting legal brief.  
DATED April 6, 2018. 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 





Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 
LEGAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT  







   
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson respectfully submits this Legal Brief in support of her motion 
for reconsideration, as follows:  
INTRODUCTION 
 Parkinson asks the Court to reconsider its order dismissing this case with prejudice. In its 
memorandum decision, the Court adopted all the right legal principles which actually support 
Parkinson’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, viz., (1) that Bishop only forbids alternative claims to 
professional negligence claims when those claims could have (and should have) been brought as 
professional negligence claims; and (2), that Idaho clients can sue their attorneys for breach of 
fiduciary duties under Rockefeller I and the standards in Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers. But then, Parkinson respectfully suggests that the Court engaged in a correctable misdirec-
tion in its subsequent use of these principles—ignoring Parkinson’s current inability to pursue a pro-
fessional negligence claim, and thus putting her in a position where Parkinson’s recognized cause of 
action leaves her with no remedy at law or in equity.  
Electronically Filed
4/6/2018 4:21 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
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As set out below, Parkinson respectfully urges the Court to reverse its dismissal order and al-
low the case to proceed on its merits, as described in Parkinson’s Rule 15(a) motion to amend. In 
the alternative, the Court should modify its order to dismiss without prejudice so that the parties can 
appropriately litigate the matter if/when Bevis institutes collection efforts against Parkinson for her 
alleged outstanding litigation debts.   
LEGAL STANDARDS 
“The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for reconsidera-
tion…when deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard 
of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered.” Fragnel-
la v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (Idaho June 21, 2012).  
“A motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the court—when new law is applied 
to previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to previously presented law, or any combi-
nation thereof—to reconsider the correctness of an interlocutory order.” Johnson v. N. Idaho College, 
153 Idaho 58, 62, 278 P.3d 928, 932 (Idaho May 31, 2012).  
LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
1. Parkinson’s Breach of Duty Claim Cannot be Brought as a Negligence Claim:  
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court said that “…the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Bishop seems to stand for the proposition that the Supreme Court will not permit clients 
in Idaho to sue their attorneys under a legal theory other than professional negligence if the client’s 
claim is one that could be brought in professional negligence.” (Memorandum Decision and Order Grant-
ing Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, pp. 19-20). Parkinson agrees with this general proposition from Bish-
op. However, Parkinson does not agree with the Court’s unprecedented extension of the 
proposition, in which the Court explains: “…if a plaintiff’s claim for professional negligence and for 
breach of duty are identical except for the remedy being sought—actual damages v. fee 
disgorgement—the plaintiff may only pursue the claim for professional negligence.” (Id., p. 21). This 
conclusion disregards the reality that some breach of fiduciary claims cannot be litigated as profes-
sional negligence claims because they lack the necessary element of damages (e.g., as in the case of 
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Rockefeller I). The Court should reconsider its decision in light of the following holdings on profes-
sional negligence damages:  
“We have previously indicated, in a case dealing with legal malpractice, that, as objective 
proof in support of actual damages is required for recovery, the statute of limitations for a 
legal malpractice claim does not begin to run until the litigation forming the basis of that 
claim has concluded. The clear reasoning behind this decision was that the cause of action 
cannot arise until damages are incurred.” 
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 843, 243 P.3d 642, 659 (2010) (emphasis added).  
“In a legal malpractice case based upon negligence in handling litigation for a claimant, the 
measure of direct damages is the difference between the client's actual recovery and the re-
covery which should have been obtained but for the attorney's malpractice…At trial, [a 
claimant] will bear the burden of proving the existence and amount of such damages with 
reasonable certainty. If he fails to meet this burden, recovery may be denied.” 
Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168, 172-73, 868 P.2d 496, 500-01 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added).  
“Application of the some damage rule in medical malpractice cases is in stark contrast to the 
application of the some damage requirement in legal malpractice cases. There does not seem 
to be any logical reason for treating the some damage requirement differently in medical 
malpractice cases than in legal malpractice cases, which require objective proof supporting 
the existence of some compensable damage.” 
Stuard v. Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701, 712, 249 P.3d 1156, 1167 (2011) (dissent) (emphasis added).  
 These holdings are clear—legal malpractice claims in Idaho require proof of actual, compen-
sable damages. Here, Parkinson cannot currently bring her fiduciary claim as a legal malpractice 
claim because she does not have “objective proof in support of actual damages.” Bevis has refused 
to turn over Parkinson’s case file due to alleged non-payment of attorney fees. As it stands, Parkin-
son can only show that she was harmed in the form of impaired value of Bevis’s services, which is 
not a compensable form of legal malpractice damages in the traditional sense of legal malpractice. 
Parkinson anticipates that as she gets more information from Bevis’s case file, that she will be able 
to substantiate her prior allegations, i.e., that Bevis was complicit with Stan Welsh, and that Bevis 
failed to properly evaluate her property. At that point, Parkinson intends to amend her pleadings to 
address her potential malpractice claims. In the interim, Parkinson asks the Court to allow her to 
pursue her known and recognized claim of breach of fiduciary duty against Bevis for his clear and 
serious breach of her attorney-client confidences with opposing counsel.  
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Parkinson’s known claim for breach of fiduciary dutyis similar to the claim litigated in Rocke-
feller I.  There, Mark Rockefeller breached his fiduciary duties to the Grabows as their real estate 
agent. Rockefeller then argued that the Grabows were not entitled to a forfeiture remedy because 
they had not suffered any actual damages. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, explaining: 
“Allowing an agent to retain his entire commission as a matter of law when he has breached 
his fiduciary duties would eviscerate agency law. Secure in his compensation from the prin-
cipal as long as the assigned task is completed, an agent's only chance of loss from violating 
his duties would be if he harmed the principal. The higher requirement of acting in the inter-
est of the principal, without a means of enforcement, would simply cease to exist.” 
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 642, 39 P.3d 577, 582 (2001). 
Thus, Rockefeller I gives this Court the appropriate standard for Parkinson’s breach of fiduci-
ary claim. The Court acknowledges this fact when it says: “This Court concludes Plaintiff may sue 
her former attorney for breach of a fiduciary duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship, just 
like other principals may sue their agents who owe them a fiduciary duty. The test articulated by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Rockefeller I and in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
is applicable to those claims.” (Memorandum Decision, p. 24). The Court should reverse its dismissal 
order, finding that Parkinson is entitled to litigate her claim as a breach of fiduciary duty claim.  
2. There Are Strong Policy Considerations in Favor of Reconsideration:  
In concluding that Parkinson’s claim is really a legal malpractice claim, the Court has put 
Parkinson in an irresolvable, legal catch-22, “…a problematic situation for which the only solution is 
denied by a circumstance inherent in the problem or by a rule.” (See Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, Unabridged. 2018.. Web. 02 Apr. 2018). In other words, the Court’s order places Parkin-
son where she has no currently available remedies, in law or in equity, despite Bevis’s clear violation 
of his ethical duties. Parkinson can’t bring a legal malpractice claim due to a lack of immediate proof 
of actual damages, and she can’t litigate her breach of fiduciary duty claim due to the Court’s hold-
ings. Unintentionally, perhaps, the Court has favorably identified the solution to Parkinson’s dilem-
ma in its memorandum decision and yet has made the solution completely inaccessible to her. The 
easiest way to correct this problem is for the Court to apply its first (and correct) proposition taken 
from the Bishop case, i.e., that the Court will not permit clients to sue their attorneys under a legal 
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theory other than professional negligence if the client’s claim is one that could be brought in 
professional negligence. (Memorandum Decision, pp. 19-20). The Court can apply the inverse of this 
proposition to Parkinson’s claim, finding that the Court should permit Parkinson to sue her attorney 
under a legal theory other than professional negligence because her known claim for breach of con-
fidences is one that could not currently be brought as professional negligence. There is no need, be-
yond these two simple propositions, to engage in any additional remedies or damages analyses.1  
There are significant, viable policy considerations in favor of reconsideration: (1) First, it 
gives Parkinson her day in court (Idaho judicial policy favors “the just resolution of actions by 
providing litigants their day in court.” Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 160 Idaho 181, 188, 370 
P.3d 384, 391 (2016)); (2) Second, it allows Parkinson to have her claim decided on its merits (“A 
‘determination’ of an action within the meaning of Rule 1 is meant to be a determination of the 
controversy on the merits—not a termination on a procedural technicality which serves litigants not 
at all.  A determination entails a finding of the facts and an application of the law in order to resolve 
the legal rights of the litigants who hope to resolve their differences in the courts.” Bunn v. Bunn, 99 
Idaho 710, 712, 587 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1978)); and (3) Third, it preserves the Court’s role in giving 
liberal construction to Idaho pleadings (“The motion to dismiss presented under IRCP 12(b) (6), has 
generally been viewed with disfavor because of the possible waste of time in case of reversal of a 
                                            
1 In its memorandum decision, the Court discusses the concept of legal remedies vs. “practical” remedies, explaining 
that: “In Bishop, the distinction between a claim sounding in contract and a claim sounding in negligence had a significant 
practical effect given the original client’s death. The claim in negligence abated upon the client’s death; the claim in con-
tract did not. In Bishop, permitting the plaintiff to pursue alternative claims for breach of contract and professional negli-
gence would have had the practical effect of permitting the plaintiff to pursue the breach of contract claim. Thus, while 
the legal remedy (compensatory damages) for each claim was the same; the practical remedies available were vastly dif-
ferent.” (Memorandum Decision, pp. 20-21). But this discussion of remedies is not relevant to Parkinson’s scenario. The 
equitable remedies in Parkinson’s case are not comparable to the two alternate legal remedies in Bishop, i.e., legal mal-
practice damages and breach of contract damages. As the Court in our case acknowledges, “…if a claim can be asserted 
as both one for breach of contract and one for professional negligence, only the claim for professional negligence can be 
brought, regardless of whether that limits or eliminates any remedy.” (Id., p. 21) (emphasis added). The Court’s repeated 
use of the qualifying word “if” in its memorandum distinguishes Parkinson’s forfeiture claim from the alternate claim in 
Bishop. If the Court is still in doubt on this point, it should consider the pertinent holdings in Hendry v. Pellad, cited later 
in the brief: “The different treatment of compensatory damages and forfeiture of legal fees…makes sense. Compensato-
ry damages make plaintiffs whole for the harms that they have suffered as a result of defendants’ actions. Clients there-
fore need to prove that their attorney’s breach caused them injury so that the trier of fact can determine whether they are 
entitled to any damages. Forfeiture of legal fees serves several different purposes. It deters attorney misconduct, a goal 
worth furthering regardless of whether a particular client has been harmed.” Hendry, 315 U.S. App. D.C. 297, 73 F.3d at 
402. 
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dismissal of the action, and because the primary objective of the law is to obtain a determination of 
the merits of the claim…a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a 
certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in sup-
port of the claim.  Pleadings are to be liberally construed.  Mere vagueness or lack of detail is not 
ground for a motion to dismiss.” Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 404, 353 P.2d 782, 784 
(1960)).  
To be clear—the Court has already found that Parkinson’s equitable forfeiture claim is a 
recognized claim under Idaho law: “This Court concludes Plaintiff may sue her former attorney for 
breach of a fiduciary duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship, just like other principals may 
sue their agents who owe them a fiduciary duty. The test articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Rockefeller I and in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is applicable to those 
claims.” (Memorandum Decision, p. 24). The flaw in logic was in adopting Bevis’s circular and incorrect 
arguments that the claim was still just a malpractice claim. As already established, Parkinson’s breach 
of confidentiality claim is not a malpractice claim because it lacks actual damages, and the only rem-
edy available to Parkinson is equitable forfeiture remedy as seen in Rockefeller I. Whether Parkinson 
also has other, parallel claims for legal malpractice remains to be seen in discovery. The Court 
should reverse its determination and allow Parkinson’s breach of fiduciary duty claim to proceed on 
its merits. Moreover, the Court should not try and resolve the fact-intensive elements of the claim 
under Rockefeller I and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (e.g., clear and serious 
violation, potential for harm, timing, etc.), as those are fact issues for resolution at trial, and not un-
der a motion to dismiss standard.  
3. The “Crux” of Parkinson’s Complaint Was Breach of Fiduciary Duty:  
The Court said in its memorandum decision: “Plaintiff may not bring a claim for breach of a 
fiduciary duty against her attorney if the crux of her complaint is that her attorney did not provide 
adequate legal representation.” (Memorandum Decision, pp. 24-25). Parkinson agrees with this as gen-
eral legal proposition because it mirrors the rule against duplication of claims. But the proposition 
does not apply here, as Parkinson could not have brought her claim as a legal malpractice claim 
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against Bevis. The term “crux,” as used by the Texas Court in Beck v. Law Offices of Edwin J. Terry, Jr., 
P.C., 284 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. App. 2009), is just another way of describing the gravamen of the com-
plaint. (“What matters is the crux—or, in legal speak, the gravamen—of the plaintiff's complaint…” 
Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 125, 132 (3d Cir. 2017)). Idaho case law defines gravamen 
as “…the material or significant part of a grievance or complaint.” Stevens v. Eyer, 161 Idaho 407, 
410, 387 P.3d 75, 78 (2016). See also “Gravamen,” Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed. (2009), p. 817 
(“The substantial point or essence of a claim.”). Under Idaho’s notice pleading standards, the crux 
or gravamen of Parkinson’s claim—her only stated claim—was clearly breach of fiduciary duty.  
The Court erred by finding that Bevis’s disclosure of confidential information “…is still, in 
essence, a claim for professional negligence.” (Memorandum Decision, p. 28). This statement contra-
dicts the Court’s earlier findings, i.e., that the Court must permit an alternate claim if the claim can-
not be litigated as a malpractice claim, and that Idaho recognizes a client’s breach of fiduciary duty 
claim against their attorney under the Rockefeller I standards. The nature and timing of Bevis’s breach 
was such that Parkinson could not have sued him for legal malpractice, as he was then on the verge 
of completing Parkinson’s divorce settlement. However, Bevis was still under duties of confidentiali-
ty to Parkinson at the time of his ethical breach. Idaho Rules. P. Conduct 1.6 says: “A lawyer shall 
not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed con-
sent.” The official comments to the Rule explain this concept in more detail:  
“A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the cli-
ent's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representa-
tion…this contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.  The 
client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly 
with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter… The rule of cli-
ent-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought 
from the lawyer through compulsion of law.  The confidentiality rule, for example, applies 
not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information re-
lating to the representation, whatever its source.”  
(Id., Comments [2] and [3]). According to these comments, the confidentiality rule applies to all case-
related client information, including any personal or embarrassing information. Here, Bevis dis-
closed embarrassing and emotionally damaging information to Parkinson’s husband, leaving Parkin-
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son with feelings of shame and inferiority as to how she faired in divorce—something she can never 
live down or conceal. Thus, Bevis substantially impaired the value of his legal services to Parkinson, 
who had paid approximately $73,500.00 to Bevis to zealous and faithfully represent her best inter-
ests. While Parkinson’s harm might seem unimportant to the Court, it is of the same caliber of harm 
suffered in Rockefeller I, where the Grabows received substantially complete services at the hands of 
their disloyal real estate agent. The Supreme Court found that such disloyalty was a basis for equita-
ble forfeiture. Again, whether Parkinson also has legal malpractice claims against Bevis remains to be 
seen in discovery; the Court should allow Parkinson to proceed on her known claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty via Bevis’s disloyalty to her during her divorce case.  
Persuasive case law supports this conclusion. For instance, the Texas Supreme Court has 
said that the doctrine of equitable forfeiture is not limited to cases with proof of actual damages:  
“Texas courts of appeals, as well as courts in other jurisdictions and respected commenta-
tors, have also held that forfeiture is appropriate without regard to whether the breach of fi-
duciary duty resulted in damages. See, e.g., Watson v. Limited Partners of WCKT, Ltd., 570 
S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin, 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that limited part-
ners may recover against general partner without a showing of actual damages); Russell v. 
Truitt, 554 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that 
plaintiffs were entitled to recovery of agency fees as a matter of law if the breach of fiduciary 
duty was proved without regard as to whether the breach caused any harm); Anderson v. Grif-
fith, 501 S.W.2d 695, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e) (explaining that, 
even though the principal was not injured, ‘the self-interest of the agent is considered a vice 
which renders the transaction voidable at the election of the principal without looking into 
the matter further than to ascertain that the interest of the agent exists’) (quoting Burleson v. 
Earnest, 153 S.W.2d 869, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.--Amarillo 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.)); see also 
Judwin Properties, Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison, P.C., 911 S.W.2d 498, 507 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st 
Dist.] 1995, no writ) (stating in dicta that ‘when an attorney has stolen or used the interest to 
the detriment of his client, the plaintiff need not prove causation for breach of fiduciary du-
ty’); Bryant v. Lewis, 27 S.W.2d 604, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1930, writ dism'd ) (holding 
that attorney who represented clients with conflicting interests was not entitled to any com-
pensation for legal services rendered without addressing whether actual damages were sus-
tained).” 
(Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 239 n.35 (Tex. 1999)). See also, Hendry v. Pelland, 315 U.S. App. D.C. 
297, 73 F.3d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Under District of Columbia law, clients suing their attorney 
for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and seeking disgorgement of legal fees as their sole remedy 
need prove only that their attorney breached that duty, not that the breach caused them injury.”).   
f
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 Next, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals confirms that the Texas rule in Burrow v. Arce is 
consistent with the Restatement Second on Agency § 469 (2010), as cited by the Court in Rockefeller 
I: 
“Under Texas law, a client need not prove actual damages in order to obtain forfeiture of an 
attorney’s fee for the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty to the client. Burrow v. Arce, 997 
S.W.2d 229, 240, 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 932 (Tex. 1999). See Yaquinto v. Sergerstrom, (In re Seger-
strom, 247 F.3d 218, 226 n.5 (5th Cir. 2001). The Texas rule accords with the rule adopted in 
several other states, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 243, the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 469, and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, §§ 37, 55. It also 
comports with the two circuit level decisions on the issue, Hendry v. Pelland, 315 U.S. App. 
D.C. 297, 73 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying D.C. law), Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245, 
1257-58 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying Kansas law).” 
(Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 77 (3d Cir. 2006)).  
Finally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explains that an attorney’s ethical violations, such 
as Bevis’s violations, are sufficient for the attorney to forfeit or disgorge his or her fees: 
“In sum, under long-standing equitable principles, a district court has broad discretion to 
deny fees to an attorney who commits an ethical violation. In making such a ruling, the dis-
trict court may consider the extent of the misconduct, including its gravity, timing, willful-
ness, and effect on the various services performed by the lawyer, and other threatened or ac-
tual harm to the client. See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 37 (2000).” 
(Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d 645, 655 (9th Cir. 2012)).  
See also, Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash. 2d 451, 462, 824 P.2d 1207, 1213 (1992) (“The general 
principle that a breach of ethical duties may result in denial or disgorgement of fees is well 
recognized.”); Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn. 1982) (“This court has repeatedly stated that 
an attorney (or any fiduciary) who breaches his duty to his client forfeits his right to 
compensation…the law has traditionally been unyielding in its assessment of penalties when a 
fiduciary, or trustee, or agent has breached any of his obligations. The underlying policy is a strong 
one. It recognizes that insuring absolute fidelity to the principal's (or beneficiary's) interests is 
fundamental to establishing the trust necessary to the proper functioning of these relationships.”).  
4. The Court Should Allow Parkinson the Opportunity to Amend Her Pleadings:  
To the extent the “crux,” or gravamen, of Parkinson’s was not made clear in her original 
complaint—a point which Parkinson strongly disputes—Parkinson has filed an amended complaint 
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herewith so that the gravamen cannot possibly be misconstrued again. This amended complaint is 
sufficient to overcome the arguments in Bevis’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss. Idaho case law says:  
“Pleadings serve the purpose of stating the nature of the action brought so as to put the oth-
er party on notice, and to declare the relief sought. Unlike common law pleading and code 
pleading, perfection is not required; imperfections are not fatal. Pleadings serve to frame the 
issues so that an orderly trial can ensue, and a just resolution be pursued. Lawsuits are quests 
for the truth and justice; trials should no longer be waged in the pleading state.”  
Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 328, 715 P.2d 993, 998 (Idaho Mar. 5, 1986) (concurring opinion);  
“A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only 
when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [the] 
claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief.”  
Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) 
“A defense of new matter does not deny any facts; it assumes the averments of the com-
plaint to be true, and by an express or silent admission admits the truth of the complaint, as 
far as it goes.”  
Smith v. Marley, 39 Idaho 779, 780, 230 P. 769, 769, 1924 Ida. LEXIS 98, *1 (Idaho 1924). Here, Bev-
is’s Rule 12 motion must be denied because it cannot defeat Parkinson’s claim for breach of fiduci-
ary duty while at the same time assuming the truth of Parkinson’s allegations. See State v. Peregrina, 
151 Idaho 538, 550, 261 P.3d 815, 827, 2011 Ida. LEXIS 129, *42 (Idaho 2011). As seen in the 
amended complaint, Parkinson’s allegations, taken as true, clearly entitle her to forfeiture and/or 
disgorgement remedies under Rockefeller I and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Law-
yers.  
5. The Court Should Reopen this Case to Allow For Discovery:  
The Court should reopen this case to allow Parkinson to conduct Discovery. Parkinson’s al-
legations are as complete as the circumstances permit. Her allegations (including any potential mal-
practice allegations) require access to divorce case file, which is still in Bevis’s exclusive control. Par-
kinson has good grounds to believe that Bevis has withheld documents and communications. On 
August 18, 2015, Parkinson’s current legal counsel, Kim Trout, asked Bevis for his complete corre-
spondence file re: the Parkinson’s divorce. On December 7, 2015, Bevis responded by disclosing 
only a single email to Mr. Trout. Bevis later sent additional emails to Parkinson. However, Bevis has 
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still only disclosed select emails from May 12, 2015 to May 17, 2015; he has not disclosed any other 
communications from the divorce case. (See Declaration of Kim J. Trout, ¶ 2-5, filed herewith).  
There are three additional reasons the Court should permit discovery: (1) it is allowed under 
Rule 26(b)’s broad discovery standards; (2) it is allowed under Rule 11(b)’s flexible signature stand-
ards; and (3) it is required under Rule 12(b) dismissal standards. First, the Court should permit dis-
covery under Rule 26(b)(1)(A)’s broad discovery standards, which allows for discovery of “…any 
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be ad-
missible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence.” Parkinson has alleged a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Bevis based on Bevis’s 
breach of her confidences. Parkinson is entitled to conduct discovery as to additional breaches so as 
to fully prepare and argue the merits of her forfeiture claims under the Rockefeller I standards. Se-
cond, the Court should permit discovery under Rule 11(b)(3)’s flexible signature standards, which 
allow parties to make claims that will “…likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable oppor-
tunity for further investigation or discovery.” Parkinson has already shown at least one clear and se-
rious breach of her confidences. It is likely that her allegations of additional breaches will have evi-
dentiary support after reviewing the complete divorce case file. Third, the Court should permit dis-
covery under Rule 12(b) dismissal standards. Idaho case law says: “A court may grant a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only when it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to re-
lief.” Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis 
added). Presently, the Court cannot make this Rule 12 determination because Bevis has exclusive 
control of Parkinson’s full divorce file, and it’s not clear that Parkinson can prove “no set of facts” 
to better support her claim once she has the case file. It is bad faith, and extremely disingenuous, for 
Bevis to withhold the file and then to ask for dismissal based on Parkinson’s lack of supporting alle-
gations. The Court should remedy this situation by reopening the case to permit discovery—
recognizing that Parkinson has already alleged a claim for breach of fiduciary duty which, if proven, 
would entitle her to some relief under Idaho forfeiture law.   
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6. In the Alternative, the Court Should Dismiss this Case Without Prejudice:  
In the alternative, the Court should only dismiss this case without prejudice. This is a rela-
tively novel question under Idaho remedies law, and it is sure to come up again once Bevis starts his 
collections against Parkinson. Even if the statute of limitations for Parkinson’s claim has expired at 
that point, Parkinson will still be able to litigate her forfeiture claim as an affirmative defense and 
offset to Bevis’s collections. Idaho case law explains: “An expired statute of limitation does not bar a 
counterclaim interposed defensively as an offset against a complaint arising from the same incident.” 
Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 268, 647 P.2d 311, 314 (Ct. App. 1982). Here, Bevis’s future col-
lections against Parkinson will be based on the value of his legal services to Parkinson. The Court 
should leave Parkinson at liberty to challenge the value of those services, and to seek forfeiture 
and/or disgorgement, as did the Grabows in Rockefeller I. In any future litigation context, there will 
be no danger of confusing Parkinson’s claims for a legal malpractice dispute, as the factual basis in 
Bevis’s collection pleadings will inherently rule out that possibility. If the Court finds that dismissal 
is still proper, notwithstanding the preceding arguments, it should dismiss this case without preju-
dice so that Parkinson has a future opportunity to litigate her claim as an offset to Bevis’s collec-
tions.  
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reconsider its prior dismissal order and reinstate this case for proceedings 
on the merits. In the alternative, the Court should dismiss the case without prejudice so that Parkin-
son may preserve her claim as a viable defense to Bevis’s future collections.    
DATED April 6, 2018. 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 6, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
E-file      
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 






   
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-1406 and I.R.C.P. 2.7, I declare the following is true and correct 
and submit the following declaration: 
1. I am counsel for the Plaintiff in this matter and have personal knowledge of the facts 
stated herein. 
2. On August 18, 2015 I sent correspondence to Mr. Bevis, the Defendant in this 
matter, asking for his production of his correspondence file in the Parkinson v. Parkinson divorce 
matter pending in Ada County, at that time.  Said request included all email correspondence and 
internal correspondence regarding the Parkinson v. Parkinson matter. 
3. On August 28, 2015, Mr. Bevis responded to my letter advising he had not destroyed 
any files and that he intends to make a 10-day demand, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120, on Ms. 
Parkinson.  However, he does not produce his correspondence file at that time. 
4. On December 7, 2015, Mr. Bevis produced a single email to my office. 
Electronically Filed
4/6/2018 4:21 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
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5. On December 21, 2015, Mr. Bevis sent correspondence to Becky Parkinson, which 
correspondence was filed with the Court attached as Exhibit A to my declaration filed on January 
30, 2018.  Mr. Bevis provided emails for a limited period of time, from May 12 through May 17, 
2015.  In that correspondence produced by Mr. Bevis, Mr. Bevis discloses that he forwarded 
correspondence between Ms. Parkinson and Mr. Bevis to Stanley W. Welsh.  This communication is 
clearly protected by the attorney-client privilege, as it is correspondence between counsel and client. 
I declare under the penalty of perjury and pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the 
foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED April 6, 2018. 
 
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 6, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
iCourt     
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
ISB #8380; adl@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
 













Case No.  CV01-17-08744 
 
 
DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S 
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS 
 
COMES NOW defendant James A. Bevis (erroneously named “James E. Bevis”), by and 
through his counsel of record, Duke Scanlan & Hall PLLC, and respectfully moves this Court to 
award costs and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 54(e) and 
Idaho Code section 12-121.   
This Motion is based on the pleadings and papers on file in this matter and Defendant’s 
Verified Memorandum of Costs and Fees and the Declaration of Counsel in Support filed 
contemporaneously herewith.  
Electronically Filed
4/6/2018 4:55 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
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DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 2 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2018. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
 
 
By /s/  Keely E. Duke    
Keely E. Duke – Of the Firm 
Aubrey D. Lyon – Of the Firm 









CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of April, 2018, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document using the iCourt E-File system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to 
the following persons: 
 
Kim J. Trout 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson 
 
 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
 Hand Delivered 






     /s/  Keely E. Duke    
      Keely E. Duke  
      Aubrey D. Lyon 
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Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
ISB #8380; adl@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
 

















MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
FEES 
 
COMES NOW Defendant James A. Bevis (erroneously named “James E. Bevis”), by and 
through its counsel of record, Duke Scanlan & Hall PLLC, and submits this Verified 
Memorandum of Costs and Fees.  This Memorandum is supported by the Declaration of Counsel 
in Support filed contemporaneously herewith. This Memorandum is filed pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54(d)(4). 
Electronically Filed
4/6/2018 4:55 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
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DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 2 
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson filed the Complaint in this matter on May 10, 2017.  Process 
was not served until six months later, on November 10, 2017.  (Aff. Of Service, Nov. 10, 2017.)   
Ms. Parkinson’s Complaint included a single cause of action for “Breach of Fiduciary Duty” 
even though Ms. Parkinson was suing her former attorney, Mr. Bevis, for alleged malpractice 
committed in the course of Mr. Bevis’s representation of Ms. Parkinson.  (Compl. at 2.)   
Mr. Bevis moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, which this Court 
granted with prejudice.  (Mem. Decision and Order, Mar. 16, 2018.)  Mr. Bevis incurred attorney 
fees and costs in defending against this action, and as the prevailing party, he respectfully 
requests that he be awarded those fees and costs. 
II. COSTS AND FEES 
A. Mr. Bevis is the prevailing party 
A prevailing party is entitled to recover certain costs.  To determine a prevailing party, 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court must, in its sound discretion, consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in 
part, and on so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in 
a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved 
in the action and the resulting judgment or judgments obtained. 
 
“A determination on prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the trial court and we 
review the determination on an abuse of discretion standard.”  Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. 
Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718–19, 117 P.3d 130, 132–33 (2005). 
In this case, Mr. Bevis is unequivocally the prevailing party.  Ms. Parkinson raised a 
single cause of action against Mr. Bevis, and that cause of action was dismissed upon Mr. 
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DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 3 
Bevis’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  For Mr. Bevis, it was “the most favorable 
outcome that could possibly be achieved,” and he is the prevailing party.  See Eighteen Mile 
Ranch, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133.   
B. Costs as a Matter of Right 
Costs are allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party unless otherwise ordered by 
the court. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A).  “When costs are awarded to a party, that party is entitled to the 
following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right: (i) court filing fees, including any fees 
incidental to electronic filing . . . .”  I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C).  Here, Mr. Bevis is entitled to the 
following costs as a matter of right:  
Date Description Amount 





C. Discretionary Costs 
Mr. Bevis also seeks his discretionary costs in this matter.  “Additional items of cost not 
enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in subpart (C), may be allowed on a 
showing that the costs were necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should in 
the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party.”  I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D).  “A court may 
evaluate whether costs are exceptional within the context of the nature of case.”  City of McCall 
v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 588, 130 P.3d 1118, 1126 (2006).  “Discretionary costs may include 
long distance phone calls, photocopying, faxes, travel expenses and additional costs for expert 
witnesses.” Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 
(2005) (emphasis added; internal quotation omitted).   
Here, Mr. Bevis seeks copying charges as discretionary costs.  Ms. Parkinson’s 
allegations in her Complaint were broad, and included an allegation that Mr. Bevis improperly 
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DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 4 
shared attorney-client communications, that through collusion he secured a divorce that was 
more favorable to Ms. Parkinson’s ex-husband than herself, and that he failed to fully and 
adequately represent Ms. Parkinson, which included an allegation that he did not seek an 
evaluation of the true value of the community real property held by the Parkinson community.  
(Compl. ¶¶ 4-6.)  Considering these allegations, Mr. Bevis’s counsel copied Mr. Bevis’s entire 
file in the underlying action in preparation for the defense of this matter.  The Parkinson marital 
community included several parcels of real property in addition to substantial assets.  Valuation 
of those assets was a primary issue in the underlying divorce matter, and reports and other 
documents related to valuation comprised a large portion of Mr. Bevis’s file.  If this case had 
proceeded to discovery, a detailed analysis of nearly every aspect of the underlying divorce 
action would have been necessary to defend against the allegations of impropriety, and it was 
necessary for counsel to obtain a complete copy of Mr. Bevis’s file to prepare the defense.  Mr. 
Bevis’s counsel had small additional copying charges. 
Mr. Bevis’s discretionary costs are below: 
Date Description Amount
11/17/2017 Copying charges (to copy 4,378-pages of client 
file) 
$437.80
1/31/2018 Copying charges (in connection with preparation 
of Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss)
$1.40
2/28/2018 Copying charges $14.00
TOTAL $453.20
 
D. Attorney Fees 
1. Mr. Bevis is entitled to recover attorney fees incurred in this matter 
In any civil action, attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party “when the judge 
finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation.”  Idaho Code § 12-121.  “An award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12–121 and 
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DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 5 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”  Idaho Military Historical 
Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 629, 329 P.3d 1072, 1077 (2014) (analyzing former Idaho 
Code § 12-121).  The existence of a single triable issue of fact no longer prevents an award under 
Idaho Code section 12-121, and a trial court may apportion fees for those elements of a case that 
were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.  Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, 156 
Idaho at 632, 329 P.3d at 1080 (“Apportionment of attorney fees is appropriate for those 
elements of the case that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.”)  Findings that a 
case was pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation “must be in writing and 
include the basis and reasons for the award.”  I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2).   
Here, Ms. Parkinson’s pursuit of this case was frivolous, unreasonable, and without 
foundation.  Ms. Parkinson pursued an action for breach of fiduciary duty, which she vigorously 
argued was distinct from an action for legal malpractice.  (Plf.’s Response to Mot. To Dismiss at 
2.) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, where a former client is suing her former attorney for 
alleged professional negligence in connection with the attorney’s representation of the client, the 
appropriate cause of action is for legal professional negligence.  See Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 
616, 621, 272 P.3d 1247, 1252 (2012).  Ms. Parkinson did not address Bishop or other cases Mr. 
Bevis cited regarding the appropriate cause of action against an attorney for an alleged breach of 
the professional standard of care in the course of an attorney’s duties to a client.  Ms. Parkinson 
conceded that she could not prove a cause of action for legal professional negligence because she 
could not prove that the alleged breached caused any damages.  (Plf.’s Response to Mot. To 
Dismiss at 6.)  Additionally, Ms. Parkinson offered no Idaho authority supporting her contention 
that her case qualified for an exception to the general rule provided by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Bishop: “that plaintiffs whose claims ‘traditionally’ have been treated as claims for legal 
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DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 6 
professional negligence may not alternatively allege relief under some other legal theory based 
on the same facts.”  (Mem. Decision and Order Re. Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss at 17.)  Because Ms. 
Parkinson did not have a good faith basis to pursue the action she pursued, Mr. Bevis 
respectfully requests that this Court grant him his reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending 
against the action. 
2. The Rule 54(e)(3) factors support an award of the fees incurred 
Rule 54(e)(3) provides 12 factors the Court must consider in determining an award of 
attorney fees.  “Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, are costs in an action and 
processed in the same manner as other costs and included in the memorandum of costs. A claim 
for attorney fees as costs must be supported by an affidavit of the attorney stating the basis and 
method of computation.” I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5).  As detailed in the Declaration of Keely E. Duke 
filed herewith, Mr. Bevis incurred a reasonable amount in attorney fees in this matter which he 
seeks to recover in the amount of $17,863.20.  Each Rule 54(e)(3) factor is discussed below. 
 a. The time and labor required.  This legal malpractice matter was 
complicated because of Ms. Parkinson’s inconsistent and unorthodox approach.  Initially, Ms. 
Parkinson alleged that she was seeking to recover on a host of alleged misconduct that appeared 
to encompass the entire divorce matter in which Mr. Bevis represented Ms. Parkinson.  (Compl. 
¶¶ 4-6.)  Ms. Parkinson also appeared to be attempting to expand the statute of limitations by 
pleading a “breach of fiduciary duty” cause of action.  Mr. Bevis’s counsel, Duke Scanlan & 
Hall, PLLC, addressed the broad allegations and the curious cause of action through a Motion to 
Dismiss.  Duke Scanlan & Hall also prepared for Mr. Bevis’s defense by obtaining, copying, and 
analyzing Mr. Bevis’s file in the underlying divorce matter.  (Duke Decl. Ex. B.)  Ms. Parkinson 
took a different turn in her response to the Motion to Dismiss and contradicted the allegations in 
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DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 7 
her Complaint.  (Plf.’s Response to Mot. To Dismiss at 6.)  Mr. Bevis’s counsel then had to 
research the novel approach from Ms. Parkinson’s response and perform additional research and 
analysis in connection with that.  (See Duke Decl. Ex. B.)  Overall, Mr. Bevis’s counsel 
approached this defense in the most efficient manner possible, but it nonetheless required 
substantial resources. 
 b. The novelty and difficulty of the questions.  As noted above, Duke 
Scanlan & Hall thoroughly researched and briefed multiple theories in connection with Ms. 
Parkinson’s Complaint and positions she took in connection with the Motion to Dismiss, 
including statute of limitations issues, breach of fiduciary duty in principal-agent relationships, 
and legal malpractice issues.  Given the nature, number, and novelty of the issues, the breadth of 
Ms. Parkinson’s allegations, and the amount at stake, the hours and fees expended on research, 
analysis, and briefing were reasonable. 
 c. The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the 
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.  Ms. Duke, the lead 
counsel on this case, has nearly 20 years of civil litigation experience, and much of her career 
has been spent defending professionals.  (Duke Decl. ¶ 2.)  Where feasible and appropriate, 
substantial work was delegated to an associate attorney and paralegal at lower billing rates.  (See 
Duke Decl. ¶ 3.) 
 d. The prevailing charges for like work.  Ms. Duke has extensive 
experience with civil litigation and professional liability defense.  (Duke Decl. ¶ 2.)  She and her 
colleagues who worked on this matter each billed at their usual and customary rates.  (Duke 
Decl.)  The hourly rates charged by Ms. Duke and her firm are commensurate with the prevailing 
rates in Boise for like work.  (Duke Decl. ¶ 6.) 
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DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 8 
 e. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  Attorneys’ fees in this matter 
were charged on an hourly basis.  (Duke Decl. ¶ 4.) 
 f. The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the 
case.  There were no unusual time limitations.  Counsel performed the necessary work as 
efficiently as possible, without compromising the quality of the legal services. 
 g. The amount involved and the results obtained.  Mr. Bevis obtained 
unqualified success, obtaining dismissal for failure to state a claim.  Ms. Parkinson never clearly 
articulated her alleged damages, but they appeared to be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
 h. The undesirability of the case.  This factor is neutral as this case was 
neither particularly desirable or undesirable. 
 i. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.  
This was the first case where Duke Scanlan & Hall has represented Mr. Bevis. 
 j. Awards in similar cases.  This factor is difficult to assess given that the 
awards in legal malpractice cases vary according to each fact pattern.  In general, the total fees in 
this case are within a reasonable range based on the significant allegations against Mr. Bevis and 
the legal work necessary to defend against those allegations. 
 k. The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted 
Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case.  
Duke Scanlan & Hall does not charge clients for the costs associated with computerized legal 
research, and accordingly, the attorney fees Mr. Bevis seeks to recover do not include costs for 
computerized legal research. 
 l. Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular 
case.  As a final factor for the Court’s consideration, Ms. Parkinson did not explore pre-litigation 
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DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 9 
dispute resolution.  While there is no requirement that she do so, her approach here, in alleging 
fault with a broad range of conduct (see Compl. ¶¶ 4-6) even though the ultimate intended 
gravamen of her claim, as later displayed in her arguments regarding Mr. Bevis’s Motion to 
Dismiss, was much narrower.  (See Plf.’s Response to Mot. To Dismiss at 6.)  Mr. Bevis’s 
defense, therefore, did not benefit from knowing the narrow scope of Ms. Parkinson’s complaints 
until late in the process, in fact, just days before the hearing on Mr. Bevis’s Motion to Dismiss, 
when a substantial portion of the costs and fees had been incurred.  Ms. Parkinson’s litigation 
strategy caused greater defense costs than a more transparent approach would have created. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Bevis respectfully requests that, pursuant to Rules 
54(d)(1) and 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code section 12-121, this 
Court grant Mr. Bevis his costs and fees as follows: 
A. Costs as a matter of right:  $140.08 
B. Discretionary costs:  $453.20 
C. Reasonable attorney fees:  $17,863.20 
 Total:  $18,456.48 
Mr. Bevis reserves the right to amend or otherwise supplement this Verified 
Memorandum of Costs and Fees. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2018. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
 
By /s/  Keely E. Duke    
Keely E. Duke – Of the Firm 
Aubrey D. Lyon – Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
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DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 10 
VERIFICATION 
 
I, Keely E. Duke, declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the state of 
Idaho as follows: 
I am one of the attorneys representing defendant James A. Bevis in the above-entitled 
action and, as such, I have knowledge of the cost and fee amounts itemized in the foregoing 
Verified Memorandum of Costs and Fees. 
I have reviewed the foregoing Verified Memorandum of Costs and Fees.  To the best of 
my knowledge and belief, the costs incurred herein are true and correct and were reasonably and 
necessarily incurred in the defense of this action.  To the best of my knowledge and belief, the 
costs incurred herein are in compliance with Rule 54(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.   
DATED this 6th of April, 2018. 
 
/s/  Keely E. Duke     
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DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES - 11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of April, 2018, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document using the iCourt E-File system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to 
the following persons: 
 
Kim J. Trout 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson 
 
 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
 Hand Delivered 






     /s/  Keely E. Duke     
      Keely E. Duke 
      Aubrey D. Lyon 
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Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
ISB #8380; adl@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
 













Case No.  CV01-17-08744 
 
 
DECLARATION OF KEELY E. DUKE 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT 
JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION FOR 
FEES AND COSTS 
 
Keely E. Duke declares and affirms as follows pursuant to Idaho Code section 9-1406: 
1. I am an attorney with the firm Duke Scanlan & Hall, PLLC (“Duke Scanlan & 
Hall”), counsel of record for Defendant James A. Bevis in this matter and have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth herein.  
2. I have handled numerous professional liability matters over the years.  I am an 
experienced civil litigator, practicing litigation and trial work in Boise, Idaho since 1999.  I hold 
an “AV” rating with Martindale-Hubbell, and since 2009 I have been selected by my peers to be 
Electronically Filed
4/6/2018 4:55 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk
 
 











i i   





l  ffir ti  
1  t fi l l l
ll f V
l f
 i  
Vi tig i is i  




DECLARATION OF KEELY E. DUKE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION 
FOR FEES AND COSTS - 2 
included in The Best Lawyers in America.  I have also been included in “Chambers USA 
America’s Leading Lawyers for Business.”  Attached as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by 
reference is a copy of my professional biography. 
3. Two other members of Duke Scanlan & Hall also assisted in this litigation 
performing different, complementary tasks and avoiding duplication. Aubrey D. Lyon, an 
associate attorney, performed research, prepared briefs, and performed other tasks as detailed in 
Exhibit B.  Jennifer L. Schwartz, a contract paralegal, performed document review and other 
paralegal tasks as detailed in Exhibit B.  
4. Duke Scanlan & Hall’s agreement for defending this case was on an hourly basis.  
For the time period being claimed with respect to Duke Scanlan & Hall’s legal fees incurred in 
this action, Duke Scanlan & Hall was compensated at the following fixed hourly rates:   
a. $225.00 per hour for legal services performed by myself (19 years of 
experience);  
b. $180.00 per hour for legal services performed by associate Aubrey D. 
Lyon (8 years of experience); and  
c. $108.00 per hour for legal services performed by paralegal Jennifer L. 
Schwartz. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference is a true and 
correct copy of a summary of billing statements generated by my firm’s billing software 
reflecting activities performed by Duke Scanlan & Hall in this matter.  As set forth in the 
summary of billing statements, Mr. Bevis incurred $17,863.20 in attorney fees between 
November 13, 2017 and March 26, 2018.  Attorneys and paralegals who billed to this matter, as 
reflected in the summary of billing statements, are as follows: Keely E. Duke (Shareholder, 
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DECLARATION OF KEELY E. DUKE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION 
FOR FEES AND COSTS - 3 
identified as “KED”); Aubrey D. Lyon (Associate, identified as “ADL”); and Jennifer L. 
Schwartz (Paralegal, identified as “JLS”).  I have examined the billing statements and summary 
and, based upon my personal knowledge, the summary of billing statements sets forth a true and 
accurate itemization of the fees for time expended by attorneys and paralegals from November 
2017 through March 2018.  The attorney fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred by Mr. 
Bevis in litigating this action.   
6. I have knowledge of attorney and paralegal fees charged by attorneys practicing 
in professional liability defense in Idaho. Based upon my 19 years of experience as a litigator 
practicing in Idaho and upon my knowledge of attorney and paralegal fees charged by litigation 
firms in Idaho, I believe that Duke Scanlan & Hall’s attorneys and paralegals reasonably and 
necessarily expended the total of 111.50 hours in providing legal services for defense of this 
action, and that the total sum of $17,863.20 incurred for those services is a fair and reasonable 
amount to award Mr. Bevis, as the prevailing party, for attorney and paralegal fees incurred by 
Duke Scanlan & Hall in defending this action and for the work described above and on the 
attached spreadsheet.  Moreover, based upon my experience and knowledge of rates charged in 
the Boise, Idaho area from 2017 to the present, the rates charged by my firm are lower than the 
rates for comparable services performed in Boise, Idaho, and are reasonable for the work 
performed and the results obtained.  I believe the time and labor expended to represent Mr. Bevis 
in this action have been reasonable and consistent with the skills required for the defense of this 
action, given the claims asserted by Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson.  The services of experienced 
litigation attorneys who were familiar with this action, as well as paralegal support, were 
necessary to properly prepare Mr. Bevis’s defense and to successfully seek a favorable outcome 
in this matter.   
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DECLARATION OF KEELY E. DUKE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JAMES A. BEVIS’S MOTION 
FOR FEES AND COSTS - 4 
7. Also reflected in Exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference is a true and 
correct copy of data showing costs incurred in this action.  As set forth in Exhibit B, Mr. Bevis 
incurred costs as a matter of right in the amount of $140.08 and discretionary costs in the total 
amount of $453.20 from November 2017 through March 2018.  The costs identified above 
include filing fees and copying expenses. It is the standard practice of lawyers in Boise to 
separately charge clients for these expenses. The categories of costs incurred are as follows:  
a. Filing fee and associated processing charge:  $140.08 
b. Copying:  $453.20 
c. Total Costs:  $593.28  
8. Each of the above costs was reasonably and necessarily incurred by Mr. Bevis in 
defending this action. 
9. We have included in our motion for attorneys’ fees only fees relating to our 
efforts directly involved in litigating the case.  Further, we have not included in our petition the 
fees expended in preparing this fee petition.   
10. All of the forgoing fees and costs were reasonably and necessarily incurred by 
Mr. Bevis in litigating this action. 
11. I swear under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of Idaho that the 
foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2018. 
 
/s/  Keely E. Duke     
 Keely E. Duke 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of April, 2018, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document using the iCourt E-File system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to 
the following persons: 
 
Kim J. Trout 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson 
 
 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
 Hand Delivered 






     /s/  Keely E. Duke     
      Keely E. Duke 
      Aubrey D. Lyon 
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defending	 companies,	 employers,	 and	 individuals	 in	 complex	 business	 litigation	 and	 in	








by	 her	 peers	 to	 be	 included	 in	The	 Best	 Lawyers	 in	 America	in	 two	 categories,	 Medical	
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 Between	 a	Rock	 and	 a	Hard	 Place:	 Limitations	 on	 a	Health	 Care	 Provider’s	 Right	 to	
Indemnification	When	 it	 is	 Targeted	 Under	 the	 False	 Claims	 Act	 as	 a	 Result	 of	 the	
Fraudulent	 Activities	 of	 a	 Third	 Party	 with	 Which	 it	 Contracts	 or	 Associates,	 The	
Federal	Lawyer,	February	2009	



















   —      l   i     
i i  t i   t   , r     
 i ,  I  fI tern io    i  ol t  (  
r  ft  r  (  
r i l/ i  t i  
r i ,   i t  —  t  (     
  our  i    o i     
  i s,  i t  ef      
  i s,    r i  Ida  (     
 irect rs,  f  r  Id     
 r      
t   i r i      '    r  , , 
 
t  t  our   ki   ,  
  t  t  i r i        
l  
t       : i    l   r '  i   
        l i     l    
r  t ie     r     t   ,  
 , r   
-  r    l  ( ,   i t    
 
    ,  l   t , r   
t  
 i r i  l     l , r  , ] . 
arr  l   ,  , . (    li  
i  
our     
    
 our  ppeals 
  our  
. i t  r    i t  f  
. our  ppeals   i  ir i  
 t   i t   —  
  i t   —  











Exhibit B  i i
000168
 
EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 1 
EXHIBIT B  
(to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of  
Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees and Costs) 
 
Attorney Fees 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
11/13/2017 ADL Review and analysis of complaint in 
preparation for initial meeting with 
client regarding facts of claim;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 ADL Analysis of timing of service and 
IRCP 4 regarding timeliness of 
service of process in connection 
with analysis of defenses for 
responsive pleading;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Review and analysis of docket 
history for underlying matter;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Review and analysis of docket 
history of current matter regarding 
Disqualifying determination;
180.00 0.10 18.00
 ADL Preparation of motion to Disqualify 
presiding judge and proposed order;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Analysis of Statute of Limitation 
defense and applicable law in 
connection with preparation of 
responsive pleading;
180.00 1.60 288.00
 ADL Analysis of cause of action and 
allegations of fault in connection 
with preparation of responsive 
pleading;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 KED Review the Complaint; 225.00 0.20 45.00
 KED Telephone conference with Mr. 
Bevis regarding this new matter;
225.00 0.40 90.00
 KED Telephone conference with Kobi 
Gibbs regarding this new matter;
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Review the correspondence from 
Mr. Bevis regarding this matter;
225.00 0.10 22.50
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 2 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
11/14/2017 JLS Receive, review, and analyze 
records from client (approx. 2100 
pages), begin electronic 
bookmarking to the file, for 
purposes of creating a 
chronologized version of all records 
for use in upcoming meeting with 
Mr. Bevis;
108.00 2.30 248.40
11/15/2017 JLS Continue analysis of records from 
client (approx. 2100 pages), 
continue electronic bookmarking to 
the file for purposes of creating a 
chronologized version of all records 
for use in upcoming meeting with 
Mr. Bevis;
108.00 5.20 561.60
11/16/2017 ADL Review and analysis of documents 
from client (approx. 2100 pages) in 
preparation for client meeting;
180.00 2.60 468.00
 ADL Meet with client regarding case 
background in connection with 
preparation of responsive pleading;
180.00 2.50 450.00
 JLS Analysis of additional information 
needed;
108.00 0.40 43.20
 JLS Continue summarizing handwritten 
notes from client's files (approx. 
2100 pages);
108.00 2.80 302.40
 JLS Prepare timeline to the judgment 
paperwork, the stipulation to enter 
the judgment/decree, the motion to 
withdraw the stipulation, and the 
notes provided thus far from client;
108.00 0.80 86.40
 JLS Extract key records from client's file 
(approx. 2100 pages) in preparation 
for upcoming meeting;
108.00 0.10 10.80
 JLS Create case core materials for 
meeting;
108.00 0.20 21.60
 KED Prepare for client meeting by 
reviewing file materials;
225.00 1.00 225.00
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 3 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 KED Attend the meeting with Mr. Bevis; 225.00 2.50 562.50
 KED Continue preparing the Motion to 
Dismiss outline re this matter;
225.00 0.50 112.50
 KED Review the records from client; 225.00 0.80 180.00
11/17/2017 KED Revise and finalize the Motion to 
Disqualify;
225.00 0.10 22.50
11/19/2017 JLS Catalogue all records received from 
client to date, (approx.. 800 of 2100 
pages), in preparation for upcoming 
discovery;
108.00 1.80 194.40
11/21/2017 ADL Preparation of motion to dismiss 
and memo in support;
180.00 1.40 252.00
 ADL Research regarding motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim 
legal standard and analogous cases 
in connection with memorandum in 
support of motion to dismiss;
180.00 1.90 342.00
11/22/2017 ADL Research regarding IRCP 11 factual 
support for allegations and "upon 
information and belief" caveat in 
connection with motion to dismiss;
180.00 1.70 306.00
 ADL Research regarding attorney 
malpractice alleged as breach of 
fiduciary duty in connection with 
motion to dismiss;
180.00 0.90 162.00
 ADL Research regarding elements of 
attorney malpractice claim in 
connection with motion to dismiss;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 ADL Research regarding analogous 
attorney malpractice, disclosure of 
confidential communications actions 
in connection with motion to 
dismiss;
180.00 0.80 144.00
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 4 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 ADL Further preparation of memorandum 
in support of motion to dismiss, 
including argument section re form 
over function, failure to allege valid 
cause of action, and failure to allege 
sufficient information to support a 
claim for relief;
180.00 3.10 558.00
11/23/2017 ADL Research regarding "substance over 
form" rationale as applied in causes 
of action for attorney malpractice in 
connection with motion to dismiss;
180.00 1.20 216.00
 ADL Further preparation of memorandum 
in support of motion to dismiss, 
including analysis regarding 
Plaintiff's failure to correctly 
characterize her cause of action;
180.00 1.30 234.00
11/24/2017 JLS Catalogue/summarize all records 
received from client to date in 
preparation for upcoming discovery 
matters (approx.. 500 of 2100 
pages);
108.00 4.10 442.80
11/25/2017 JLS Catalogue/summarize all records 
received from client to date in 
preparation for upcoming discovery 
matters (approx.. 800 of 2100 
pages);
108.00 3.20 345.60
11/27/2017 KED Review and revise the memorandum 
in support of the Motion to Dismiss;
225.00 1.50 337.50
11/28/2017 ADL Further preparation of memorandum 
in support of motion to dismiss, 
including analysis of sufficiency of 
factual support for allegations 
argument and analysis of 
Complaint;
180.00 0.40 72.00
 ADL Email with client regarding 
memorandum in support of motion 
to dismiss;
180.00 0.10 18.00
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 5 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 ADL Telephone conference with client 
regarding memorandum in support 
of motion to dismiss;
180.00 0.20 36.00
11/30/2017 ADL Telephone conference with client 
regarding memorandum in support 
of motion to dismiss;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 ADL Further preparation of memorandum 
in support of motion to dismiss, 
including information and 
recommendations from client;
180.00 0.40 72.00
12/01/2017 ADL Further preparation of memo in 
support of motion to dismiss;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 KED Finalize the Motion to Dismiss; 225.00 1.00 225.00
12/06/2017 JLS Begin review, analysis, electronic 
bookmarking, and cataloguing of 
additional underlying legal files 
from client (page range 
approximately 13,000 initially);
108.00 2.30 248.40
12/07/2017 JLS Continue review, analysis, electronic 
bookmarking, and cataloguing of 
additional underlying legal files 
from James Bevis (page range 
approximately 13,000 initially);
108.00 0.70 75.60
12/08/2017 JLS Continue review, analysis, electronic 
bookmarking, and cataloguing of 
additional underlying legal files 
from James Bevis (page range 
approximately 13,000 initially);
108.00 0.80 86.40
12/12/2017 JLS Continue review, analysis, electronic 
bookmarking, and cataloguing of 
additional underlying legal files 
from James Bevis (approx.. 600 
pages of total page range 
approximately 13,000);
108.00 2.60 280.80
12/13/2017 ADL Receipt and review order regarding 
motion to disqualify;
180.00 0.20 36.00
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 6 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 JLS Continue review, analysis, electronic 
bookmarking, and cataloguing of 
additional underlying legal files 
from James Bevis (approx. 700 of 
total page range approximately 
13,000);
108.00 0.80 86.40
 KED Review the notice of the Court 
regarding the Disqualification we 
filed; 
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Analysis re notice of the Court on 
motion to disqualify;
225.00 0.20 45.00
12/14/2017 ADL Preparation of document re motion 
to disqualify;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Telephone conference with client; 180.00 0.10 18.00
 ADL Receipt and review of affidavit of 
service; 
180.00 0.10 18.00
 KED Review and evaluate Affidavit of 
Service filed by plaintiff's counsel 
today; 
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Review the Affidavit of Service 
filed today by plaintiff; 
225.00 0.10 22.50
12/15/2017 JLS Continue review and analysis of 
electronic files to confirm integrity 
of all scans, continue OCR of all 
files, electronic bookmarking, and 
catalogue underlying legal files 
from James Bevis (approx. 1000 
pages of total files from Mr. Bevis 
approximately 13,000 pages);
108.00 3.20 345.60
12/16/2017 JLS Summarize/catalogue portions of 
the documents provided by Mr. 
Bevis (approx. 300 pages);
108.00 0.40 43.20
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 7 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
12/20/2017 JLS Continue review and analysis of 
scanned images of Mr. Bevis' legal 
files to ensure integrity of the scans 
compared to original files, in 
preparation for providing originals 
back to Mr. Bevis (reviewing and 
modifying bookmarks on approx. 
1000 pages);
108.00 0.80 86.40
 KED Review the Notice of Reassignment 
to Judge Medema;
225.00 0.10 22.50
12/21/2017 JLS Continue review and analysis of Mr. 
Bevis' legal files (continuing review 
of and modification of electronic 
bookmarks on approx. 1000 pages);
108.00 0.60 64.80
12/27/2017 JLS Coordinate, oversee, and revise 
electronic bookmarking of 
additional files from Mr. Bevis 
(approx. 1500 pages);
108.00 0.70 75.60
12/28/2017 JLS Coordinate, oversee, and revise 
electronic bookmarking of 
additional files from Mr. Bevis 
(approx. 1500 pages);
108.00 0.70 75.60
 KED Telephone call to the Court 
regarding obtaining a hearing date 
on our Motion to Dismiss;
225.00 0.10 22.50
01/01/2018 JLS Analyze records from Jim Bevis 
(approx. 9000 pages) for 
duplications and relevance to the 
instant claims (this segment has not 
yet been catalogued, duplicative in 
part) and continue electronic 
bookmarking of these segments;
108.00 0.80 86.40
 JLS Analyze, catalogue, and summarize 
records from client (approx. 200 
pages);
108.00 0.80 86.40
1/02/2018 JLS Complete cataloguing and 
summarizing records from client 
(approx. 200 pages);
108.00 1.80 194.40
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 8 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 JLS Analyze, catalogue, and summarize 
records from client (approx. 600 
pages);
108.00 2.60 280.80
1/12/2018 ADL Email to client responding to 
inquiry;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 JLS Review, analyze, and coordinate 
electronic bookmarking of Mr. 
Bevis' underlying files (approx. 500 
pages);
108.00 1.20 129.60
1/15/2018 KED Correspondence with Mr. Bevis 
regarding the case;
225.00 0.10 22.50
1/19/2018 JLS Continue review, analysis, and 
revision of electronic bookmarks to 
the records from client (approx. 
2000 pages);
108.00 1.30 140.40
 JLS Continue review, analysis, and 
revision of electronic bookmarks to 
the records from client (approx. 300 
pages);
108.00 0.20 21.60
 JLS Analysis of and coordinate revisions 
to the electronic bookmarks to the 
records from client (approx. 5000 
pages);
108.00 0.70 75.60
01/31/2018 ADL Review and analysis of response to 
Motion to Dismiss in connection 
with preparation of reply;
180.00 0.60 108.00
 ADL Preparation of reply in support of 
motion to dismiss;
180.00 2.90 522.00
 ADL Review and analysis of authorities 
cited in Plaintiff's response brief in 
connection with preparation of reply 
in support of Motion to Dismiss;
180.00 2.40 432.00
 KED Review and evaluate the opposition 
to the motion to dismiss;
225.00 0.60 135.00
 KED Prepare outline regarding 
responding to same; 
225.00 0.60 135.00
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 9 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
2/01/2018 ADL Further preparation of reply in 
support of motion to dismiss, 
including introduction and analysis 
of Plaintiff's arguments regarding 
disgorgement of fees;
180.00 3.20 576.00
 ADL Research regarding attorney fee 
forfeiture due to breach of fiduciary 
duty in connection with reply in 
support of motion to dismiss;
180.00 1.80 324.00
 ADL Further preparation of reply in 
support of motion to dismiss, 
including distinguishing cases cited 
in Plaintiff's response memorandum;
180.00 1.40 252.00
 KED Revise the Reply memorandum we 
are filing;
225.00 0.80 180.00
2/02/2018 ADL Research regarding legal issue in 
response to call from client;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 ADL Telephone call from client regarding 
case; 
180.00 0.10 18.00
 ADL Two calls to client re case; 180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Further preparation of reply in 
support of motion to dismiss, 
including analysis regarding 
Plaintiff's authorities;
180.00 1.10 198.00
 ADL Email to client responding to call; 180.00 0.20 36.00
 KED Revise and finalize the Reply 
Memorandum;
225.00 1.00 225.00
2/05/2018 ADL Preparation of outline for oral 
argument regarding Motion to 
Dismiss;
180.00 0.80 144.00
 KED Correspondence with the Court 
regarding the Reply brief;
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Telephone call to Mr. Bevis 
regarding case;
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Correspondence to Mr. Bevis 
regarding same;
225.00 0.10 22.50
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 10 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 KED Begin preparing for tomorrow's 
Motion to Dismiss hearing;
225.00 0.80 180.00
2/06/2018 ADL Preparation for hearing on motion to 
dismiss, including case summaries 
and holdings for cases supporting 
arguments supporting dismissal;
180.00 1.40 252.00
 KED Prepare for today's hearing on the 
Motion to Dismiss;
225.00 3.30 742.50
 KED Handle today's hearing on the 
Motion to Dismiss;
225.00 2.00 450.00
2/09/2018 ADL Receipt and review Plaintiff's 
motion to file supplemental brief 
including proposed supplemental 
brief and proposed order;
180.00 0.40 72.00
 KED Review the request by plaintiff to 
file a supplemental memorandum 
and review the supplemental memo;
225.00 0.30 67.50
 KED Review and evaluate the Motion for 
Leave to file a supplemental 
memorandum;
225.00 0.30 67.50
2/14/2018 KED Receive and review Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Memorandum;
225.00 0.10 22.50
 ADL Preparation of objection to 
Plaintiff's motion to file 
supplemental brief;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Receipt and review order denying 
Plaintiff's motion for supplemental 
briefing;
180.00 0.10 18.00
 KED Review the Order denying the 
request for supplemental briefing;
225.00 0.10 22.50
3/16/2018 ADL Review and analysis of 
memorandum decision and order 
granting motion to dismiss (31 
pages in length);
180.00 1.90 342.00
 KED Brief review of the decision (we 
won); 
225.00 0.10 22.50
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 11 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 KED Correspondence to our clients 
regarding case;
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Telephone call to Jim Bevis 
regarding case;
225.00 0.20 45.00
 KED Review and evaluate the 30 page 
opinion by the Court;
225.00 1.00 225.00
3/19/2018 KED Review the correspondence from 
client; 
225.00 0.10 22.50
3/22/2018 ADL Research regarding post-judgment 
matters;
180.00 2.10 378.00
3/23/2018 KED Review the Judgment that was filed 
today; 
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Begin evaluating whether to file a 
Motion for fees;
225.00 0.40 90.00
 ADL Status report to client regarding 
post-judgment matters;
180.00 1.20 216.00
3/26/2018 ADL Further preparation of letter to client 
re post-judgment matters;
180.00 0.90 162.00






11/17/2017 First Appearance Fee and associated processing 
charge 
$140.08
11/17/2017 Copying charges (to copy 4,378-pages of client file) $437.80
1/31/2018 Copying charges (in connection with preparation of 
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss)
$1.40
2/28/2018 Copying charges $14.00
TOTAL $593.28
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Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees | Page 1 
KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 
MOTION TO DISALLOW  






   
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson respectfully moves this Court to disallow Bevis’s verified memo-
randum of costs and fees, as set out in Parkinson’s supporting legal brief, filed herewith.   
DATED April 20, 2018. 
 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk
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Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees | Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 20, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
iCourt     
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 
LEGAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 







   
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson respectfully submits this legal brief in support of her motion to 
disallow Bevis’s verified memorandum of fees and costs, as follows:  
INTRODUCTION 
 Parkinson filed a motion for reconsideration on April 6, 2018. The Court should disallow 
Bevis’s memorandum of fees and costs for the reasons stated in that motion. If Court ultimately denies 
the motion, then it should only award Bevis partial costs and no attorney fees. Specifically, Bevis 
should only be allowed to recover his mandatory filing fee cost. Bevis’s discretionary photocopying 
costs are not exceptional under the Rule 54(d) standards. In addition, Parkinson’s claim was not friv-
olous or unfounded; rather, it was deemed to be valid (at least in terms of its form), and so it cannot 
be considered so plainly fallacious as to trigger Idaho Code § 12-121 fees.   
LEGAL STANDARDS 
“When costs are awarded to a party, that party is entitled to the following costs, actually paid, 
as a matter of right…court filing fees.” (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C)(i)). “Additional items of cost…may be 
Electronically Filed
4/20/2018 3:18 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk
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Legal Brief in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees | Page 2 
allowed on a showing that the costs were necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and 
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party.” (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D)). 
“Idaho law regarding the recovery of attorney fees by litigants follows the ‘American rule,’ 
which requires that litigants bear their own attorney fees absent a contractual right or a statutory au-
thorization.” Gillihan v. Gump, 140 Idaho 693, 695, 99 P.3d 1083, 1085 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2003).  
“A district court should only award fees [under Idaho Code § 12-121] when it is left with the 
abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation.” Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259 P.3d 608, 614 (Idaho Aug. 4, 2011).  
LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
1. The Court Should Disallow Fees and Costs Due to Parkinson’s Pending Motion for 
Reconsideration:  
The Court should disallow all costs and fees due to Parkinson’s pending motion for reconsid-
eration. If granted, Bevis will not be a prevailing party in the matter, and Parkinson will be allowed to 
address her claim on its actual merits, i.e., as a breach of fiduciary duty claim. The Court erred by 
holding that Parkinson should have brought her claim as a legal malpractice claim. As explained in her 
pending motion, Parkinson was entitled to plead a breach of fiduciary duty claim under the standards 
of Rockefeller I and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. The question of who 
prevailed on Parkinson’s real claim, i.e., her breach of fiduciary duty claim, can only be decided once 
the case is reopened and the merits of the claim are fully and fairly litigated.   
2. In the alternative, the Court Should Only Allow Mandatory Costs:  
In the alternative, if the Court denies Parkinson’s motion for reconsideration, then the Court 
should only award Bevis his mandatory filing fee cost of $140.08. This is the only cost which Bevis 
asks for under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C), and it is the only cost he can legitimately recover.  
The Court should deny Bevis’s request for discretionary photocopy costs of $435.20. Bevis 
cites to the case Hayden Lake Fire Dept. v. Alcorn to support this discretionary costs claim. But Hayden 
Lake Fire Dept. is incongruent with Bevis’s own position. In that case, the Court found that discretion-
ary costs “may include” photocopying—but the Court went on to explain:  
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“[The Idaho Supreme Court] has always construed the requirement that a cost be ‘exceptional’ 
under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) to include those costs incurred because the nature of the case was 
itself exceptional.”  
Id., 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005). The District Court in Hayden granted the prevailing 
party its discretionary photocopy costs due to the apparent “exceptional” nature of the case, i.e., a 
large class action lawsuit which involved claims by SIF of approximately $28,301.14 in mandatory 
costs and $516,753.18 in discretionary costs. By contrast, Bevis’s own arguments suggest that this is 
nothing more than a routine legal malpractice case. In fact, Bevis states at some length in his prior 
briefing that the case is “well established” under Bishop and other Idaho precedents. By these admis-
sions, Bevis establishes that this is not an exceptional case. Moreover, Bevis does not take the time to 
explain why the case was exceptional; he only says that he incurred the photocopying costs in antici-
pation of his eventual defense. This conclusory argument, if adopted, would convert every routine 
case into an exceptional case, which goes against the language of Rule 54(d)(1)(D).    
 Idaho case law generally does not allow photocopy costs as discretionary costs. For instance, 
in Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 175 (1998), the Court refused to allow discretionary photo-
copy costs in a personal injury jury case, saying “…travel and lodging expenses for expert witnesses 
and attorneys and photocopy expenses are not exceptional but, on the contrary, are common in a case 
of this nature.” Id., at p. 493. And, in Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 865 P.2d 965 (1993), 
the Court refused to allow photocopying costs, explaining: “Nowhere in the record do the cross-
appellants attempt to explain why these [photocopying] charges were necessary and exceptional, and 
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party.” Id., at p. 881. Bevis’s case is 
much more analogous to Fish and to Auto Club, i.e., it is a routine case, with routine litigation costs. 
The Court should follow these precedents and disallow Bevis’s photocopying costs.   
 Finally, Bevis’s photocopying costs were not “reasonable” under the circumstances. Bevis in-
sists that Parkinson’s claim is really a legal malpractice claim, not a breach of fiduciary duty claim. This 
fact is important because Bevis knew up-front that Parkinson had not alleged a legal malpractice claim. 
Therefore, Bevis should have postponed his photocopying efforts until his preliminary Rule 12 motion 
had been decided. Bevis admits that the reason he photocopied the divorce case file (4,378 pp.) was 
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done in anticipation of his later discovery needs: “If this case had proceeded to discovery, a detailed 
analysis of nearly every aspect of the underlying divorce action would have been necessary to defend 
against the allegations of impropriety, and it was necessary for counsel to obtain a complete copy of 
Mr. Bevis’s file to prepare the defense.” (Defendant’s Verified Memorandum of Costs and Fees, p. 4). It was 
simply not reasonable for Bevis to photocopy all his files prior to a ruling on his Rule 12 motion, 
knowing that the photocopies would not be needed until much later in the case.    
3. The Court Should Disallow All Attorney Fees under Idaho Code § 12-121:  
In all events, the Court should disallow Bevis’s request for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 
12-121. Idaho case law is clear: “A district court should only award fees [under Idaho Code § 12-121] 
when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation.” Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259 P.3d 608, 614 (Idaho 
Aug. 4, 2011) (emphasis added). Here, the Court found that Parkinson’s claim was valid—at least in 
terms of its form: “This Court concludes Plaintiff may sue her former attorney for breach of a fiduciary 
duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship, just like other principals may sue their agents who 
owe them a fiduciary duty. The test articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Rockefeller I and in the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is applicable to those claims.” (Memorandum Deci-
sion, p. 24). The Court’s ultimate conclusions on the form of Parkinson’s claim, coupled with the 
Court’s lengthy analysis on the substance of the claim, shows that the claim (as breach of fiduciary 
duty) was fairly debatable, and that fact is enough to prevent Bevis from claiming § 12-121 fees: “A 
court must determine whether the evidence adduced is sufficient, albeit disputed, to establish a fairly 
debatable issue under the legal theories advanced by the plaintiff…attorney fees should be awarded 
under I.C. § 12-121 only if the position advocated by the non-prevailing party is plainly fallacious and, 
therefore, not fairly debatable.” Assocs. Nw. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 
1987). See also Gulf Chem. Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 895, 693 P.2d 1092, 1097 
(Ct. App. 1984) (“…when a fairly debatable claim is deemed frivolous for no stated reason other than 
its ultimate failure upon a point of law, we believe discretion has been abused.”); Wing v. Amalgamated 
Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 911, 684 P.2d 307, 313 (Ct. App. 1984) (“A misperception of law or of one's 
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interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable conduct. If it were, virtually every case controlled 
by a question of law would entail an attorney fee award against the losing party under I.C. § 12-121.  
Rather, the question must be whether the position adopted by the owner was not only incorrect but 
so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.”).  
In addition, Parkinson’s claim involved a novel application of Idaho case law—a fact which 
precludes all §12-121 fees. Parkinson alleged that Bevis breached his fiduciary duties of confidentiality 
and should forfeit and/or disgorge his attorney compensation. Up to this time, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has only extended its Rockefeller I forfeiture analysis to real estate agents, not to attorneys. Here, 
the Court correctly held in its memorandum decision that the Rockefeller I forfeiture standards are the 
same as those set out in Section § 37 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers—
which suggests that Parkinson was justified in arguing her breach of fiduciary duty claim as an 
extension of those standards. See Karel v. Dep't of Fin. (In re Karel), 144 Idaho 379, 384, 162 P.3d 758, 
763 (2007); Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 852, 203 P.3d 1246, 1251 (2009).  
It should be noted, in passing, that the Court is only allowed to grant Bevis his “reasonable” 
attorney fees. Bevis’s fees, as stated, are grossly excessive and unreasonable. For instance, Bevis admits 
in his supporting declaration that a large portion of his fees are dedicated to copying and organizing 
files which would not be used until later in the case. (See time entries for: 11/14 (2.30 hrs.), 11/15 
(5.20 hrs.), 11/16 (2.60 hrs. + 2.80 hrs. + .80 hrs. + .10 hrs. + 1.00 hrs. + .80 hrs.), 11/19 (1.80 hrs.), 
11/24 (4.10 hours), 11/25 (3.20 hours), 12/06 (2.30 hrs.), 12/07 (.70 hrs.), 12/08 (.80 hrs.), 12/12 
(2.60 hrs.), 12/13 (.80 hrs.), 12/15 (3.20 hrs.), 12/16 (.40 hrs.), 12/20 (.80 hrs.), 12/21 (.60 hrs.), 12/27 
(.70 hrs.), 12/28 (.70 hrs.), 1/01 (.80 hrs. + .80 hrs.), 1/02 (1.80 hrs. + 2.60 hrs.), 1/12 (.20 hrs. + 1.20 
hrs.), 1/19 (1.30 hrs. + .20 hrs. + .70 hrs.))1. Bevis fails to explain why this effort was necessary prior 
to his Rule 12 motion, and so any fees associated with the copying and organizing of his case files 
should be disallowed. But to reiterate—any fee award under Idaho Code § 12-121 should be disal-
lowed, whether Bevis’s fees were reasonable or not. The important point is that Parkinson’s claim was 
                                            
1 These are highlighted in yellow on the attached “Exhibit B (to the Declaration of Keeley E. Duke in Support of De-
fendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees and Costs). 
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not frivolous and was fairly debatable, as seen from the record. It would be an abuse of discretion to 
allow Bevis any portion of his fees, even those related to his Rule 12 defense. 
4. The Court Should Disallow the Discretionary Costs:  
Bevis has not made a showing that the requested discretionary costs, “were necessary and 
exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against” Par-
kinson.  The discretionary costs of $453.20 for “copying” is presumably for copying Mr. Bevis’ file.  
As discussed above, Bevis fails to explain why this effort was necessary prior to the decision of his 
Rule 12 motion.  Moreover, Bevis makes no showing as to why the copying costs “were necessary 
and exceptional.”  Bevis has the burden, under Rule 54(d)(1)(D), to prove the exceptional nature of 
the requested discretionary costs, and he has failed to do so.  Therefore, said costs should be disal-
lowed. 
CONCLUSION 
Parkinson respectfully asks the Court to grant her pending motion for reconsideration and to 
disallow all Bevis’s costs and fees. In the alternative, the Court should only award Bevis his mandatory 
filing fee cost and disallow all attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121.  
DATED April 20, 2018. 
 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 20, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
iCourt     
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 1 
EXHIBIT B  
(to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of  
Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees and Costs) 
 
Attorney Fees 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
11/13/2017 ADL Review and analysis of complaint in 
preparation for initial meeting with 
client regarding facts of claim;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 ADL Analysis of timing of service and 
IRCP 4 regarding timeliness of 
service of process in connection 
with analysis of defenses for 
responsive pleading;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Review and analysis of docket 
history for underlying matter;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Review and analysis of docket 
history of current matter regarding 
Disqualifying determination;
180.00 0.10 18.00
 ADL Preparation of motion to Disqualify 
presiding judge and proposed order;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Analysis of Statute of Limitation 
defense and applicable law in 
connection with preparation of 
responsive pleading;
180.00 1.60 288.00
 ADL Analysis of cause of action and 
allegations of fault in connection 
with preparation of responsive 
pleading;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 KED Review the Complaint; 225.00 0.20 45.00
 KED Telephone conference with Mr. 
Bevis regarding this new matter;
225.00 0.40 90.00
 KED Telephone conference with Kobi 
Gibbs regarding this new matter;
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Review the correspondence from 
Mr. Bevis regarding this matter;
225.00 0.10 22.50
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 2 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
11/14/2017 JLS Receive, review, and analyze 
records from client (approx. 2100 
pages), begin electronic 
bookmarking to the file, for 
purposes of creating a 
chronologized version of all records 
for use in upcoming meeting with 
Mr. Bevis;
108.00 2.30 248.40
11/15/2017 JLS Continue analysis of records from 
client (approx. 2100 pages), 
continue electronic bookmarking to 
the file for purposes of creating a 
chronologized version of all records 
for use in upcoming meeting with 
Mr. Bevis;
108.00 5.20 561.60
11/16/2017 ADL Review and analysis of documents 
from client (approx. 2100 pages) in 
preparation for client meeting;
180.00 2.60 468.00
 ADL Meet with client regarding case 
background in connection with 
preparation of responsive pleading;
180.00 2.50 450.00
 JLS Analysis of additional information 
needed;
108.00 0.40 43.20
 JLS Continue summarizing handwritten 
notes from client's files (approx. 
2100 pages);
108.00 2.80 302.40
 JLS Prepare timeline to the judgment 
paperwork, the stipulation to enter 
the judgment/decree, the motion to 
withdraw the stipulation, and the 
notes provided thus far from client;
108.00 0.80 86.40
 JLS Extract key records from client's file 
(approx. 2100 pages) in preparation 
for upcoming meeting;
108.00 0.10 10.80
 JLS Create case core materials for 
meeting;
108.00 0.20 21.60
 KED Prepare for client meeting by 
reviewing file materials;
225.00 1.00 225.00
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 3 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 KED Attend the meeting with Mr. Bevis; 225.00 2.50 562.50
 KED Continue preparing the Motion to 
Dismiss outline re this matter;
225.00 0.50 112.50
 KED Review the records from client; 225.00 0.80 180.00
11/17/2017 KED Revise and finalize the Motion to 
Disqualify;
225.00 0.10 22.50
11/19/2017 JLS Catalogue all records received from 
client to date, (approx.. 800 of 2100 
pages), in preparation for upcoming 
discovery;
108.00 1.80 194.40
11/21/2017 ADL Preparation of motion to dismiss 
and memo in support;
180.00 1.40 252.00
 ADL Research regarding motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim 
legal standard and analogous cases 
in connection with memorandum in 
support of motion to dismiss;
180.00 1.90 342.00
11/22/2017 ADL Research regarding IRCP 11 factual 
support for allegations and "upon 
information and belief" caveat in 
connection with motion to dismiss;
180.00 1.70 306.00
 ADL Research regarding attorney 
malpractice alleged as breach of 
fiduciary duty in connection with 
motion to dismiss;
180.00 0.90 162.00
 ADL Research regarding elements of 
attorney malpractice claim in 
connection with motion to dismiss;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 ADL Research regarding analogous 
attorney malpractice, disclosure of 
confidential communications actions 
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 4 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 ADL Further preparation of memorandum 
in support of motion to dismiss, 
including argument section re form 
over function, failure to allege valid 
cause of action, and failure to allege 
sufficient information to support a 
claim for relief;
180.00 3.10 558.00
11/23/2017 ADL Research regarding "substance over 
form" rationale as applied in causes 
of action for attorney malpractice in 
connection with motion to dismiss;
180.00 1.20 216.00
 ADL Further preparation of memorandum 
in support of motion to dismiss, 
including analysis regarding 
Plaintiff's failure to correctly 
characterize her cause of action;
180.00 1.30 234.00
11/24/2017 JLS Catalogue/summarize all records 
received from client to date in 
preparation for upcoming discovery 
matters (approx.. 500 of 2100 
pages);
108.00 4.10 442.80
11/25/2017 JLS Catalogue/summarize all records 
received from client to date in 
preparation for upcoming discovery 
matters (approx.. 800 of 2100 
pages);
108.00 3.20 345.60
11/27/2017 KED Review and revise the memorandum 
in support of the Motion to Dismiss;
225.00 1.50 337.50
11/28/2017 ADL Further preparation of memorandum 
in support of motion to dismiss, 
including analysis of sufficiency of 
factual support for allegations 
argument and analysis of 
Complaint;
180.00 0.40 72.00
 ADL Email with client regarding 
memorandum in support of motion 
to dismiss;
180.00 0.10 18.00
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 5 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 ADL Telephone conference with client 
regarding memorandum in support 
of motion to dismiss;
180.00 0.20 36.00
11/30/2017 ADL Telephone conference with client 
regarding memorandum in support 
of motion to dismiss;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 ADL Further preparation of memorandum 
in support of motion to dismiss, 
including information and 
recommendations from client;
180.00 0.40 72.00
12/01/2017 ADL Further preparation of memo in 
support of motion to dismiss;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 KED Finalize the Motion to Dismiss; 225.00 1.00 225.00
12/06/2017 JLS Begin review, analysis, electronic 
bookmarking, and cataloguing of 
additional underlying legal files 
from client (page range 
approximately 13,000 initially);
108.00 2.30 248.40
12/07/2017 JLS Continue review, analysis, electronic 
bookmarking, and cataloguing of 
additional underlying legal files 
from James Bevis (page range 
approximately 13,000 initially);
108.00 0.70 75.60
12/08/2017 JLS Continue review, analysis, electronic 
bookmarking, and cataloguing of 
additional underlying legal files 
from James Bevis (page range 
approximately 13,000 initially);
108.00 0.80 86.40
12/12/2017 JLS Continue review, analysis, electronic 
bookmarking, and cataloguing of 
additional underlying legal files 
from James Bevis (approx.. 600 
pages of total page range 
approximately 13,000);
108.00 2.60 280.80
12/13/2017 ADL Receipt and review order regarding 
motion to disqualify;
180.00 0.20 36.00
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 6 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 JLS Continue review, analysis, electronic 
bookmarking, and cataloguing of 
additional underlying legal files 
from James Bevis (approx. 700 of 
total page range approximately 
13,000);
108.00 0.80 86.40
 KED Review the notice of the Court 
regarding the Disqualification we 
filed; 
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Analysis re notice of the Court on 
motion to disqualify;
225.00 0.20 45.00
12/14/2017 ADL Preparation of document re motion 
to disqualify;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Telephone conference with client; 180.00 0.10 18.00
 ADL Receipt and review of affidavit of 
service; 
180.00 0.10 18.00
 KED Review and evaluate Affidavit of 
Service filed by plaintiff's counsel 
today; 
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Review the Affidavit of Service 
filed today by plaintiff; 
225.00 0.10 22.50
12/15/2017 JLS Continue review and analysis of 
electronic files to confirm integrity 
of all scans, continue OCR of all 
files, electronic bookmarking, and 
catalogue underlying legal files 
from James Bevis (approx. 1000 
pages of total files from Mr. Bevis 
approximately 13,000 pages);
108.00 3.20 345.60
12/16/2017 JLS Summarize/catalogue portions of 
the documents provided by Mr. 
Bevis (approx. 300 pages);
108.00 0.40 43.20
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 7 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
12/20/2017 JLS Continue review and analysis of 
scanned images of Mr. Bevis' legal 
files to ensure integrity of the scans 
compared to original files, in 
preparation for providing originals 
back to Mr. Bevis (reviewing and 
modifying bookmarks on approx. 
1000 pages);
108.00 0.80 86.40
 KED Review the Notice of Reassignment 
to Judge Medema;
225.00 0.10 22.50
12/21/2017 JLS Continue review and analysis of Mr. 
Bevis' legal files (continuing review 
of and modification of electronic 
bookmarks on approx. 1000 pages);
108.00 0.60 64.80
12/27/2017 JLS Coordinate, oversee, and revise 
electronic bookmarking of 
additional files from Mr. Bevis 
(approx. 1500 pages);
108.00 0.70 75.60
12/28/2017 JLS Coordinate, oversee, and revise 
electronic bookmarking of 
additional files from Mr. Bevis 
(approx. 1500 pages);
108.00 0.70 75.60
 KED Telephone call to the Court 
regarding obtaining a hearing date 
on our Motion to Dismiss;
225.00 0.10 22.50
01/01/2018 JLS Analyze records from Jim Bevis 
(approx. 9000 pages) for 
duplications and relevance to the 
instant claims (this segment has not 
yet been catalogued, duplicative in 
part) and continue electronic 
bookmarking of these segments;
108.00 0.80 86.40
 JLS Analyze, catalogue, and summarize 
records from client (approx. 200 
pages);
108.00 0.80 86.40
1/02/2018 JLS Complete cataloguing and 
summarizing records from client 
(approx. 200 pages);
108.00 1.80 194.40












EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 8 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 JLS Analyze, catalogue, and summarize 
records from client (approx. 600 
pages);
108.00 2.60 280.80
1/12/2018 ADL Email to client responding to 
inquiry;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 JLS Review, analyze, and coordinate 
electronic bookmarking of Mr. 
Bevis' underlying files (approx. 500 
pages);
108.00 1.20 129.60
1/15/2018 KED Correspondence with Mr. Bevis 
regarding the case;
225.00 0.10 22.50
1/19/2018 JLS Continue review, analysis, and 
revision of electronic bookmarks to 
the records from client (approx. 
2000 pages);
108.00 1.30 140.40
 JLS Continue review, analysis, and 
revision of electronic bookmarks to 
the records from client (approx. 300 
pages);
108.00 0.20 21.60
 JLS Analysis of and coordinate revisions 
to the electronic bookmarks to the 
records from client (approx. 5000 
pages);
108.00 0.70 75.60
01/31/2018 ADL Review and analysis of response to 
Motion to Dismiss in connection 
with preparation of reply;
180.00 0.60 108.00
 ADL Preparation of reply in support of 
motion to dismiss;
180.00 2.90 522.00
 ADL Review and analysis of authorities 
cited in Plaintiff's response brief in 
connection with preparation of reply 
in support of Motion to Dismiss;
180.00 2.40 432.00
 KED Review and evaluate the opposition 
to the motion to dismiss;
225.00 0.60 135.00
 KED Prepare outline regarding 
responding to same; 
225.00 0.60 135.00
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 9 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
2/01/2018 ADL Further preparation of reply in 
support of motion to dismiss, 
including introduction and analysis 
of Plaintiff's arguments regarding 
disgorgement of fees;
180.00 3.20 576.00
 ADL Research regarding attorney fee 
forfeiture due to breach of fiduciary 
duty in connection with reply in 
support of motion to dismiss;
180.00 1.80 324.00
 ADL Further preparation of reply in 
support of motion to dismiss, 
including distinguishing cases cited 
in Plaintiff's response memorandum;
180.00 1.40 252.00
 KED Revise the Reply memorandum we 
are filing;
225.00 0.80 180.00
2/02/2018 ADL Research regarding legal issue in 
response to call from client;
180.00 0.30 54.00
 ADL Telephone call from client regarding 
case; 
180.00 0.10 18.00
 ADL Two calls to client re case; 180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Further preparation of reply in 
support of motion to dismiss, 
including analysis regarding 
Plaintiff's authorities;
180.00 1.10 198.00
 ADL Email to client responding to call; 180.00 0.20 36.00
 KED Revise and finalize the Reply 
Memorandum;
225.00 1.00 225.00
2/05/2018 ADL Preparation of outline for oral 
argument regarding Motion to 
Dismiss;
180.00 0.80 144.00
 KED Correspondence with the Court 
regarding the Reply brief;
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Telephone call to Mr. Bevis 
regarding case;
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Correspondence to Mr. Bevis 
regarding same;
225.00 0.10 22.50
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 10 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 KED Begin preparing for tomorrow's 
Motion to Dismiss hearing;
225.00 0.80 180.00
2/06/2018 ADL Preparation for hearing on motion to 
dismiss, including case summaries 
and holdings for cases supporting 
arguments supporting dismissal;
180.00 1.40 252.00
 KED Prepare for today's hearing on the 
Motion to Dismiss;
225.00 3.30 742.50
 KED Handle today's hearing on the 
Motion to Dismiss;
225.00 2.00 450.00
2/09/2018 ADL Receipt and review Plaintiff's 
motion to file supplemental brief 
including proposed supplemental 
brief and proposed order;
180.00 0.40 72.00
 KED Review the request by plaintiff to 
file a supplemental memorandum 
and review the supplemental memo;
225.00 0.30 67.50
 KED Review and evaluate the Motion for 
Leave to file a supplemental 
memorandum;
225.00 0.30 67.50
2/14/2018 KED Receive and review Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Memorandum;
225.00 0.10 22.50
 ADL Preparation of objection to 
Plaintiff's motion to file 
supplemental brief;
180.00 0.20 36.00
 ADL Receipt and review order denying 
Plaintiff's motion for supplemental 
briefing;
180.00 0.10 18.00
 KED Review the Order denying the 
request for supplemental briefing;
225.00 0.10 22.50
3/16/2018 ADL Review and analysis of 
memorandum decision and order 
granting motion to dismiss (31 
pages in length);
180.00 1.90 342.00
 KED Brief review of the decision (we 
won); 
225.00 0.10 22.50
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EXHIBIT B (to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendant James A. Bevis’s Motion for Fees 
and Costs) - 11 
Date Timekeeper Description Rate Hours Charge
 KED Correspondence to our clients 
regarding case;
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Telephone call to Jim Bevis 
regarding case;
225.00 0.20 45.00
 KED Review and evaluate the 30 page 
opinion by the Court;
225.00 1.00 225.00
3/19/2018 KED Review the correspondence from 
client; 
225.00 0.10 22.50
3/22/2018 ADL Research regarding post-judgment 
matters;
180.00 2.10 378.00
3/23/2018 KED Review the Judgment that was filed 
today; 
225.00 0.10 22.50
 KED Begin evaluating whether to file a 
Motion for fees;
225.00 0.40 90.00
 ADL Status report to client regarding 
post-judgment matters;
180.00 1.20 216.00
3/26/2018 ADL Further preparation of letter to client 
re post-judgment matters;
180.00 0.90 162.00






11/17/2017 First Appearance Fee and associated processing 
charge 
$140.08
11/17/2017 Copying charges (to copy 4,378-pages of client file) $437.80
1/31/2018 Copying charges (in connection with preparation of 
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss)
$1.40
2/28/2018 Copying charges $14.00
TOTAL $593.28
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 





   
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 4, 2018, at the hour of 2:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter 
as counsel can be heard, in the courtroom of the Ada County Courthouse, before the Honorable Judge 
Jonathan Medema, the undersigned will call up for hearing Motion to Disallow Attorneys’ Fees and 
Costs.   
DATED April 20, 2018. 
 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 20, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
iCourt     
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
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Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
ISB #8380; adl@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
Electronically Filed 
4/24/2018 2:23 PM 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REBECCA PARKINSON, 
Case No. CV01-17-08744 
Plaintiff, 
vs . NOTICE OF HEARING 
JAMES E. BEVIS, 
Defendant. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, defendant James A. Bevis by and through his counsel of 
record, Duke Scanlan & Hall, PLLC, have set before this Court to be heard his Motion for Fees 
and Costs. Said motion is set to be heard before the Honorable Jonathan Medema on the 41h day 
of June, 2018, at 2:00pm at the Ada County Courthouse, Boise, Idaho. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
000204
DATED this 24th day of April, 2018. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
By Is/ Keely E. Duke 
Keely E. Duke- Of the Firm 
Aubrey D. Lyon- Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24th day of April, 2018, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document using the iCourt E-File system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to 
the following persons: 
Kim J. Trout 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Drive, Suite 101 
Boise, ID 83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ISJ iCourt/Email 
ktrout@trout -law. com 
Is/ Keely E. Duke 
Keely E. Duke 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
__________________ 
Notice of Hearing | Page 1 
KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 




   
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on JUNE 4, at the hour of 2:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter 
as counsel can be heard, in the courtroom of the Ada County Courthouse, before the Honorable 
Judge Jonathan Medema, the undersigned will call up for hearing Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider 
and Motion to Amend Complaint.  
DATED May 24, 2018. 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 





Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk
 
12 1  
 l t,  
  
 ,  
].
. t .  
i
( ) —57  
i ( ) —57  
ut tr0ut— 0tn
t r i t . 
,





 , f f
us ra l
 l r l i t ’s i
. 
 , . 
J‘ I. rap/2‘ 
J 





Notice of Hearing | Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 24, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
E-file      
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 





   
PLAINTIFF, by and through her counsel of record, Kim J. Trout, hereby moves this Court 
for an order shortening time in which to have Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider and Motion to 
Amend Complaint heard.  This motion is made on the grounds that Plaintiff’s Motion was filed on 
April 20, 2018.  Plaintiff was advised by the Clerk that the Court intended to rule on Plaintiffs’ pend-
ing motions without hearing, however the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not set a response time 
without a hearing.  Therefore, Plaintiff requests the Court set this matter to be heard on June 4, 
2018, at 2:00 p.m. at the time scheduled for Plaintiff’s Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs. 
DATED May 24, 2018. 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 





Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 24, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
E-file      
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
ISB #8380; adl@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile (208) 342-3299 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
Electronically Filed 
5/25/2018 4:20 PM 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By: Lori Ferguson, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




JAMES E. BEVIS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV01-17-08744 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
FEES 
COMES NOW Defendant James A. Bevis (erroneously named "James E. Bevis"), by and 
through his counsel of record, Duke Scanlan & Hall PLLC, and submits this Response in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
FEES-I 
DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
FEES - 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mr. Bevis timely moved for an award of mandatory costs, discretionary costs, and 
attorney fees as the prevailing party. Mrs. Parkinson objected and filed a Motion to Disallow 
Costs and Fees, which should be denied because her pending Motion for Reconsideration does 
not provide a basis to decline an award of fees and costs.  Furthermore, Mr. Bevis is entitled to 
the costs, both mandatory and discretionary, as outlined in his Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Costs and Fees because they were actually and appropriately incurred in this case. A 
fee award under Idaho section 12-121 is appropriate here because Mrs. Parkinson’s pursuit of 
this case was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. Additionally, the time incurred 
and fees Mr. Bevis’s counsel charged were reasonable. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
 
A prevailing party is entitled to recover certain costs and fees.  See, e.g., I.R.C.P. 54 and 
Idaho Code § 12-121. To determine a prevailing party, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court must, in its sound discretion, consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in 
part, and on so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in 
a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved 
in the action and the resulting judgment or judgments obtained. 
 
“A determination on prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the trial court and we 
review the determination on an abuse of discretion standard.”  Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. 
Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718–19, 117 P.3d 130, 132–33 (2005). 
 “An award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12–121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”  Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 
Idaho 624, 629, 329 P.3d 1072, 1077 (2014) (analyzing former Idaho Code § 12-121).  The 
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DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
FEES - 3 
existence of a single triable issue of fact no longer prevents an award under Idaho Code section 
12-121, and a trial court may apportion fees for those elements of a case that were frivolous, 
unreasonable, and without foundation.  Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, 156 Idaho at 632, 329 
P.3d at 1080 (“Apportionment of attorney fees is appropriate for those elements of the case that 
were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.”) 
III.  ARGUMENT 
 
A. Mrs. Parkinson’s pending Motion for Reconsideration does not provide a basis to 
decline to award fees and costs. 
 
 Mrs. Parkinson argues that the Court should disallow all costs and fees due to her 
pending Motion for Reconsideration. (Plf.’s Brief in Supp. Of Mot. To Disallow Costs and Fees 
at 2.) If Mrs. Parkinson’s argument is adopted, Mr. Bevis would be put in the position of never 
being entitled to move for costs and fees. A party is obligated to submit its requests for costs and 
fees within 14 days of entry of a judgment. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4). “A memorandum of costs 
prematurely filed is considered as timely.” Id.  
Here, if the Court adopts Mrs. Parkinson’s argument that Mr. Bevis’s Motion for Costs 
and Fees was filed prematurely then, appropriately, denies Mrs. Parkinson’s Motion for 
Reconsideration, Mr. Bevis will not have another opportunity to move for costs and fees because 
the deadline under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4) will have expired. Mr. Bevis timely moved for an award of 
costs and fees, and the issue is ripe to be heard and decided. 
B. Mr. Bevis is entitled to the costs, both mandatory and discretionary, as outlined in 
his Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and Fees. 
 
 Mrs. Parkinson argues that Mr. Bevis’s photocopying fees were not extraordinary and 
therefore should not be allowed as discretionary costs. (Plf.’s Brief in Supp. Of Mot. To 
Disallow Costs and Fees at 2-4.) “A court may evaluate whether costs are exceptional within the 
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DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
FEES - 4 
context of the nature of case.” City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 588, 130 P.3d 1118, 
1126 (2006). 
 As the court instructed in Seubert, Mr. Bevis’s need to copy his entire file was 
exceptional because Mrs. Parkinson’s allegations against Mr. Bevis were broadly worded and 
encompassed every aspect of Mr. Bevis’s representation of Mrs. Parkinson in the underlying 
divorce matter even though briefing later established that Mrs. Parkinson was really focused on 
only a single communication.  Due to Mrs. Parkinson’s broad allegations and the way her true 
claim became clear, it had been necessary for counsel to obtain and copy Mr. Bevis’s entire file 
to prepare the defense.  Accordingly, he asks that his discretionary costs be awarded and Mrs. 
Parkinson’s Motion to Disallow those costs be denied. 
C. Mrs. Parkinson’s pursuit of this case was frivolous, unreasonable, and without 
foundation. 
 
 Mrs. Parkinson argues that the Court found that her claim was valid—at least in terms of 
its form—which should preclude an award of fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. (Plf.’s Brief 
in Supp. Of Mot. To Disallow Costs and Fees at 4.) This Court determined that a client may sue 
her former attorney for breach of a fiduciary duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship, 
but “Plaintiff may not bring a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty against her attorney if the crux 
of her complaint is that her attorney did not provide adequate legal representation. In that event, 
the Plaintiff must pursue an action for professional negligence.” (Mem. Decision and Order 
Granting Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss at 24-25.) 
 Here, Mrs. Parkinson’s claim was never fairly debatable because the crux of her claim 
was always an alleged failure to provide adequate legal representation and she conceded that she 
suffered no damages caused by any alleged breach of fiduciary duty. (See, e.g., Plf.’s Response 
in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss 6 (“Admittedly, Bevis’s breach did not affect the substance 
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DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
FEES - 5 
of Parkinson’s divorce, as the parties had already settled at the time of his emails. Instead, the 
breach impaired the value of Bevis’s services.”).) Mrs. Parkinson never distinguished her case 
from a legal professional negligence claim except in arguing that she should be exempt from 
proving the elements of professional negligence because of the form of recovery she sought. She 
offered no authority for the proposition that simply seeking a different form of damages could 
change the nature of the cause of action itself, and Idaho case law unequivocally discourages that 
concept. See Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 159 Idaho 103, 105, 356 P.3d 1049, 1051 (2015) (the 
focus is not on the remedy sought or the type of damages, but on the source of the damages).  
This Court noted the distinction between a professional negligence claim and an 
actionable breach of fiduciary duty claim: 
To distinguish independently actionable breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims against 
lawyers from those that sound in negligence, Texas courts have generally held 
that a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim focuses on “whether an attorney obtained an 
improper benefit from representing the client,” while a negligence claim focuses 
on “whether an attorney represented a client with the requisite level of “Breach of 
fiduciary duty by an attorney most often involves the attorney’s failure to disclose 
conflicts of interest, failure to deliver funds belonging to the client, placing 
personal interests over the client’s interests, improper use of client confidences, 
taking advantage of the client’s trust, engaging in self-dealing, and making 
misrepresentations.” 
 
(Mem. Decision and Order Granting Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss at 28-29.) Mrs. Parkinson had no 
basis to allege, and did not allege, that Mr. Bevis did anything to give rise to a claim for breach 
of fiduciary duty. Mrs. Parkinson did not allege that Mr. Bevis had a conflict of interest, that he 
stood to benefit himself by sharing her email with the other attorney, or that he lied to her in any 
way. From the start, it was clear that Mrs. Parkinson could not distinguish her claim from a cause 
of action for professional negligence. For that reason, Mrs. Parkinson pursued her action in 
violation of Idaho Code section 12-121, and an award of attorney fees is appropriate. 
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DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
FEES - 6 
 
D. Mr. Bevis’s fees are reasonable. 
 Mrs. Parkinson argues that Mr. Bevis’s fees were not reasonable and identifies certain 
fees associated with the review and analysis of Mr. Bevis’s file in the divorce matter. (Plf.’s 
Brief in Supp. Of Mot. To Disallow Costs and Fees at 5.) Mrs. Parkinson did not analyze the 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors that this Court is required to consider in determining the amount of a fee 
award. She only argued that certain fees were unreasonable because Mr. Bevis’s counsel did not 
need to analyze his file prior to a ruling on his I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion. (Id.) 
 Mrs. Parkinson’s argument that Mr. Bevis’s counsel should not have analyzed his file 
until after the Court ruled on Mr. Bevis’s Motion to Dismiss is inconsistent with the Idaho Rules 
of Professional Conduct.  Rule 1.1 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct requires attorneys 
to “provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” 
Comments to Rule 1.1 provide: 
Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of 
the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures 
meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate 
preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what 
is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more 
extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequence. 
 
I.R.P.C. 1.1 cmt. 5.  
In this case, Mrs. Parkinson alleged that Mr. Bevis’s representation of her began in 2011, 
that he shared confidential information, that he was complicit in securing a divorce that was 
more favorable for her husband, and that he failed to fully and adequately evaluate the true value 
of the substantial real property held by her marital community. (Compl. ¶¶ 2-6.) Mr. Bevis’s 
counsel could not provide competent representation in defending Mr. Bevis on these issues 
.
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without some understanding of the documents in the underlying file. The time records Mr. 
Bevis’s counsel submitted show that evaluation of the underlying file was done in an efficient, 
economical manner. Counsel relied on a paralegal, billing at a lower rate, to do an initial analysis 
of the materials so that attorney time spent digging through the thousands of pages of records in 
this matter would be minimized. The time spent would not be appropriate for a file that was 
smaller or in a case where the allegations were narrower, but here, the time was appropriate and 
was actually incurred. Additionally, counsel had to know what was in the records and understand 
the records in order to make its arguments and develop a case strategy. Mr. Bevis’s counsel spent 
the time and effort necessary to understand the underlying file to competently represent Mr. 
Bevis in this matter, and accordingly, the fees were reasonable. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Bevis respectfully requests that this Court deny Mrs. 
Parkinson’s Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees. 
DATED this 25th day of May, 2018. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
 
By Keely E. Duke    
Keely E. Duke – Of the Firm 
Aubrey D. Lyon – Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant James A. Bevis 
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Case No.  CV01-17-08744 
 
 
DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
 
COMES NOW Defendant James A. Bevis (erroneously named “James E. Bevis”), by and 
through his counsel of record, Duke Scanlan & Hall PLLC, and submits this Opposition to 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Rebecca Parkinson moved for reconsideration of this Court’s 30-page 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Decision”).  Mrs. 
Parkinson’s Motion for Reconsideration should be denied because Mrs. Parkinson has not 
presented any new facts or new law to the Court in reconsideration – she is simply rearguing the 
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2 
same facts and repeating the same arguments this Court already rejected.  In addition, as this 
Court already ruled, Mrs. Parkinson’s Motion for Reconsideration should be denied because the 
gravamen of her claim against Mr. Bevis is for professional negligence, and Mrs. Parkinson 
admits she cannot prove the required damages element to make that claim.  (Plf.’s Brief in Supp. 
Of Mot. For Reconsideration at 3 (“Here, Parkinson cannot currently bring her fiduciary claim as 
a legal malpractice claim because she does not have ‘objective proof in support of actual 
damages.’”).)  As such, under Idaho law, she has no actionable claim.  Taylor v. McNichols, 149 
Idaho 826, 845, 243 P.3d 642, 661 (2010) (damages is a required element of a professional 
negligence cause of action).  
This Court has also previously, and correctly, rejected Mrs. Parkinson’s policy arguments 
given they ignore clear Idaho authority that professional negligence, and not a breach of 
fiduciary duty, is the only cause of action she could attempt to bring against her former attorney.  
This Court should also reject Mrs. Parkinson’s argument that an amendment to her 
pleadings at some later date warrants the reversal of this Court’s Decision to dismiss her case.  
No amendment that Mrs. Parkinson could make to her claims remedies her admission that she 
cannot prove actual damages.  As such, given she cannot prove a required element of any 
professional malpractice claim, any amendment would be futile.   
Mrs. Parkinson also suggests that if she gains Mr. Bevis’ file through discovery, she may 
be able to support her claim for legal malpractice by amending her complaint to allege that Mr. 
Bevis failed to properly evaluate her property. In making this argument, Mrs. Parkinson vaguely 
alludes to the fact that “[she] anticipates that as she gets more information from Bevis’s case file, 
that she will be able to substantiate her prior allegations, i.e., that Bevis was complicit with Stan 
Welsh, and that Bevis failed to properly evaluate her property.  At that point, Parkinson intends 
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3 
to amend her pleadings to address her potential malpractice claims.”  (Plf.’s Brief in Supp. Of 
Mot. For Reconsideration at 3).  This argument should be rejected because any claim that the 
settlement Mrs. Parkinson agreed to was not appropriate is clearly barred by the Idaho Supreme 
Court’s application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel in such a situation.  See McKay v. Owens, 
130 Idaho 148, 154, 937 P.2d 1222, 1228 (1997) (the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a 
party from entering a settlement, then repudiating the settlement to obtain a recovery against 
another party arising out of the same transaction).  Accordingly, any such amendment would be 
futile. See Carl H. Christensen Family Tr. v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197, 
1202 (1999) (futility of amendment is a basis to deny a motion for leave to amend a pleading). 
Mrs. Parkinson also alleges that she should be permitted discovery to obtain a copy of her 
legal file so that she may evaluate it to determine whether she believes there are potential 
breaches by Mr. Bevis.  Again, however, Mrs. Parkinson has admitted that she did not sustain 
actual damages and, therefore, regardless of whether she finds additional alleged breaches of the 
standard of care by Mr. Bevis, further litigation would be futile because she cannot meet a 
required element of any professional malpractice claim – that she suffered some damage. Id. 
Lastly, Mrs. Parkinson provides no authority as to why this case should be dismissed 
without prejudice.   
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
 
“A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final judgment may be 
made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final judgment.” I.R.C.P. 
11.2(b)(1). 
On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible 
evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. 
However, a motion for reconsideration need not be supported by any new 
evidence or authority. When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district 
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4 
court must apply the same standard of review that the court applied when 
deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. In other words, if the 
original order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, then so is the 
decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. 
 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012) (internal citations 
omitted). 
III.   ARGUMENT 
 
A. Mrs. Parkinson has not presented any new facts or new law to the Court in 
reconsideration.  
 
 It is well-established in Idaho that if the gravamen of the claim against an attorney sounds 
in negligence, the only actionable claim the client has against her former attorney is one for 
professional negligence. Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 621, 272 P.3d 1247, 1252 (2012).  The 
Idaho Supreme Court has also ruled that a client cannot prove a cause of action for legal 
professional negligence until “some damage” has occurred. See Molen v. Christian, 161 Idaho 
577, 580, 388 P.3d 591, 594 (2017) (citing Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley LLP, 
157 Idaho 863, 866–67, 341 P.3d 580, 583–84 (2015)).  Mrs. Parkinson essentially argues that 
because this Court followed Idaho law, that she has been put “in a position where [her] 
recognized cause of action leaves her with no remedy at law or in equity” (Plf.’s Brief in Supp. 
Of Mot. For Reconsideration at 1), and that she is “in an irresolvable, legal catch-22.” (Id. at 4.) 
As such, Mrs. Parkinson argues that because she cannot prove professional negligence, then 
another cause of action must be available to her, even though Idaho has not recognized any such 
cause of action in a legal malpractice action where, as here, the gravamen of the claim is 
negligence. While unfortunate for Mrs. Parkinson, not all negligent acts are actionable. See, e.g., 
Stem v. Prouty, 152 Idaho 590, 596, 272 P.3d 562, 568 (2012) (summary judgment for 
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 5 
defendant-landlord affirmed where plaintiff-worker proved breach but failed to show that 
landlord's breach was the proximate cause of injury).  
“A motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the court—when new law is 
applied to previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to previously presented law, or 
any combination thereof—to reconsider the correctness of an interlocutory order.” Johnson v. N. 
Idaho Coll., 153 Idaho 58, 62, 278 P.3d 928, 932 (2012). As this Court correctly concluded, the 
set of facts Mrs. Parkinson alleges is not actionable because, as discussed below, the gravamen 
of her claim is negligence and she cannot prove the necessary element of damages. (Decision at 
28-30.)  On reconsideration, Mrs. Parkinson argues for reconsideration because, she alleges, “the 
Court engaged in correctible misdirection” in its use of the legal principles she offered. (Plf.’s 
Brief in Supp. Of Mot. For Reconsideration at 1.) Mrs. Parkinson has not argued any new facts 
or any new law in an attempt to persuade the Court to reconsider its Decision. Rather, Mrs. 
Parkinson is simply rearguing the facts and repeating the arguments this Court previously 
rejected.  As such, Mrs. Parkinson’s Motion for Reconsideration should be denied. 
B. This Court correctly ruled that Mrs. Parkinson’s facts do not give rise to a breach of 
fiduciary duty cause of action. 
 
This Court correctly decided that Mrs. Parkinson’s facts do not support a breach of 
fiduciary duty cause of action. (Decision at 29-30.) Mrs. Parkinson did not directly attempt to 
demonstrate how the facts she alleges are more similar to the type of facts giving rise to a breach 
fiduciary duty rather than legal professional negligence. Rather, she argues that because she 
cannot prove professional negligence, professional negligence cannot be the crux of her claim. 
(Plf.’s Brief in Supp. Of Mot. For Reconsideration at 6-7.) As this Court held, the appropriate 
focus in determining the crux of a cause of action is on the nature of the duty and how it was 
allegedly breached. (Decision at 21.) When determining the crux, or gravamen, of an action, the 
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 6 
Idaho Supreme Court looks to the nature of the duty and breach alleged, not whether the plaintiff 
can allege all of its elements. See Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 25, 333 P.3d 130, 136 (2014) 
(“We look to the complaint to determine ‘whether or not the gravamen of this action consists of a 
breach of the contract, itself, or the duty imposed by law in relation to the manner of its 
performance.’”).  
Similarly, in Bishop, 152 Idaho at 621, 272 P.3d at 1252, the court analyzed the nature of 
the duty at issue in concluding that “this action is really a legal malpractice claim disguised as a 
contract claim. A person cannot change a tort action into a contract action simply by labeling it 
as such.” The client in Bishop was attempting to recharacterize her cause of action to get around 
a statute of limitations problem, just as here Mrs. Parkinson is trying to recharacterize her cause 
of action to get around a damages problem. Id. The court’s rationale in Bishop applies here: “the 
fact that a proponent labels his or her action as sounding in contract as well as malpractice does 
not make the underlying action contract. The ‘theory’ of relief sought is not different.” Id. 
Whether the plaintiff could prove all the elements of the professional negligence action was not a 
consideration in determining the gravamen of the claim. See id. Where there may be two causes 
of action for an alleged breach of a professional duty, the plaintiff may only pursue one cause of 
action which is for professional negligence. Id. 
Mrs. Parkinson argues that the facts of her case are similar to the facts of Rockefeller v. 
Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2001) (“Rockefeller 1”), and therefore should be 
actionable. The facts of Rockefeller 1 are dissimilar to the facts of this case, and the lack of 
similarities demonstrates why characterizing Mrs. Parkinson’s claim as “breach of fiduciary 
duty” is inappropriate. In Rockefeller 1, a real estate broker sued landowners for his commission 
under an agreement to develop and market a residential development. The landowners filed a 
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 7 
counterclaim for damages arising from the broker’s breach of the residential development 
agreement and violation of his fiduciary duties. The broker had been the landowners’ 
development agent even before the agreement to develop and market the residential 
development. Id. at 642, 39 P.3d at 582. Facts came to light that that broker had been assisting a 
neighbor in a land dispute with the landowners while the residential development agreement was 
effective. Id. at 640, 39 P.3d at 580. 
Primarily, Rockefeller 1 is unlike the matter before this Court because Rockefeller 1 did 
not address the interplay between a negligence cause of action and breach of fiduciary duty. The 
decision gives no indication that negligence was raised as an alternative cause of action, and the 
court was not presented with the question of determining the crux of a cause of action based on 
the nature of the duty and how it was allegedly breached. Additionally, unlike the facts of Mr. 
Bevis’s representation of Mrs. Parkinson, in Rockefeller 1 the conduct at issue was an alleged 
conflict of interest. Conflicts of interest are of the type of breach of fiduciary duty which go 
beyond mere legal professional negligence. (Decision 29.) For these reasons, Rockefeller 1 does 
not assist in determining whether Mrs. Parkinson can bring a cause of action for breach of 
fiduciary duty where she alleges the gravamen of a legal professional negligence cause of action. 
Mrs. Parkinson has not alleged facts giving rise to a breach of fiduciary cause of action, and her 
Motion for Reconsideration should be denied. 
C. Mrs. Parkinson’s policy considerations do not overcome Idaho authority that 
professional negligence is the appropriate cause of action here.  
 
Mrs. Parkinson argues that, notwithstanding the insufficiency of her factual allegations, 
she should be entitled to her day in court, her claim should be decided on the merits, and that the 
pleadings should be given liberal construction. (Plf.’s Brief in Supp. Of Mot. For 
Reconsideration at 5.) In her Response to Mr. Bevis’s Motion to Dismiss, Mrs. Parkinson also 
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 8 
argued that she should be entitled to amend her Complaint so that her claim can be determined 
on the merits. (Plf.’s Resp. to Mot. To Dismiss at 7-8.) In support of her argument in the Motion 
for Reconsideration regarding getting her day in court, Mrs. Parkinson relied on Houpt v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 160 Idaho 181, 188, 370 P.3d 384, 391 (2016), reh'g denied (Mar. 10, 
2016). However, Houpt is not factually comparable because the discussion of the plaintiff getting 
her day in court arose in connection with an argument that the plaintiffs did not have standing 
due to a technical real-party-in-interest interpretation. The court was not considering an issue 
regarding whether a litigant should get her day in court when she cannot prove the elements of 
her cause of action, which is the issue here. Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure make clear that a litigant does not get her day in court if she cannot prove all the 
elements of her claims. 
Mrs. Parkinson also cited to Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 712, 587 P.2d 1245, 1247 
(1978), which is inapposite. The court in Bunn dealt with dismissal of an action based on a 
procedural technicality. The court acknowledged that “liberal construction” under Rule 1 is 
instructive on handling procedural technicalities, but it cannot alter compliance which is 
mandatory and jurisdictional. Id. The court in Bunn considered the effect of the appellant missing 
a deadline to pay a court reporter related to obtaining a copy of the record. Bunn is not helpful to 
Mrs. Parkinson because, here, Mrs. Parkinson has failed to satisfy the requirement that she be 
able to prove all the fundamental elements of her claim. This is not a technicality but is, rather, a 
fundamental aspect of Mrs. Parkinson’s claim. 
Mrs. Parkinson also refers the Court to an Idaho Supreme Court decision for the 
proposition that “[m]ere vagueness or lack of detail is not ground for a motion to dismiss.” (Plf.’s 
Brief in Supp. Of Mot. For Reconsideration at 6.) This Court’s ultimate decision to dismiss Mrs. 
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 9 
Parkinson’s claims was not based on finding them vague. Rather, this Court considered the 
material Mrs. Parkinson offered and still found that she had failed to state a claim. (Decision at 
28.) For these reasons, Mrs. Parkinson’s policy considerations do not support the Court 
reconsidering its original decision. 
D. This Court has already considered the arguments raised by Mrs. Parkinson’s 
persuasive authority, and they do not demonstrate that Mrs. Parkinson has a 
separate cause of action. 
 
 Mrs. Parkinson argues that authority from Texas in the case Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 
229 (Tex. 1999), supports her argument that she has a separate breach of fiduciary duty cause of 
action. (Plf.’s Brief in Supp. Of Mot. For Reconsideration at 8.) This Court, however, already 
considered this out-of-state authority, and after analyzing Burrow and more recent Texas 
decisions on breach of fiduciary duty, found that they support the conclusion that Mrs. Parkinson 
cannot “fracture” her professional negligence claim simply to reach a different form of recovery. 
(Decision at 21-24.)  
 Mrs. Parkinson offers decisions from other jurisdictions, including the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals interpreting California law (Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(considering attorney fees for attorneys operating under a conflict of interest)), Washington 
(Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash. 2d 451, 824 P.2d 1207 (1992) (considering alleged conflict of 
interest)), and Minnesota (Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1982) (considering conflict of 
interest)). These cases all involved fee forfeiture associated with an attorney’s conflict of 
interest, an issue not presented in Mrs. Parkinson’s case. This Court noted that the negligence 
alleged here is not the form which would give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty action: “Here 
Plaintiff does not allege Defendant had a conflict of interest, that he stood to benefit himself by 
sharing her email with the other attorney, or that he lied to her in any way.” (Decision at 29.) 
r s fi  
r r til t
r r l
i . 
i r l i  s r
t r t s r i s
p r f t
r . r t ri . .
 f f 
 l f  f . i t  l
-st t ri f l
f fi t , r r
fr i l f f . 
r . r j ris ictions, i
f li . i ,  
i t t t fl f t»
.  i l fl f
t» inne . i . i fl f
t» l i Wi t fl f
i r . r  
l i f fi t  
l i tiff l fl f t fi lf  
ri i t
’ I ’ I -
000225
 
DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 10 
Mrs. Parkinson’s persuasive authority addressed factual considerations not at issue here, and her 
Motion for Reconsideration should be denied. 
E. Neither an amendment nor discovery are appropriate here. 
Mrs. Parkinson contends that, if she is allowed to amend her complaint, she will 
articulate a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty that will leave no question as to the 
gravamen of her complaint. (Plf.’s Brief in Supp. Of Mot. For Reconsideration at 9-10.) She 
appears to refer to the proposed Amended Complaint attached as Exhibit A to her April 6, 2018 
Motion to Amend. (Id.) Review of that Amended Complaint shows that it would not give rise to 
a cause of action for anything but professional negligence, which she concedes she cannot prove.  
The proposed Amended Complaint focuses on the May 2015 exchanges in connection 
with Mrs. Parkinson wanting to disavow the divorce settlement which had been reached. 
(Proposed First Am. Compl.) She alleges that Mr. Bevis breached his professional duties by 
failing to maintain her confidences. (Id. at 4.) She acknowledges that “Bevis did not have any 
reason to send Welsh a copy of Parkinson’s May 12, 2015 email, titled ‘I am sick to my 
stomach,’ or his other emails to Parkinson.” (Proposed First Am. Compl. ¶ 25.)  
This Court already considered these allegations in reaching its decision to grant Mr. 
Bevis’s Motion to Dismiss.  The conclusion this Court reached applies equally well to the 
proposed Amended Complaint: 
She simply claims, essentially, that the rules of conduct that govern Defendant’s 
profession precluded him from sharing her email without her permission and that 
he did so anyway. While Plaintiff has chosen to articulate that claim in the 
language of an action for breach of fiduciary duty, it is, at its essence, a claim that 
Defendant did not exercise the care his profession demands in handling her 
communications. That is a claim for professional negligence. 
 
(Decision at 29.)  
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 11 
Mrs. Parkinson also suggests that if she gains Mr. Bevis’ file through discovery, that she 
may be able to support her claim for legal malpractice by amending her complaint to allege that 
Mr. Bevis failed to properly evaluate her property. (Plf.’s Brief in Supp. Of Mot. For 
Reconsideration at 10-11.) In making this argument, Mrs. Parkinson vaguely alludes to the fact 
that “[she] anticipates that as she gets more information from Bevis’s case file, that she will be 
able to substantiate her prior allegations, i.e., that Bevis was complicit with Stan Welsh, and that 
Bevis failed to properly evaluate her property.  At that point, Parkinson intends to amend her 
pleadings to address her potential malpractice claims.”  (Plf.’s Brief in Supp. Of Mot. For 
Reconsideration at 3).   
This argument should be rejected because any claim that the settlement Mrs. Parkinson 
agreed to was not appropriate is clearly barred by the Idaho Supreme Court’s application of the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel in such a situation.  See McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 154, 937 
P.2d 1222, 1228 (1997). The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents Mrs. Parkinson from agreeing 
to settle her divorce action, obtaining the benefit of settlement, then repudiating her agreement, 
and by means of an inconsistent position seeking a recovery against Mr. Bevis arising out of the 
same transaction. Judicial estoppel applies where a litigant, by means of sworn statements, 
obtains a judgment, advantage or consideration from one party, the litigant will not thereafter, by 
repudiating such allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony, 
be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same 
transaction or subject matter.  Id. at 152, 937 P.2d at 1226. 
In McKay, the client brought a legal malpractice action against her attorney arising from 
a medical malpractice action in which she had been a plaintiff and claimed that her attorney 
agreed to settle the underlying medical malpractice action without her consent.  In a hearing on 
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 12 
the proposed settlement in the underlying medical malpractice matter, the client testified that she 
agreed with the settlement, and soon thereafter she signed a release agreement memorializing the 
settlement.  Later, she sued her attorney alleging that her attorney settled the matter without her 
consent and that the amount of the settlement was insufficient.  Id. at 151.  The court held that 
the client had obtained an advantage (the settlement) from one party (the medical malpractice 
defendant), and that she could not subsequently repudiate her acceptance, and by means of her 
inconsistent positions, obtain a recovery against another party, arising out of the same 
transaction.  Id. at 154. 
In this case, Mrs. Parkinson is attempting the very conduct prohibited by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in McKay. She agreed to settle her divorce matter. (See Trout Decl. Jan. 30, 
2018, Ex. A, Email correspondence re settlement.) She obtained the benefit of the settlement. 
(See id.) Now, related to the same transaction, she hopes to obtain a recovery from Mr. Bevis by 
repudiating her agreement to the process used in reaching the settlement. Accordingly, any such 
amendment would be futile. See Carl H. Christensen Family Tr. v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 
871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999) (futility of amendment is a basis to deny a motion for leave to 
amend a pleading). 
Mrs. Parkinson also alleges that she should be permitted discovery to obtain a copy of her 
legal file so that she may evaluate it to determine whether she believes there are potential 
breaches by Mr. Bevis.  Again, however, Mrs. Parkinson has admitted that she did not sustain 
actual damages and, therefore, regardless of whether she finds additional alleged breaches of the 
standard of care by Mr. Bevis, further litigation would be futile because she cannot meet a 
required element of any professional malpractice claim – that she suffered some damage. Id. 
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Additionally, by this argument, Mrs. Parkinson tacitly concedes that she has no evidence 
of those alleged bad acts and is only speculating that they occurred. Speculation and the hope 
that a fishing expedition will turn up evidence of an unknown bad act is not sufficient to 
overcome the deficiency of Mrs. Parkinson’s claim against Mr. Bevis, that is, that she cannot 
prove actual damages. See Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125, 132, 320 P.3d 1284, 1291 (Ct. App. 
2014) (“A court is not required to permit a petitioner to engage in ‘fishing expedition’ discovery 
because a post-conviction action ‘provides a forum for known grievances, not an opportunity to 
research for grievances.’”). 
Mrs. Parkinson argues that she has no evidence that, besides an alleged unauthorized 
disclosure of an email, any wrongdoing happened. She hopes this Court will give her an 
opportunity to look for something that she can make a case out of, years after this matter was 
concluded. This argument is ultimately irrelevant, though, as she concedes that she was not 
damaged. 
F. The “with prejudice” designation should not be changed. 
Mrs. Parkinson requests that this Court dismiss her matter without prejudice instead of 
with prejudice because of her concern on the subsequent impact of a dismissal with prejudice. 
(Plf.’s Brief in Supp. Of Mot. For Reconsideration at 12.) Mrs. Parkinson does not support this 
argument with analysis of what makes a dismissal with or without prejudice appropriate. 
Generally, a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when there has been an adjudication on the 
merits. See King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 912, 42 P.3d 698, 705 (2002). Here, this Court’s 
dismissal with prejudice was appropriate because it decided this matter on the merits—not just 
on what Mrs. Parkinson alleged, but also on what she could have alleged. (Decision at 30.) Mrs. 
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Parkinson has not offered argument or otherwise demonstrated why that determination was 
anything but correct. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Bevis respectfully requests that this Court deny Mrs. 
Parkinson’s Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2018. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
 
 
By   /s/  Keely E. Duke    
Keely E. Duke – Of the Firm 
Aubrey D. Lyon – Of the Firm 
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REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT  






   
“How often misused words generate misleading thoughts.” — Herbert Spencer. 
REPLY ARGUMENTS 
1. Bevis is Misusing Parkinson’s Arguments, Misleading the Court: 
Bevis is completely misusing Parkinson’s legal arguments—saying repeatedly that Parkinson 
has not presented any new law to the Court (Def. Opp. to Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 1-2, 3, 4-5, 13). 
This is an disingenuous statement for Bevis to make, considering that Bevis then cites to several of 
the new cases presented by Parkinson and tries to distinguish the new cases. Bevis also says that 
Parkinson is repeating the same arguments which the Court has already rejected (Id., p. 2, 5). This is 
also patently misleading, considering that both Parkinson and the Court moved past the original ar-
guments—the Court having acknowledged that Parkinson’s claim is valid, at least in theory. (Memo-
randum Decision, p. 24). Bevis is the only one still discussing the original arguments. Obviously lacking 
a justified better approach, Bevis raises yet again reiterates only his original arguments (e.g., that Ida-
ho only recognizes malpractice actions for legal clients, not breach of fiduciary duty actions), and 
Electronically Filed
5/31/2018 4:37 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk
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then argues the positions as if they were still relevant. This is a classic straw-man tactic: “A ‘straw 
man’…refers to an idea or argument that has no substance, but is set up so that it can be easily 
knocked down.” Penate v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11346, *1, 2008 WL 323617 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2008). The Court should reject such arguments as either irrelevant or as moot.  
First, contrary to Bevis’s statements, Parkinson cites twenty (20) new cases or legal authori-
ties on reconsideration which were not cited her prior brief, as seen in the following table: 
No. Citation (page #): Purpose: 
1 Restatement Second on Agency § 469 
(2010) (p. 9).  
Cited to illustrate that the general agency 
principles in Rockefeller I and persuasive case 
law support the principles in Restatement 
(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 37.  
2 Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th Ed. (p. 7). Cited in response to the “crux” of the plead-
ings issue identified by the Court.  
3 Beck v. Law Offices of Edwin J. Terry, Jr., 
P.C., 284 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. App. 2009) (p. 
7).  
Cited in response to the “crux” of the plead-
ings issue identified by the Court. 
4 Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620, 272 
P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012) (p. 1, 2, 4, 5).  
Cited in response to Court’s discussion of 
the case. 
5 Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 712, 587 
P.2d 1245, 1247 (1978) (p. 5).  
Cited in support of Idaho’s policy against 
technical dismissals.  
6 Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash. 2d 451, 462, 
824 P.2d 1207, 1213 (1992) (p. 9). 
Cited in support of policy for attorney fee 
disgorgement for breach of ethical duties. 
7 Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 
281 P.3d 103, 113 (Idaho June 21, 2012) 
(p. 2). 
Cited in reference to Idaho’s policy of apply-
ing the same standards of decision on a mo-
tion for reconsideration. 
8 Hendry v. Pelland, 315 U.S. App. D.C. 
297, 73 F.3d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (p. 
8). 
Cited in support of the principle that an at-
torney forfeits his compensation for breach 
of ethical duties, and that the client need not 
prove actual harm or damages. 
9 Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 
160 Idaho 181, 188, 370 P.3d 384, 391 
(2016) (p. 5). 
Cited in support of Idaho’s policy for decid-
ing cases on their real merits.  
10 Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 77 (3d Cir. Cited in support of the principle that a client 
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2006) (p. 9).  need not prove actual damages to obtain a 
forfeiture of attorney fees; additional discus-
sion of persuasive case law on the issue.  
11 Johnson v. N. Idaho College, 153 Idaho 
58, 62, 278 P.3d 928, 932 (Idaho May 31, 
2012) (p. 2). 
Cited in reference to Idaho’s standards for 
reconsideration, which allows the Court to 
consider new facts or new law, or both. 
12 Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn. 
1982) (p. 9). 
Cited in support of the principle that an at-
torney forfeits his compensation for breach 
of fiduciary duties.  
13 Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d 645, 655 
(9th Cir. 2012) (p. 9). 
Cited in support of the principle that an at-
torney forfeits his compensation for breach 
of ethical duties. 
14 Smith v. Marley, 39 Idaho 779, 780, 230 P. 
769, 769, 1924 Ida. LEXIS 98, *1 (Idaho 
1924) (p. 10). 
Cited in reference to Idaho’s standard for 
assuming the truth of the plead allegations in 
a dismissal context.  
15 Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168, 172-73, 868 
P.2d 496, 500-01 (Ct. App. 1994) (p. 3). 
Cited in reference to Idaho’s standards for 
proving actual damages in a legal malpractice 
case.  
16 State v. Peregrina, 151 Idaho 538, 550, 261 
P.3d 815, 827, 2011 Ida. LEXIS 129, *42 
(Idaho 2011) (p. 10). 
Cited in reference to Idaho’s standard for 
assuming the truth of the plead allegations in 
a dismissal context. 
17 Stuard v. Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701, 712, 
249 P.3d 1156, 1167 (2011) (p. 3). 
Cited in reference to Idaho’s standards for 
proving actual damages in a legal malpractice 
case. 
18 Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 
268, 647 P.2d 311, 314 (Ct. App. 1982) (p. 
12). 
Cited in reference to Idaho’s policy regard-
ing statutes of limitations and asserting 
claims defensively as an offset claim.  
19 Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 404, 
353 P.2d 782, 784 (1960) (p. 6). 
Cited in reference to Idaho’s policy against 
dismissal for mere vagueness.  
20 Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 
F.3d 125, 132 (3d Cir. 2017) (p. 7). 
Cited in response to the “crux” of the plead-
ings issue identified by the Court. 
This table of new authorities is significant because Parkinson only cited nineteen (19) legal 
authorities in her original brief on dismissal. That means that Parkinson increased her legal authori-
ties by more than 100% from those in her prior brief. This figure does not include Parkinson’s re-
newed discussion of her prior authorities, e.g., Rockefeller I, Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
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Lawyers § 37, Burrow v. Arce, Harper v. Harper, etc. Bevis’s repeated statement about lack of new au-
thority is either irresponsible, or purposefully misleading, or both. Bevis’s strong emphasis on the 
point suggests more than mere hyperbole and seems to cross the boundary of candor toward this 
tribunal in not making false statements. See Idaho R. Prof. C. 3.3(a)(1).  
Importantly and of significance, Bevis destroys his own argument about lack of new authori-
ties by attempting, without success, to distinguish some of the new authorities in his opposition 
brief. (Def. Opp. to Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 7-9). But even if Bevis’s argument about new authori-
ty was correct, Bevis ignores the fact that Parkinson is entitled to argue the same authorities as be-
fore if she feels that the Court misapplied those authorities: “[Idaho Supreme Court authority] does 
not state that a trial court cannot reconsider its own interlocutory orders for facial errors or errors of 
law.” Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006). This same reasoning 
goes for the alleged lack of new facts: “In our view, the case law applying Rule 11(a)(2)(B) permits a 
party to present new evidence when a motion is brought under that rule, but does not require that 
the motion be accompanied by new evidence.” Id. The Court can safely disregard Bevis’s position 
that Parkinson does not legally support her motion.  
Second, Parkinson is not simply repeating her prior legal arguments. Rather, Parkinson is 
asking the Court to apply the facts alleged in her new complaint to the acknowledged case law. The 
Court has already decided that Parkinson’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is theoretically sound: 
“This Court concludes Plaintiff may sue her former attorney for breach of a fiduciary duty arising 
out of the attorney-client relationship, just like other principals may sue their agents who owe them a 
fiduciary duty. The test articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Rockefeller I and in the Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is applicable to those claims.” (Memorandum Decision, p. 
24). Parkinson is addressing what she feels is the Court’s misapplication of the claim in a Rule 12 
context. (See Legal Brief in Support of Reconsideration, pp. 6-9, 9-10). Ignoring all this, Bevis tries to take 
the issue back to square one and says: “This Court has…previously, and correctly, rejected Mrs. Par-
kinson’s policy arguments given they ignore clear Idaho authority that professional negligence, and 
not a breach of fiduciary duty, is the only cause of action she could attempt to bring against her 
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former attorney.” (Def. Opp. to Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2). This statement is simply false. Even if 
the Court felt that Parkinson’s fiduciary duty claim was really a malpractice claim (Memorandum Deci-
sion, pp. 28-29), that is not to say that there is only one available claim. Bevis may think that Parkin-
son’s facts do not support the fiduciary duty claim, but that is a different issue from whether Parkin-
son has alleged the claim to begin with. It seems most telling that Bevis asks the Court to decide the 
merits of Parkinson’s alleged claim at this stage of the case; when in reality he can only ask to chal-
lenge the sufficiency of her pleadings and whether her claim, if proven, entitles her to relief.1 (See 
Savage v. Scandit Inc., discussed in next section).  
Third, Parkinson is not trying to “get around a damages problem,” as Bevis suggests. (Def. 
Opp. to Motion for Reconsideration, p. 6). Parkinson makes it clear that the whole discussion about dam-
ages is really a moot point until discovery is complete on the issue. (Legal Brief in Support of Reconsidera-
tion, pp. 10-11). It is disingenuous and a bit perverse for Bevis to blame Parkinson for the alleged 
damages problem when he is the one who has caused the problem by improperly withholding the 
case file and other relevant information. (Id.). Parkinson’s amended pleadings, taken as true, are 
enough to warrant discovery on the issue: “…Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivi-
leged matter that is relevant to [the] party's claim.” I.R.C.P. Rule 26(b)(1)(A). One need not speculate 
to understand why it is that Bevis doesn’t want to disclose the file to his client. 
2. Rockefeller I Support’s Parkinson’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim: 
Bevis makes the puzzling statement that Rockefeller I is distinguishable because it involved a 
“conflict of interest,” and that the case’s holdings do not apply because “…Conflicts of interest are 
of the type of breach of fiduciary duty which go beyond mere legal professional negligence.” (Def. 
Opp. to Motion for Reconsideration, p. 7). If anything, Bevis’s distinction supports Parkinson’s own posi-
tion on the need for legal clients to be able to seek a remedy for a distinctly ethical breach outside of 
                                            
1 Bevis makes the unwarranted statement that: “Mrs. Parkinson did not directly attempt to demonstrate how the facts 
she alleges are more similar to the type of facts giving rise to a breach fiduciary duty rather than legal professional negli-
gence.” (Opposition Brief, p. 5). Parkinson does not have a duty to “directly” make that kind of comparison. Parkinson has 
leeway under I.R.C.P. 8 to allege her claim in the form she thinks is most appropriate. She does not have to make a 
preemptory showing—in her pleadings or otherwise—that one form is better than another. In any event, the Court has 
already acknowledged Parkinson’s claim as being theoretically valid. 
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a normal legal malpractice action. Of course, this discussion is a moot point because the Court has 
already found that Rockefeller I gives the necessary criteria for an Idaho breach of fiduciary action by 
clients against their attorneys. (Memorandum Decision, p. 24).  
3. Parkinson is Entitled to Amend Her Pleadings:  
Parkinson is entitled to amend her pleadings to better state her claims. Bevis ignores this and 
makes another misleading statement to the Court about Idaho pleading standards: “Mrs. Parkinson 
has failed to satisfy the requirement that she be able to prove all the fundamental elements of her 
claim.” (Def. Opp. to Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8). That is not the Idaho pleadings standard. Parkin-
son does not have to “prove” the elements of her claim in a Rule 12 context. In the recent case Sav-
age v. Scandit Inc., No. 45143, 2018 Ida. LEXIS 108 (May 1, 2018), the Idaho Supreme Court con-
firmed that Rule 12 dismissal is not proper if the pleadings contain facts which, if proven, would 
constitute a tri-able claim. There, Savage claimed that her employer, Scandit, had breached the Idaho 
Wage Claim Act by withholding certain commissions and bonuses. Scandit responded by saying that 
these items were not yet earned at the time Savage had filed her complaint. Scandit then filed a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and the District Court granted the motion. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court noted the key question in such cases is 
“…whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim, which if true, would 
entitle him to relief. In doing so, the Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.” Id., at p. *5. The Court found that the allegations stated in Savage’s complaint, i.e., 
that she had already earned the wage items, together with reasonable inferences in Savage’s favor, 
were enough to defeat Scandit’s dismissal motion. The Court also found that the question of wheth-
er Savage would ultimately prevail on her wage claims was immaterial in a dismissal context: “While 
Scandit may be able to show later that the deal was not formally booked or that there were contin-
gencies that prevented the booking, for purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Savage has stated a claim under the Idaho Wage Claim Act.” Id., at p. *10. 
Finally, the Supreme Court found that Savage’s proposed amendments were not futile “…Because 
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the amended complaint contained facts alleging the commission was due and owing at the time Sav-
age sought leave to amend.” Id., at p. *13.  
In our case, Bevis is pushing the Court to uphold the same reversible errors as found in the 
Savage v. Scandit case. For instance, Bevis is asking the Court to go beyond identifying the presence of 
viable claims and is asking the Court to test the merits of those claims. Bevis is also pushing the 
Court to reject the proposed amendments because they are not yet fully proven. In sum, Bevis is 
asking the Court to put the evidentiary cart before the minimal pleadings horse. Doing so is a clear 
legal error and, as seen in Scandit, is a reversable error if not corrected on reconsideration.  
4. Parkinson’s Proposed Amendments Are Not Futile or Barred by Estoppel: 
Bevis says that Parkinson’s amendments would be futile based on Parkinson’s divorce set-
tlement. (Def. Opp. to Motion for Reconsideration, p. 12). However, Parkinson says in her amendments 
that the breach of fiduciary duty claim is centered on conduct which happened after the settlement, 
i.e., Bevis’s needless breach of Parkinson’s confidences to Stan Welsh, and so estoppel principles do 
not apply. In any event, this is a fact-centered issue, and if Bevis wants to argue judicial estoppel, he 
must answer the complaint, be subject to discovery, and address the issue in summary judgment or 
at trial. Bevis cannot refuse to make a responsive pleading and then ask the Court to construe the 
pleadings his favor. Under Rule 12, the Court can only construe the pleadings in Parkinson’s favor. 
There is nothing in Parkinson’s pleadings or amendments (the only relevant documents at this point 
in the case) to suggest that the amendments are futile under the McKay v. Owens standards, or other-
wise.  
5. Parkinson Supported Her “Without Prejudice” Arguments:  
Bevis makes an additional misleading statement that Parkinson does not provide the Court 
with any legal authority to change its existing order to a dismissal without prejudice. (Def. Opp. to Mo-
tion for Reconsideration, p. 13). Bevis then concludes: “This Court’s dismissal with prejudice was ap-
propriate because it decided this matter on the merits.” (Id.). For this same reason, i.e., the “merits” 
of the claim, the Court has power to change its prior order. Parkinson is asking the Court to recon-
sider the “merits” of her claim. If for some reason the Court declines to do so, the Court should 
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find that Parkinson has the parallel right to discuss the merits of her claim in any future collection 
actions by Bevis. Parkinson provided extensive argument and legal authority to substantiate the 
“merits” of her claim in this action, together with legal authority on her rights to assert the claim de-
fensively in the future.  
6. The Court Should Allow Further Amendments: 
If the Court finds that Parkinson’s amendments are still somehow deficient, the Court 
should highlight the deficiencies and allow Parkinson a reasonable time in which to cure them. The 
Court should abandon Bevis’s flawed and simply incorrect arguments about Idaho dismissal stand-
ards.  
CONCLUSION 
 The Court should vacate its dismissal order and allow the claim to proceed on its merits. The 
Court should allow further amendments, as needed.  
DATED May 31, 2018. 
 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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REPLY ARGUMENTS 
1. Bevis Misstates the Basis of Parkinson’s Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees: 
Bevis misstates the basis for Parkinson’s motion to disallow fees and costs. Bevis says: 
“Here, if the Court adopts Mrs. Parkinson’s argument that Mr. Bevis’s Motion for Costs and Fees 
was filed prematurely then, appropriately, denies Mrs. Parkinson’s Motion for Reconsideration, Mr. 
Bevis will not have another opportunity to move for costs and fees because the deadline under 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4) will have expired.” (Def. Response in Opp. to Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees, p. 2). 
Parkinson never makes that argument, i.e., that Bevis’s motion was procedurally premature. In fact, 
Parkinson never mentions, or even hints at, the concept of the filing maturity. Rather, Parkinson 
argues that the Court should not award fees and costs because the case was dismissed on substantive 
errors and should be reinstated for additional proceedings. (Legal Brief in Support of Motion to Disallow, 
p. 2).  
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Bevis says: “Here, Mrs. Parkinson’s claim was never fairly debatable because the crux of her 
claim was always an alleged failure to provide adequate legal representation and she conceded that 
she suffered no damages caused by any alleged breach of fiduciary duty.” (Def. Response in Opp. to Mo-
tion to Disallow Costs and Fees, p. 4). This argument is flawed for at least three reasons: (1) the Court 
acknowledged that Parkinson’s claim was theoretically sound (Memorandum Decision, p. 24); (2) the 
Court admitted that it had a difficult time reaching its conclusions about the claim (Memorandum Deci-
sion, pp. 28-29); and (3) the Court’s memorandum reflects that Parkinson was asking for a good-faith 
extension of Idaho case law in her favor. (See Memorandum Decision, generally). In sum, Parkinson’s 
claim involved a fairly debatable question of law, and so Bevis is not entitled to Idaho Code § 12-121 
fees: “Where questions of law are raised, we have held that attorney fees should be awarded under 
I.C. § 12-121 only if the position advocated by the nonprevailing party is plainly fallacious and, 
therefore, not fairly debatable.” Assocs. Nw. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 
1987).  
2. Bevis’s Document Review Fees Were Not Reasonable:  
To re-emphasize, Parkinson objects to all Bevis’s fees—even those associated with Bevis’s 
Rule 12 defense. (Legal Brief in Support of Motion to Disallow, pp. 5-6). By making arguments on reason-
ableness, Parkinson does not concede that any of Bevis’s fees are warranted under Idaho Code § 12-
121. (Id.). With that fact in mind, the Court should find that Bevis’s document review fees, even if 
awardable, were not reasonably incurred. Bevis says that his “…counsel had to know what was in 
the [divorce] records and understand the records in order to make its arguments and develop its case 
strategy.” (Def. Response in Opp. to Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees, p. 7). This argument, even if true, is 
not factually supported by counsel’s affidavit. See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5), which says: “A claim for attorney 
fees as costs must be supported by an affidavit of the attorney stating the basis and method of com-
putation.” As stated in prior briefing, Bevis fails to explain why this effort was necessary prior to the 
resolution of his Rule 12 motion—which did not focus on the contents of the divorce file but on 
the form of Parkinson’s causes of action. (Legal Brief in Support of Motion to Disallow, pp. 5-6).  
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In addition, Bevis says: “The time spent would not be appropriate for a file that was smaller 
or in a case where the allegations were narrower, but here, the time was appropriate and was actually 
incurred.” (Def. Response in Opp. to Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees, p. 7). Parkinson fails to see why a 
smaller file review would have been inappropriate while a larger file review—spanning dozens of 
hours and thousands of dollars—was somehow appropriate. Any major file review was largely su-
perfluous to Bevis’s Rule 12 arguments about the form of Parkinson’s claims.        
CONCLUSION 
 The Court should disallow all Bevis’s fees and costs. In the alternative, the Court should only 
award Bevis his mandatory filing fee cost and disallow all fees under Idaho Code § 12-121.  
DATED May 31, 2018. 
 




     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 31, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
iCourt     
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
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     Plaintiff,
vs.
James Bevis
     Defendant.
Event Code: CMIN
JUDGE: Jonathan Medema DATE: June 4, 2018 TIME: 2:00 PM
CLERK: Janet Ellis COURTROOM: 502
REPORTER: Penny Tardiff
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for Plaintiff(s): Kim Jay Trout
Counsel for Defendant(s): Keely Elizabeth Duke
01:54:32 PM Court
called Rebecca Parkinson vs James Bevis CV01-17-8744, time set 
for Motion to Reconsider and Motion for Atty Fees and Costs
01:55:11 PM Keely 
Duke counsel for defendant
01:55:21 PM Kim 
Trout counsel for plaintiff
01:56:04 PM Court has read the briefing, inquired if any add'l argument
01:56:17 PM Mr. 
Trout
regarding the Motion to Reconsider, Need to distinguish Bishop. 
Argues Savage. Request Court reconsider
02:04:56 PM Ms. 
Duke
argued in opposition. No basis for Court to reconsider, Savage case 
argued first time today, does not change anything.
02:09:20 PM Mr. 
Trout response believe the Court could allow to go forward.
02:13:56 PM
Court
In the Court's view, lawyers can act in a fiduciary duty. Court 
concluded in original decision as Court reads Bishop, Supreme Court 
takes position in regulating. If don't have actual damages, don't have 
a claim. As to this motion, Court will get subsequent ruling to the 
parties. Court will rule on the fees as well.
02:17:54 PM Mr. 
Trout
regarding fees, fundamental opposition to the fees claims, no 
showing case was filed frivously, copying charges were extraordinary 
in this case. Request Court deny.
02:19:46 PM Ms. Mr. Trout focuses on 12-2121.
Filed: June 4, 2018  at 2:21 PM.
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court




02:20:33 PM Court will get a written decision on both.
02:20:49 PM Mr. 
Trout inquired if Court would be addressing the Motion to amend.
02:21:06 PM Court will include
02:21:11 PM END 
CASE  
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 










JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 








Case No. CV01-17-8744 
 








 Plaintiff moves this Court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2 to 
reconsider its order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. For the reasons stated herein, the Court declines to reconsider its earlier 
decision. The motion to reconsider is denied.  
 Plaintiff claims that Defendant, her former attorney during her divorce proceedings, 
breached a duty he owed to her as a result of that relationship: a duty to keep her 
communications with him in confidence. Plaintiff concedes that she cannot show any 
economic damages as a result of this alleged breach, but she wishes to pursue the equitable 
remedy of fee disgorgement available to principals whose fiduciary breaches a duty owed 
to the principal. The Court will not restate the reasons it concluded Plaintiff cannot bring 
that claim under Idaho law. Those are set forth in the Court’s Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court will simply address arguments 
raised by Plaintiff in her motion to reconsider.  
 Plaintiff argues this Court was correct in concluding that under existing Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent a client may sue her lawyer for a claim of breach of a fiduciary 
duty if the client could not bring the claim as being one for professional negligence. 




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -
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because she cannot bring her suit as a professional negligence claim because she cannot 
prove damages as a result of any breach by her lawyer. She seeks only the equitable 
remedy of fee disgorgement. Plaintiff argues this Court erred in not recognizing that she 
cannot bring her claim as a claim for professional negligence. She argues that it is precisely 
because she cannot bring her claim as one for professional negligence that she should be 
permitted to bring it as one for breach of a fiduciary duty. 
 This Court understood this argument originally. The Court will attempt to clarify its 
earlier ruling. In this Court’s view, the Idaho Supreme Court in Bishop v. Owens, 152 
Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012) adopted a rule unique to cases where lawyers are 
defendants. The Court held that “Bishop’s breach of contract claim, which asserts the same 
claim as the legal malpractice theory, which has traditionally been treated as the proper 
claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. at 623, 272 P.3d at 1254. 
That holding is unique to that case and to the wording of Ms. Bishop’s claim. It is not 
binding on this Court. However, in the majority opinion and the concurring opinion of 
Justice Jim Jones, the Court articulated a rationale behind the holding in that case. As this 
Court reads the opinions in Bishop, the majority concluded that if you are going to sue 
your lawyer and allege that your lawyer breached one of the ethical rules imposed by the 
Idaho State Bar Association and the Idaho Supreme Court on lawyers in Idaho, you may 
only do so in an action for professional negligence. That means you have to prove 
damages. Plaintiff here concedes she cannot.  
 As this Court explained in its original decision, this Court is not persuaded the 
holding of Bishop necessarily extends quite that far, but it is a fair summary of the 
rationale expressed. For example, in this Court’s view, a client may bring a claim for 
breach of a fiduciary duty in Idaho alleging that her lawyer provided competent legal 
services to her, but breached Idaho Professional Rule of Conduct 1.8 by acquiring a 
pecuniary interest adverse to her interests. However, if the client’s claim, as in Bishop, is 
that the adequacy of the legal services provided by the lawyer fell below the standard of 
care set by the profession, the client must bring that claim as one for professional 
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negligence. In Bishop, the plaintiff alleged the lawyer failed to advise her1 of the operation 
of a particular statute that might affect her ability to recover monies. She argued that her 
lawyer had a duty to advise her of how this statute might affect her in the future. She 
argued that duty arose not only from the standards of the legal profession, but also from the 
language of her specific contract with her lawyer, the defendant. 
 The Supreme Court held that her personal representative could not pursue the claim 
for professional negligence because, at the time her complaint arose, claims in tort abated 
upon the death of the claimant. Id. at 620; 272 P.3d at 1250. Contract claims, however, 
generally survive the death of one of the parties to the contract. Nonetheless, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held her representative could not recover in contract based upon her 
attorney’s bad advice because the standard of care in the contract was essentially the same 
as the standard of care required by the professional standards of the legal profession. 
Where the duty she alleged her lawyer breached was essentially the same under the rules of 
professional conduct for lawyers and the contract she had with her lawyer individually, the 
Court held she could not bring her claim for breach of contract, because such claims 
“traditionally” are characterized as claims for professional negligence. Id. at 621; 272 P.3d 
at 1252.  
 Plaintiff’s claim in this case is essentially indistinguishable from the situation in 
Bishop. The plaintiff in Bishop alleged her lawyer violated a rule of his profession related 
to the competency of his services. She could not bring a claim in professional negligence 
because she died. Therefore, she sought to bring the claim in contract. The Bishop majority 
refused to allow her to do so, despite the fact her estate was left without a remedy.  
 In this case, Plaintiff claims her lawyer breached Idaho Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.6 which imposes on the lawyer a duty to keep certain information relating to the 
lawyer’s representation of the client confidential. She claims her lawyer disclosed this to 
her adversary in the court proceedings. She cannot bring a suit in professional negligence 
because she cannot prove she suffered any damages due to this act. However, she wishes to 
bring a suit in equity seeking fee disgorgement. This Court believes the majority’s 
                                                          
1 The Plaintiff Lois Bishop was suing as the personal representative of Patricia Shelton, who died while the 
action was pending in the trial court. This Court’s references to “she” are a reference to Ms. Shelton.  
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rationale in Bishop applies equally to Plaintiff’s claim in this case. Her claim is related to 
the adequacy or competency of the work Defendant performed on her behalf. If the 
Supreme Court would not permit the plaintiff in Bishop to pursue a claim in contract under 
those circumstances, this Court concludes the Supreme Court would not permit the 
Plaintiff here to pursue her claim in equity. This is what this Court was attempting to say 
when it discussed remedies in its original decision.  
 Plaintiff complains there are many policy reasons she ought to be permitted to 
bring her equitable claim. This Court understands and agrees. In its original decision, this 
Court cited to various scholarly articles presenting varied approaches to the policy issues at 
play. This Court simply reads the majority and concurring opinions in Bishop as making a 
policy decision about what kinds of suits the Supreme Court will permit clients to bring 
against their lawyers.  
 To be candid, this Court disagrees with the majority in Bishop. This Court finds the 
dissenting opinion to be more persuasive. However, the Idaho Supreme Court obviously 
has supervisory authority over the trial courts. This includes the authority to decide what 
types of actions in equity the Idaho courts will recognize. The Supreme Court also has a 
supervisory function over the legal profession, and deciding how to permit clients to seek 
redress from wrongs they allege they have suffered at the hands of their lawyers is part of 
that function. This Court is not free to ignore the Supreme Court’s policy decisions simply 
because this Court disagrees with them.  
 This Court acknowledges that the decision in Bishop does not squarely address the 
issue presented here. However, as best this Court can discern from Bishop, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has made a policy decision that lawyers are different. Defendant argues 
that Bishop held any suit claiming a breach of any duty arising from the attorney-client 
relationship must be brought as a claim for professional negligence. There is certainly 
language in Bishop that supports that argument. This Court is not convinced the majority in 
Bishop intended to adopt such a sweeping prohibition against clients suing their former 
lawyers. However, the language of Justice Jones’ concurring opinion says that if the duty 
alleged to have been breached is a duty established by the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct for lawyers, the client must bring the suit in negligence. See id. at 623; 272 P.3d 
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at 1254 (“Since the alleged breaches of duty for which [the client] sued [her lawyer] are 
duties emanating from the I.R.P.C., the action is tort in nature.”). Here Plaintiff’s claim is 
not in tort; it is in equity. She cannot pursue a claim in tort because she cannot prove 
damages. Absent more clear direction from the Supreme Court about the extent of its 
holding in Bishop, this Court feels compelled to conclude Plaintiff may not bring her claim 
in the Idaho courts.  
 This does not mean Plaintiff is without an avenue to redress what she calls her 
attorney’s unethical conduct. Plaintiff may complain to the Idaho Bar Association. That 
body has the power, if it chooses to do so, to sanction her attorney; including the sanction 
of requiring him to disgorge fees he was paid. From the arguments of the lawyers in this 
case, the Court infers Plaintiff has tried that route and has come away dissatisfied with the 
results. Whatever the case may be, this Court felt, and still feels, compelled by the decision 
in Bishop to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim because it fails to state a claim upon which this Court 
could grant relief. Not because of the remedy sought; but because of the duty she alleges 
was breached.  
 The motion to reconsider is DENIED. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 
       ______________________________ 
 JONATHAN MEDEMA    
 District Judge 
 
 
Signed: 7/3/2018 02:44 PM
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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
AMEND THE COMPLAINT 
 
 




 After this Court entered judgment dismissing her claim pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6), Plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint. In her motion, Plaintiff asserts 
this Court dismissed her complaint for defects in her pleading and that she has remedied 
those defects in her proposed amended complaint. While this Court discussed the language 
of the complaint in its decision regarding the motion to dismiss, this Court did not grant the 
motion due to defects in Plaintiff’s use of language. This Court granted the motion 
because, considering all the evidence presented at the motion hearing, this Court concluded 
Plaintiff simply cannot establish facts that would entitled her to relief in the Idaho courts. 
The Court explained its reasoning for that conclusion in its decision granting Defendant’s 
motion to dismiss and its decision denying Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. The Court will 
decline to do so again here. The motion to amend is DENIED.  
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 
       ______________________________ 
 JONATHAN MEDEMA    
 District Judge 
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 Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging a breach of a fiduciary duty by her former 
attorney in the course of his representation of her in divorce proceedings. The Court 
granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. Defendant then submitted a memorandum of costs seeking an 
award of mandatory costs, discretionary costs, and attorney fee costs. Plaintiff filed a 
timely motion to disallow those costs. For the reasons stated below, the Court awards the 
Defendant costs as a matter of right, but not the requested discretionary costs and not 
attorney fees.  
 
As the prevailing party, Defendant is entitled to an award for certain costs.  
 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) states that the prevailing party in an action is 
entitled to an award for certain of its costs.  Those costs are listed in Rule 54(d)(1)(C). In 
this case the only request for a cost listed in that subsection is for the filing fee. The Court 
will award that cost. Defendant is the prevailing party in this action; he was successful in 
getting the only cause of action in this matter dismissed. He is entitled to that cost as a 
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 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(D) authorizes a trial court to award to the 
prevailing party additional costs “on a showing that the costs were necessary and 
exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed 
against the adverse party.” Defendant asks for an award to compensate him for making 
photocopies of various documents in preparation for discovery proceedings in this case. 
Whether to award such costs is left to the discretion of the trial court. While expenses 
incurred in copying documents are necessary expenses in most court actions, they are 
certainly not exceptional costs in every case. There are cases, such as those cited to by the 
Defendant, where copying costs can be exceptional. This is not one of those cases. The 
Court declines to award the discretionary costs requested. The motion to disallow those 
costs is granted.  
 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) authorizes a trial court to award to the 
prevailing party the reasonable costs incurred by the party to hire his attorney. However, 
the court may award attorney fees only when provided for by statute or by contract. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). Defendant argues attorney fees are appropriate in this case under I.C. § 
12-121. That statute simply grants the judge in any civil action the ability to award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. However, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) limits the 
judge’s ability to award fees pursuant to that statute. That section of Rule 54 clarifies the 
judge may only award fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 when the judge finds the case was 
brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.  
 Defendant argues such was the case here. Defendant argues that prior decisions of 
the Idaho Supreme Court have made it clear that when a client sues her lawyer alleging her 
lawyer breached some duty owed to her that arose from their professional attorney-client 
relationship, the only cause of action the client may bring is one for professional 
negligence (i.e. malpractice). Defendant argues it is clear under Idaho law that in order to 
recover in professional negligence, a plaintiff must show damages as a result of the breach 
of the duty owed. Defendant argues that because Plaintiff never alleged damages as a result 
of the breach she claimed, Plaintiff should have known from the start that she could not 
bring this claim. Therefore, Defendant argues this claim was frivolous.  
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ORDER AWARDING COSTS - 3 
 
 As is hopefully evident from this Court’s memorandum decision granting 
Defendant’s motion, this Court does not find the issue to be that straightforward. This 
Court concludes Plaintiff’s position was based on a good faith interpretation of the 
applicable Idaho Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, the Court declines to award 
Defendant attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121. Defendant has not cited any other statute that 
would entitle him to an award of attorney fees. Therefore, the motion to disallow attorney 
fees is granted.  
 Defendant is awarded costs in the amount of $140.08. The Court will amend the 
judgment in this action to reflect that award. The motion to disallow costs is, in all other 
respects, granted.  
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 
       ______________________________ 
 JONATHAN MEDEMA    
 District Judge 
 
 
Signed: 7/3/2018 02:43 PM
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
 All of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice.  Judgment 
is entered against Plaintiff, in favor of Defendant, for costs in the amount of $140.08. 




       ______________________________ 
 JONATHAN MEDEMA    
 District Judge 
 
 
                                                          
1
 This Judgment is being amended to reflect the Court’s award of costs to Defendant. 




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -
000256
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING







DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC
ked@dukescanlan. com
adl@dukescanlan.com
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Interdepartmental Mail
(X) Electronic Mail
( )Facsimile
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid








Signed: 7/5/2018 11:09 AM
000257
__________________ 
Notice of Appeal | Page 1 
KIM J. TROUT, ISB #2468 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
3778 N. Plantation River Dr., Ste. 101 
Boise, ID  83703 
Telephone (208) 577-5755 
Facsimile (208) 577-5756 
ktrout@trout-law.com 
 
Attorney for the Plaintiff/Appellant. 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 








JAMES E. BEVIS, 
 
Defendant/Respondent. 
 Case No. CV01-17-08744 
 






   
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, JAMES E. BEVIS, AND HIS ATTORNEYS, 
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant Rebecca Parkinson appeals against the above-named respond-
ents from the Judgment entered on March 23, 2018. A copy of the judgment is attached to this no-
tice.  
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court under I.A.R. 11(a)(1), as the 
judgment described in paragraph one of this notice is an appealable judgment.  
3. Appellant makes the following preliminary statement of the issues on appeal; provided, this 
list of issues on appeal shall not prevent appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. 
a. Did the District Court err in holding that Appellant’s breach of fiduciary duty claim 
was, in essence, a professional negligence claim? 
b. Did the District Court err by dismissing Appellant’s case? 
Electronically Filed
8/15/2018 5:07 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Austen Joseph, Deputy Clerk
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c. Did the District Court err by dismissing Appellant’s case without first allowing Ap-
pellant to further amend its complaint?   
d. Did the District Court err by denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration? 
e. Did the District Court commit other errors of fact and law? 
f. In accordance with I.A.R. 17(f) this is a preliminary statement of the issues on ap-
peal, the Appellant hereby reserves the right to assert additional issues on appeal. 
4. There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record.  
5. Appellant requests the standard reporter’s transcripts as defined by I.A.R. 25, supplemented 
by the reporter’s transcripts of the following hearings and proceedings:  
a. Appellant requests that a transcript of the hearing held on February 6, 2018 before 
the Honorable Jonathan Medema be made part of the record on this appeal.  The appellant requests 
an electronic transcript. 
b. Appellant requests that a transcript of the hearing held on June 4, 2018 before the 
Honorable Jonathan Medema be made part of the record on this appeal.  The appellant requests an 
electronic transcript. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk’s record, in addi-
tion to those included under I.A.R. 28: An electronic copy of the entire District Court file. 
7. I make the following certifications:  
a. That I have served a copy of this notice of appeal on each reporter of whom a tran-
script has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Penny Tardiff 
Ada County Courthouse  
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
b. That I have paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter’s transcripts;  
c. That I have paid the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk’s record;  
d. That I have paid the applicable appellate filing fees;  
000259
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e. That I have effected service upon all parties required to be served pursuant to I.A.R. 
20. 
Dated August 15, 2018. 
 
TROUT LAW, PLLC 
 
 
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 15, 2018, a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was served as indicated below: 
 
Keely E. Duke 
ked@dukescanlan.com 
 
Aubrey D. Lyon 
adl@dukescanlan.com  
iCourt     
  
     /s/ Kim J. Trout     
Kim J. Trout 
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
 All of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are dismissed with prejudice. 




       ______________________________ 
 JONATHAN MEDEMA    
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 I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
emailed/mailed on _____________________, one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant 
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02-06-18 Motion to Dismiss 
16 
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18 for the above-referenced appeal with the District Court 
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Notice is hereby given that on October 3, 2018 , I 
lodged a transcript 25 pages in length for the 
above -referenced appeal with the District Court 
Clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REBECCA PARKINSON, 
Supreme Court Case No. 46269 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
JAMES BEVIS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 5th day of October, 2018. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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JAMES BEVIS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
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